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11 Introduction
A benevolent government that aims to increase welfare can employ various means in order to
eliminate or mitigate market failures. An important example is the use of progressive taxa-
tion in order to reduce negative consequences of uninsurable, idiosyncratic income risk. Such
interventions in the market, however, may lead to other inefficiences, since they distort house-
hold decisions. Progressive taxation, for instance, distorts the labor supply. And in addition,
it distorts the incentive to reach for higher education, as it implies a relative decrease of the
net income for higher skilled jobs. Addressing this trade-off, Krueger and Ludwig (2013) and
Krueger and Ludwig (2016) develop a quantitative model that shows that college subsidies are a
valuable tool to counteract the distorting effect of progressive taxation on educational decisions.
Thus their papers are to be seen in the intersection of two strands of literature - on the one hand
the literature on optimal income taxation and on the other hand a previously rather theoretical
literature, dealing with the optimal combination of progressive income taxes and educational
subsidies in models that abstract from idiosyncratic risk.
The extension of the work of Krueger and Ludwig, which is made in this thesis, links it
additionally to the literature on human capital production of young people.1 This literature em-
phasizes the differences in the formability of skills in the various stages of ability development
across the life-cycle, and draws attention especially to the early years. Due to the dynamic-
complementary nature of the human capital process, it is hardly possible to compensate for
missed early investments in education at later stages. Hence, when this foundation is not built
when children are young, for example, a subsequent college education will hardly be possi-
ble, regardless of its costs.2 The key contribution of this thesis is thus to expand the model of
Krueger and Ludwig by analyzing the endogenous formation of the human capital that people
1See Cunha and Heckman (2010) for a comprehensive summary of the literature on the production of skills of
young people.
2Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) dissect the skill formation process of children and estimate a multi-
stage human capital production function, taking into account the empirical facts of the literature summarized in
Cunha and Heckman (2010).
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already have when they start into their adult life. This analysis takes into account parents’ invest-
ments in primary and secondary education in response to college subsidies. These investments,
in turn, have a major impact on the effectiveness of the subsidies. Additionally, the college pro-
cess is further refined in this thesis. Students achieve a degree with a success probability that is
dependent on their human capital. Hence, with college dropouts a third qualification status is
introduced and the tertiary education process is modeled more realistically.
While early investments in human capital are very important, they differ across socioeco-
nomic groups. In this context, the literature on human capital shows a high level of persistence
of income over generations, which in addition to the inheritance of skills comes in particular
from better access to education for children of better-earning households.3 In this thesis, the
government will have the opportunity to choose over not only college subsidies but also its in-
vestments in primary and secondary education. Although intergenerational immobility is not
the focus of this thesis per se, it points to another market failure, when human capital can not
flourish because of low innate abilities, but because of the lack of financial resources of parents.4
As a result, I will show that the effectiveness of college subsidies and non-tertiary investments
are dependent on each other, and by incorporating both instruments, the government can opti-
mally balance the interplay of early and late education subsidies.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop a model that, building on the
work of Krueger and Ludwig, involves the human capital process during primary and secondary
education. In doing so, I will analyze which mechanisms from the human capital literature are
relevant to the problem at hand and where they find themselves in the model. In particular,
3Solon (2002) provides a cross-country survey of intergenerational mobility. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) dis-
sect the source of intergenerational persistence and stress the importance of early education investments. Blanke-
nau and Youderian (2015) discuss how intergenerational persistence in earnings can be explained by government
spending in early education.
4In a quantitative analysis Caucutt and Lochner (2017) show that ignoring the earlier investment responses
may lead to a significant under-estimation of the impact of college subsidies and emphasize the importance of
borrowing constraints of families at early stages. Findeisen and Sachs (2016) show that governmental education
loans to young households combined with income-contingent repayment can be designed in a Pareto optimal way.
In recent work, Lee and Seshadri (2019) underline the importance of financial frictions in early years for the
persistence of economic status.
3self-productivity and dynamic complementarity are key elements and I will show that these
concepts are incorporated in all stages of human capital development in this thesis, i.e. primary,
secondary and tertiary education.
Chapter 3 deals with the solution algorithm of the model. First, I show that the combination
of endogenous grid method and level search over the value function used in Krueger and Ludwig
(2013) leads to inaccuracies. In this thesis, an alternative solution method is developed, which
delivers accurate results. This is illustrated using a two-period model, which is first solved
analytically and then quantitatively under both solution methods. By comparing household
decisions based on different cash-on-hand levels, the solution method in Krueger and Ludwig
(2013) does not address the trade-off between consumption, savings and investments correctly
and thereby underestimates the investment choice. In addition, the region in which households
are borrowing constraint is not identified precisely, when situations occur in which savings
are zero but human capital investments are positive.5 In a second step, I extend the model of
Krueger and Ludwig (2013) by introducing taste shocks to avoid kinks in the value function and
jumps in first order conditions that would otherwise be caused by the discrete college decision.
Next, I build a bridge to Chapter 2 by showing that the model’s policy functions are consistent
with the mechanisms of the human capital literature. I conclude this part with a quick look at
the quantitative computation, in particular the parallelization of the solution algorithm, which
was necessary for this complex model to be solved in a timely manner.
In Chapter 4, the model is calibrated to the core moments of the underlying problem. In
addition to education-specific targets such as college attendance and college wage premium,
this will be about a realistic representation of the government’s budget and its expenditures
in tertiary and non-tertiary education. Similar to the previous part, I conclude this chapter by
showing that the life-cycle profiles resulting from the calibrated benchmark model are consistent
with the findings from the human capital literature.
In Chapter 5, three policy experiments are conducted in partial equilibrium, in which wages
5This applies for both the solution of optimal vivos transfers and investments in primary and secondary educa-
tion. While only the former are included in the paper of Krueger and Ludwig, in this thesis, this issue would spill
over to the human capital investment periods of parents as well.
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do not react to shifts in the labor market. Initially, the government can optimize either college
subsidies or investments in non-tertiary education, while the other policy instrument remains
at the level of the benchmark model. In both experiments, the welfare optimum is above the
current status quo. However, these two univariate experiments show, that the two policy in-
struments work through different channels. College subsidies lead to a higher aggregate human
capital as parents respond with an endogenous increase in their primary and secondary educa-
tion investments. But this does not lead to a more equal distribution of income and consumption,
since the human capital of children from education and income-poor households increases the
least by this policy measure. By contrast, higher governmental investments in non-tertiary ed-
ucation lead to an increase in human capital across all income and education groups and, in
addition to an increase in aggregate production and consumption, to a more equal distribution.
Still in partial equilibrium, I then conduct a bivariate experiment, in which the government can
determine both investments in non-tertiary education and college subsidies. It becomes appar-
ent, that the effectiveness of college subsidies depends on the level of non-tertiary education
investments - and vice versa. In a nutshell, this is because the benefits of college subsidies
can only be claimed if the young adults have the skills to successfully complete college. Early
investments lead to a high human capital level, but this potential remains unused and is not
translated into higher wages, if college education can only be afforded by a small fraction of
households. If investments are kept to a minimum, for example, one could come to the mislead-
ing conclusion that college subsidies are not an effective tool in increasing college attendance
and welfare. In the bivariate optimum of partial equilibrium, both policy instruments are above
their respective values of the benchmark model. Consequently, aggregate levels of production
and consumption are higher while their distributions are more equal than in the status quo.
In Chapter 6, I will perform the same experiments in a small open economy setup, in which
wages do react to changes in the labor market, but the interest rate remains constant.6 This
6This intermediate step allows to disentangle the effects from the labor market and the capital market. In
addition, computationally, the small open economy experiments converge much faster than the general equilibrium
experiments. This was crucial in order to perform bivariate experiments due to restrictions of high performance
computing resources.
5will allow the college wage premium to adapt to shifts in the labor market. As a result, the
differences with respect to the impact of the two policy instruments on the distribution of the
economy are less sharp than in partial equilibrium, but they continue to work thorough different
channels. Subsidies accomplish equality by a reduction in the college wage premium, while
investments in non-tertiary education not only shift aggregate human capital to a higher level,
they also accomplish a denser distribution of skills. The other results, however, are transferred
from the partial equilibrium to the small open economy: (i) the effectiveness of one policy
instrument depends on the level of the other, (ii) therefore univariate experiments can lead to
misleading results and (iii) the optimal interplay of the two policy instruments is accomplished
at a higher level for both college subsidies and non-tertiary education investments compared to
their respective values from the benchmark model, financed by a higher labor tax rate.
In Chapter 7, I will summarize the results and give an outlook on other aspects that should
be considered in future work related to this thesis.
Brief Summary of the Model Structure
The model allows the government to set up a progressive tax scheme and to use revenues to
grant college subsidies as well as to invest in early human capital. In order to analyze the
respective interactions, a life-cycle model with endogenous educational choices, labor supply
and consumption-savings decisions in presence of risky labor productivity and borrowing con-
straints is developed. Educational investments of parents into their children take place at all
stages of the child’s life-cycle. When children reach adulthood, they decide whether or not to
attend college, which relies on four key aspects. First, college education is costly, both in terms
of time and monetary resources. Second, parents can transfer resources to their children which
may relax potential financial constraints. Third, average wages of college graduates exceed
those of non-college workers. Fourth, the success probability in college and the distribution of
wages around mean wages over the life-cycle depends on the acquired human capital at the time
of the college decision.
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A benevolent government may affect all these margins through the choice of the three poli-
cies measures mentioned above: early education subsidies (primary and secondary), college
subsidies (tertiary education) and progressive income taxes. The latter provide insurance against
idiosyncratic labor productivity risk and redistribute across different types of workers, who can
differ in education and their respective productivity. However, by intervening in the tax system,
the government distorts labor supply and, given that the return on investments in human capital
is expressed in higher net wages, the distortion also affects educational decisions. The govern-
ment may mitigate the latter through education subsidies. But then the question arises, how
to optimally design an educational system. Are education subsidies sufficient to improve the
distribution of resources? How exactly do early and late education subsidies and progressive
income taxes interact?
In order to address these questions, the life-cycle model is further embedded into a macroe-
conomic framework through which general equilibrium repercussions are acknowledged, that
play an important role. For instance, increasing subsidies to tertiary education will increase the
number of college workers relative to non-college workers. In a small open economy or general
equilibrium, this increased abundance of college workers reduces the college wage premium
which has welfare enhancing redistributional implications.
Related Literature
This thesis finds itself in the intersection of different strands of the literature and can be seen
as an extension of the work of Krueger and Ludwig (2013) and Krueger and Ludwig (2016).
Krueger and Ludwig (2013) characterize the optimal policy mix of capital income taxes, pro-
gressive labor income taxes and education subsidies in a model with income risk, borrowing
constraints and endogenous human capital formation. They conclude that both the degree of tax
progressivity as well as education subsidies for college education should be higher than in the
current U.S. status quo. Krueger and Ludwig (2016) extend this earlier work by accounting for
the feedback from an increase of the share of workers with a college degree on the college wage
7premium. Through this general equilibrium feedback education subsidies are a powerful instru-
ment to achieve redistributional objectives. To mitigate distortions, tax progressivity should be
reduced, especially along the economy’s transition to a new steady state. The optimal policy
is therefore characterized by higher education subsidies and lower progressivity than under the
current status quo.
Their work is located in the intersection of two bodies of literature. First of all the litera-
ture on optimal income taxation, which examines the optimal income tax code a Ramsey type
government7 should implement in a quantitative OLG model,8 when uninsurable idiosyncratic
income risk is present9. In addition, their work is connected to a previously rather theoretical
literature, studying the optimal combination of progressive income taxes and educational sub-
sidies in models that abstract from idiosyncratic risk. By building up on the work of Krueger
and Ludwig this thesis also incorporates both these strands of literature and the references they
make.
By adding to the model the entire human capital process of primary and secondary educa-
tion, this work additionally opens up to the literature on the production of skills of young people.
Cunha and Heckmann (2010) provide a detailed overview of empirically established facts and
the mechanisms models need to incorporate in order to be able to acknowledge them.10 They
emphasize the self-productive and dynamic complementary nature of skill production, implying
that higher investments at early stages increase the return on investments in all following stages
of human capital formation. Against the background of these results, Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010) estimate a multistage human capital production function capable of taking
all of these facts into account.
These properties of human capital development pave the way for intergenerational persis-
tence of earnings.11 One measure for this persistence frequently used in the literature is the
7See Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
8See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
9See Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993, 1997) and Aiyagari (1994).
10These these facts and findings will be discussed in more detail below, when I describe how the educational
process is designed in this thesis.
11Solon (1999) starts with a very memorable illustration to highlight the importance of intergenerational per-
sistence when considering equality in a society. In a cross-sectional analysis two countries with the same Gini
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slope coefficient received by regressing log earnings of children (when they become adults) on
log earnings of parents. A general finding is a high intergenerational persistence of earnings in
the US. Following Stokey (1998) and Solon (1999) roughly 40% of the relative earnings posi-
tion is passed from parents to their children.12 At first glance, the intergenerational persistence
is more of a philosophical aspect to this thesis and the underlying research question, since my
welfare evaluation does not take intergenerational persistence into account. However, on closer
inspection it points to a second inefficiency - despite the distorting effects of a progressive tax
code - the government may address. In order to identify the reasons for intergenerational per-
sistence and cross-sectional inequality of earnings, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) set up a model
where they allow three different sources to be their main drivers: innate ability, early education
and college education. In a quantitative analysis they find that the half of the 40% of intergen-
erational persistence is accounted for by differences in early education.13,14
Looking at these results together, the question arises as to what the differences between the
primary and secondary education of children are due to. Kaushal, Magnuson and Waldfogel
(2011) arrive at the conclusion that parents in the top 20% spend 9% of their income on educa-
tional enrichment items whereas parents in the bottom income quintile only spend 3% of their
income. In a similar context Caucutt and Lochner (2017) investigate the importance of bor-
rowing constraints of families at early stages. They find that a $10, 000 increase in discounted
annual income of parents when children are at the age of zero to eleven reduces high school
drop out rates by 2.5 percentage points, while it increases college attendance by 4.6 percentage
points. Regarding the same increase at age 12 to 23 the effect is not only much smaller but also
coefficient would be considered as equal unequal. But adding the intergenerational information that in one of
these countries children end up at the exact same position in the income distribution as their parents with certainty,
whereas in the other country this is completely random, the second society would be considered as providing more
equal opportunities.
12Canada’ slope coefficient is by about 23% and Finland’s is about 22% (Solon 2002). Wiegand (1997) performs
a similar regression for Germany and arrives at a persistence of 34%.
13The other half is explained by intergenerational persistence of innate ability, whereas college education drives
the extent of cross-sectional disparity, but does not explain its origin.
14In a more recent study Blankenau and Youderian (2015) discuss how intergenerational persistence in earnings
can be reduced by government spending in early education, where they use the estimates of Cunha, Heckman and
Schennach (2010) to set up their human capital production function.
9statistically insignificant.
Caucutt and Lochner refine this result, highlighting the importance of endogenizing the human
capital process to analyze the impact of college subsidies. In a quantitative analysis they show
that ignoring the earlier investment responses may lead to a significant under-estimation of the
total wage impact of college-age investment subsidies by around 60%.15
In summary, the literature on optimal income taxation shows that the government can imple-
ment a progressive tax code to compensate inefficiencies caused by uninsurable idiosyncratic
income risk. Krueger and Ludwig have shown that college subsidies are a valuable tool to coun-
teract the distorting effects of progressive tax codes on labor and education related decisions.
However, the literature on human capital suggests that a change in college subsidies will lead to
endogenous adjustments that in turn affect their effectiveness. In addition, evidence from this
literature suggests that policies aimed at early education are the more powerful tool in shaping
skills and thereby counter intergenerational persistence, which is not due to the inheritance of
skills, but to access to education in childhood.
The contribution of this thesis to this literature is a large-scale OLG model that takes into ac-
count all core mechanisms of the human capital literature and allows for endogenous responses
within the whole human capital process of primary, secondary and tertiary education to changes
in college subsidies and non-tertiary education investments by the government. By embedding
this in a large-scale OLG environment, I am able to compare and quantify the different paths
of impact of the two policy instruments in a realistic framework. By contrasting the results of
the univariate with the bivariate policy experiments in both partial equilibrium and a small open
economy setup, the differences of the two policy measures could be highlighted very clearly. I
quantify how the interplay of the policy instruments affects distributional aspects of the econ-
omy, human capital formation, and ultimately welfare. In addition, inaccuracies of the solution
method used in Krueger and Ludwig (2013) were identified and corrected.
15Among others, in earlier work Bohacek and Kapicka (2008) and Bohacek and Kapicka (2012) allow for
endogenous human capital accumulation in models with education subsidies.
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2 A Model for the Interplay of Early and
Late Education Subsidies and Taxation
Everything that follows is based on collaborative work of Dirk Krueger, Alexander Ludwig and
myself.16,17
Large parts of the model we now develop are based on the work of Krueger and Ludwig
(2013) and Krueger and Ludwig (2016). The key difference is, that they consider human capital
at the age of the college decision to be exogenous. In our model, the formation of human
capital is a core element and is shaped by the investments of government and parents during
primary and secondary education. In addition, by introducing a stochastic college outcome,
which is dependent on the human capital of the student, we refine the tertiary education process.
Therefore, this chapter is organized as follows:
We start with a rather brief description of the parts of the model that are borrowed from Krueger
and Ludwig. We will then describe the extensions we make in great detail in Section 2.2. In
particular, it will be about demonstrating how our model approach does justice to the literature
on human capital production.
2.1 Environment
Demographics Population grows at the exogenous rate χ. We assume that parents give birth
to children at the age of j f and denote the fertility rate of households by f , both assumed to be
16We thank the participants of CMR Lunch Seminar and the Money and Macro Brown Bag Seminar at Goethe
University Frankfurt for great feedback in the early phase of this project. All stages of the project were supported
by great comments of the participants of the Reading Group on Quantitative Macroeconomics at Goethe University
Frankfurt. We also thank the participants of the CEPR Workshop Financing Human Capital and the participants
of the conference Human Capital and Financial Frictions at the Georgetown University.
17I gratefully acknowledge financial support of the Land North Rhine Westphalia.
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the same across education groups.18 Notice that f is also the number of children per household.
Further, agents live with certainty until age J. The population dynamics are then given by
Nt+1,0 = f · Nt, j f , Nt+1, j+1 = Nt, j,∀ j = 0, . . . , J − 1. (1)
Observe that the population growth rate is given by
χ = f
1
1+ j f − 1. (2)
Furthermore, we denote by ja < j f the age of adulthood (i.e., the age when children leave
the household, form an own adult household and make the college attendance decision) and
by jr > j f the retirement age ( jr − 1 is the last working age before retirement).
Technology We distinguish between workers according to their qualification q ∈ {n, c, d},
where q = n denotes non-college workers (without any attendance at college), q = c denotes
workers who completed college and q = d workers who attended but dropped out of college.
We assume that non-college workers and dropouts are perfect substitutes in production, whereas
these two types of labor are imperfectly substitutable in production with respect to college work-
ers (see Katz and Murphy (1992) and Borjas (2003)). Within each qualification-group labor is
perfectly substitutable across different ages. Let Lt,q denote aggregate labor of qualification
group q, measured in efficiency units and let Kt denote the capital stock. Total labor efficiency
units at time t, aggregated across the three qualification groups, is then given by
Lt =
(
(Lt,n + Lt,d)ρ + L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
=
(
Lρt,nd + L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
, (3)
18Note that due to the endogeneity of the education decision in the model, if we were to allow differences in the
age at which households with different education groups have children it would be hard to assume that the model
has a stationary joint distribution over age and skills.
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where Lt,nd ≡ Lt,n + Lt,d. Aggregate production follows a nested CES-Cobb-Douglas production
function, reading as
Yt = F(Kt, Lt) = Kαt (Lt)
1−α = Kαt
[(
Lρt,nd + L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]1−α
. (4)
Perfect competition among firms and constant returns to scale in the production function
imply zero profits for all firms and an indeterminate size distribution of firms. Thus, there is
no need to specify the ownership structure of firms in the household sector, and without loss of
generality we can assume the existence of a single representative firm.
This representative firm rents capital and hires the two skill types of labor on competitive
spot markets at prices rt + δ and wt,q, where rt is the interest rate, δ the depreciation rate of
capital and wt,q is the wage rate per unit of labor of qualification q. Furthermore, we denote
by kt = KtLt the “capital intensity” defined as the ratio of capital to the CES aggregate of labor.
Profit maximization of firms implies the standard conditions
rt = αkα−1t − δ, (5a)
wt,q = (1 − α)kαt
(
Lt
Lt,q
)1−ρ
= ωt
(
Lt
Lt,q
)1−ρ
, (5b)
where ωt = (1 − α)kαt is the marginal product of total aggregate labor Lt. The college wage
premium follows as
wt,c
wt,nd
=
(
Lt,nd
Lt,c
)1−ρ
(6)
and depends on the relative supplies of non-college and college dropout to college labor (un-
less ρ = 1) and the elasticity of substitution between the two types of skills.
Household Preferences Households are born at age j = 0 and form independent house-
holds at age ja, standing in for age 18 in real time. Households give birth at age j f and chil-
dren live with adult households until they form their own households. Hence for ages j =
j f , . . . , j f + ja − 1 children are present in the parental household. Parents derive utility from
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per capita consumption of all household members and leisure that are represented by a standard
time-separable expected lifetime utility function
E ja
J∑
j= ja
β j− jau
(
C j
1 + 1Jsζ f
, ` j
)
, (7)
where C j is total consumption, ` j is leisure, 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 is an adult equivalence parameter and 1Js
is an indicator function taking the value one during the period when children are living in the
respective household, that is, for j ∈ Js = [ j f , j f + ja − 1], and zero otherwise. Expectations
are taken with respect to the stochastic processes governing labor productivity risk.
We model an additional form of altruism of households towards their children. At parental
age j f , when children leave the house, the children’s expected lifetime utility enters the parental
lifetime utility function with a weight ν˜β j f , where the parameter ν˜ = ν f measures the strength
of parental altruism.19
2.2 Human Capital and College Education
We will now describe the individual components of the human capital process and their impact
on wages in our model. In Appendix A.1 we discuss in detail the facts of the human capital
literature and where they find themselves in our model. In particular, we will demonstrate
why dynamic complementarity and self-productivity (Section 2.2.3) are the key mechanisms
we need to incorporate, in order to address the underlying research question.
19Evidently the exact timing when children lifetime utility enters that of their parents is inconsequential.
2 MODEL FOR INTERPLAY OF EARLY AND LATE EDU. SUBSIDIES AND TAXATION14
2.2.1 Human Capital Process
Initial Endowments and Human Capital At birth of age j = 0 children draw their
innate ability h0 from
log(h0) = ρ log(h
p
0) +  with  ∼ N(0, σ2h0), (8)
where hp0 is innate ability of the respective child’s parents.
20 After four periods children reach
adulthood at age ja. In periods j0, . . . , ja − 1 kids receive consumption units as well as parents’
and government’s education investments (ipj and i
g
j respectively) in their human capital. Educa-
tion investments of the government are certain, known by parents and each child receives the
same amount. Human capital is acquired given a human capital production function
h j+1 = f
(
h j, i
p
j , i
g
j
)
(9)
that is assumed to be concave in investments and twice differentiable in its arguments. Govern-
mental and parental investments within a period are assumed to be perfect substitutes, implying
we can express the function in terms of total investments within a period, i.e. I j = i
p
j + i
g
j .
The human capital process according to equation (9) is completed at age ja and is expresses
in acquired human capital h ja. While it was considered exogenous in Krueger and Ludwig
(2013) and Krueger and Ludwig (2016), it is now endogenously determined and a result of a
process to which both parents and the government contribute.
College At age ja children form an adult household and have to decide whether or not to
attend college. This decision leads to one of three different qualification outcomes q ∈ {n, c, d}.
Households deciding not to attend college directly join workforce at age ja with non-college
qualification status q = n. Households attending college are enrolled from period ja to ja + 1.
20This specification is borrowed from Restuccia and Urrutia.
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We assume that they are hit by a college completion shock and succeed with likelihood pic(h ja),
which is increasing in acquired human capital, i.e., ∂pic(h ja )
∂h ja
≥ 0. This changes their qualification
status to either q = c for college graduates or to q = d for college dropouts.21 By extending the
model of Krueger and Ludwig (2013) by different outcomes of college attendance, we imple-
ment a direct link between human capital and the prospect of a college degree, which refines
the tertiary education process.
During college, students have to spend part of their time endowment for studying according
to some function ξ(h ja) with
∂ξh ja
h ja
≤ 0, i.e., higher skilled students need to spend less time for
their studies. College dropouts only get φξ(h ja) deducted from their time endowment, where
parameter φ < 1 stands in for average college enrollment of college dropouts. Further, all
students are able to work for non-college wages in order to finance consumption and college
fees, whereas the latter are proportional to average wages of high-skilled workers and are given
by κwt,c (accordingly, dropouts only have to pay φκwt,c). The government can choose to cover
a fraction θt of college costs by implementing college subsidies. In addition, a fraction θpr is
borne by private subsidies, capturing the fact that, empirically, a significant share of university
funding comes from alumni donations and support by private foundations.
2.2.2 Labor Productivity and Wages
Households with qualification q and age j earn wage
wt,q j,qγη,
where  j,q is a deterministic life-cycle earnings profile, γ stands in for the productivity type of
the household and η is an idiosyncratic shock. Recall from Section 2.1 that non-college workers
and dropouts are perfect substitutes in aggregate production so that wt,n = wt,d.
The deterministic component of life-cycle earnings  j,q will be determined from life-cycle
21Accordingly the probability to drop out of college is given by 1 − pic(h ja ).
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earnings data. With regard to the productivity component γ, we assume that the continu-
ous variable of acquired human capital h ja is mapped into qualification specific productivity
types γ ∈ Γq = {γhq, γlq}, with γhq > γlq.22 Hence, this fixed effect spreads out wages within
each education group and, once determined, is constant over the life-cycle. It is drawn at age ja
for non-college households and at age ja+1 for households going to college (i.e., both college
graduates and college dropouts), when entering the labor market. The probability of drawing
the high productivity type γhq is given by piγ(h ja) and increasing in acquired human capital h ja .
The stochastic component η is an idiosyncratic earnings shock which is mean-reverting and
follows a qualification group specific Markov chain with states Eq = {ηq1,...,ηqM } and transi-
tions piηq(η
′|η) > 0. Prior to the college decision, at age ja, η is drawn from Πn. Both college
graduates and college dropouts re-draw an initial η from Πq after college at age ja+1. Table 1
summarizes the wage processes for the different types of households at different stages of their
life-cycle.
non-college college dropout
q n c d
wage at j = ja wt,n j,nγη wt,n j,cη wt,n j,dη
college costs at j = ja - κwt,c(1 − θt − θpr) φκwt,c(1 − θt − θpr)
time loss at j = ja, ξ(h ja) - ξ(h ja) φξ(h ja)
wage at js, . . . , jr wt,n j,nγη wt,c j,cγη wt,d j,dγη
Table 1: Educational CVs
2.2.3 Dynamic Complementarity and Self-Productivity
The trio of ”Human Capital Process”, “College” and “Labor Productivity and Wages” alto-
gether describes both the process of human capital formation and the incentive for its produc-
tion, namely the return on investment in the form of resulting wages. In order for us to develop
a reliable model, this whole process has to be in line with the human capital literature, as sum-
marized in Cunha and Heckman (2007) and (2010). Besides the empirical facts, they show that
22Mapping a continuous variable into a discrete variable with only two outcomes is convenient computationally.
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a CES production function can capture the core mechanisms behind the empiricism sufficiently.
We discuss these facts and their relation to the functional form of the human capital production
in detail in Appendix A.1. Here we concentrate on the technical requirements.
Regarding equation (9), let us assume the following function:
h j+1 = f j(h j, i j) =
(
υ jh
φ j
j + (1 − υ j)
(
ψI j
)φ j) 1φ j
, (10)
with φ j , 0. Parental and governmental investments are assumed to be perfect substitutes and
summed up in I j = i
p
j + i
g
j . Using the recursive form of (10) and taking into account the four
period structure of our model, human capital at age ja, when young adults face the college
decision, is received by substituting in h ja−1, . . . , h ja−4 and we arrive at:
h ja = m(h0, I0, . . . , I3), (11)
where h0 is the innate human capital the kid was born with. Equation (11) expresses human
capital as a function of all investments during childhood ( j = 0, . . . , 3). The first key mechanism
a proper human capital exhibit is dynamic complementarity, which is defined as:
∂2 f j(h j, I j)
∂h j∂I j
> 0.
This property ensures, that when skills acquired up to current age j are higher, investments in
human capital within this period (It) yield higher returns. In addition, as h j is strictly increasing
in all past investments, that also creates a direct, positive relation between past investments to
the return on investment at current age j. Dynamic complementarity should not be confused
with decreasing marginal products, as we still have ∂
2 f j(h j,I j)
∂I j∂I j
< 0. It rather reflects the dynamic
structure of human capital formation. An example of this would be two children, both of whom
have just completed elementary school. Assuming these children are identical except for their
IQ, then the kid with higher IQ would pull more out of secondary school than the kid with lower
IQ (dynamic complementarity). On the other hand, endless learning in secondary school would
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not lead to an arbitrarily high level of human capital (decreasing marginal returns).
The second key mechanism is self-productivity. Intuitive speaking, higher stocks of skills
in one period need to create higher stocks of skills in the next period. Self-productivity arises,
when the function fulfills the following property:
∂ f j(h j, I j)
∂h j
> 0.
In the context of our model, we have to distinguish two phases. Primary and secondary edu-
cation are taking place during the first four model periods, in which human capital is devel-
oped according to a function in the spirit of (10). Thus, we remain in the standard notion of
the human capital literature and skill development exhibits both dynamic complementarity and
self-productivity. However, it does get more complicated when we look at college education.
In our design, it is rather complicated to work with derivatives the way Cunha and Heckman
(2007) do. Nevertheless, the basic idea should remain, implying that investing in a possible
college degree should follow the core mechanisms of human capital formation.
As opposed to primary and secondary education, a successful college degree is not expressed
in a higher skill level h ja. Instead, it translates into a higher wage after college. In addition,
college completion and drawing the productivity type is risky in our model and we therefore
work with expectations over both mechanisms. The preservation of self-productivity in tertiary
education is straightforward: higher skills h ja lead to a higher (expected) human capital level,
which is reflected in a higher expectation of both college completion and drawing productivity
type γh.
In order to be able to address dynamic complementarity, we first have to define the return on
education during the college period. As mentioned, unlike in primary and secondary education,
a higher skill level after college directly translates into higher wages. Thus, we denote as return
for college attendance the expected wage increase, i.e. the expected difference between wages
after attending college and the outside option of directly joining the labor market. The idea
of dynamic complementarity is retained, if attending college yields to a higher expected wage
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increase for households with higher skill levels. We abstract from idiosyncratic shocks as well
as the qualification specific age profiles ( j,q). The former is independent from human capital
and the latter will be normalized and only differ in shape for different qualifications. Further, we
abstract from time costs ζ(h ja) reflecting opportunity costs of studying, which effects the return
on attending college and is dependent of acquired ability. However, it is monotone decreasing
in h ja and therefore not in conflict with the unambiguity of (12). The expected wage increase
per period of an agent with acquired ability level h ja is the following:
E
[
4w(h ja)
]
=pic(h ja)
[
(1 − piγ(h ja))γlc + piγ(h ja)γhc
]
wt,c + (1 − pic(h ja))
[
(1 − piγ(h ja))γln + piγ(h ja)γhn
]
wt,n
−
[
(1 − piγ(h ja))γln + piγ(h ja)γhn
]
wt,n
=pic(h ja)
[
γlc + piγ(h ja)(γ
h
c − γlc)
]
wt,c − pic(h ja)
[
γln + piγ(h ja)(γ
h
n − γln)
]
wt,n
=pic(h ja)
[(
γlc + piγ(h ja)(γ
h
c − γlc)
)
wt,c −
(
γln + piγ(h ja)(γ
h
n − γln)
)
wt,n
]︸                                                                      ︷︷                                                                      ︸
:=wˆ(h ja )
. (12)
The first line shows the expected wage after college for an agent of type h ja , while the sec-
ond line denotes the expected wage of non-college agents. Uncertainty has two sources23 for
students. Before starting their studies, they do not know whether they will finish college suc-
cessfully. In addition, they are unaware of the productivity shock they will draw, which also
applies for non-college workers. We were able to collapse the equation, as we assume the
wages and productivity types for dropouts and non-college agents to be the same. Further, we
will assume that piγ(h ja) is following the same distribution for skilled and unskilled labor.
24
Regarding equation (12), pic(h ja) is clearly increasing in human capital. In order for the
remaining piece of (12) to be unambiguously increasing in h ja , we need
∂4wˆ(h ja )
∂h ja
> 0, which we
23We are still abstracting from the idiosyncratic shock, which is not important for the expected wage increase.
24It is worth noticing that there will be higher overall wages for dropouts in the calibrated version of the model,
which will be driven by higher abilities of dropouts compared to non-college agents and therefore higher average
productivity realizations.
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can express as:
∂4wˆ(h ja)
∂h ja
=
∂piγ(h ja)
∂h ja
(γhc − γlc)wt,c −
∂piγ(h ja)
∂h ja
(γhn − γln)wt,n
=
∂piγ(h ja)
∂h ja
(
(γhc − γlc)wt,c − (γhn − γln)wt,n
)
. (13)
Thus, for (13) to be positive for all h ja types, it is necessary that the wage spread within a
qualification group, weighted with the respective average wage is higher for college graduates,
i.e. (γhc − γlc)wt,c > (γhn − γln)wt,n. This condition will be established in the calibration. However,
the empirical background is straightforward: wt,c > wt,n reflects a positive wage premium
wt,c
wt,n
of
1.8 in the data.25
The different sources of risk make it possible for a household with lower human capital to
receive a larger wage than a household with higher human capital. This is intended and in line
with reality. However, what is important to properly model the mechanisms of human capital
production is an expected wage increase which is positively dependent on human capital - ex
ante dynamic complementarity, if you will - which our model captures.
2.3 Market Structure
We assume that financial markets are incomplete in that there is no insurance available against
idiosyncratic and productivity labor income shocks. Households can self-insure against this risk
by accumulating a risk-free one-period bond that pays a real interest rate of rt. In equilibrium
the total net supply of this bond equals the capital stock Kt in the economy, plus the stock of
outstanding government debt Bt.
Furthermore, we severely restrict the use of credit to self-insure against idiosyncratic labor
productivity and thus income shocks by imposing a strict credit limit. The only borrowing we
permit is to finance a college education. Households that borrow to pay for college tuition and
consumption while in college face age-dependent borrowing limits of A j,t (whose size depends
25In the calibrated benchmark model, equation (13) will take a value of 0.1848.
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on the degree to which the government subsidizes education) and also face the constraint that
their balance of outstanding student loans cannot increase after college completion. This as-
sumption rules out that student loans are used for general consumption smoothing. College
dropouts are only allowed to borrow up to φA j,t.
The constraints A j,t are set such that student loans need to be fully repaid by retirement at
age jr, which also insures that households can never die in debt. Beyond student loans we rule
out borrowing altogether. This, among other things, implies that non-college households can
never borrow. As the calibration of the model will make clear, we think of the constraints A j,t
being determined by public student loan programs, and thus one may interpret the borrowing
limits as government policy parameters that are being held fixed in our analysis.
2.4 Government Policies
The government needs to finance an exogenous stream Gt of non-education expenditures and
an endogenous stream Et of education expenditures, financing both early (non-tertiary) and late
(tertiary) education. It can do so by issuing government debt Bt, by levying linear consump-
tion taxes τc and income taxes Tt(yt) which are not restricted to be linear. The initial stock of
government debt B0 is given. We restrict attention to a tax system that discriminates between
the sources of income (capital versus labor income), taxes capital income rtAt at the constant
rate τk,t, but permits labor income taxes to be progressive or regressive. We take consumption
and capital income tax rates τc, τk,t as exogenously given, but optimize over labor income tax
schedules within a simple parametric class.
Specifically, the total amount of labor income taxes paid takes the following simple linear
form
Tt(yt) = max
{
0, τl,t
(
yt − dt YtNt
)}
= max{0, τl,t (yt − Zt)}, (14)
where yt is household taxable labor income, YtNt is per capita income in the economy and Zt = dt
Yt
Nt
measures the size of the labor income tax deduction. Therefore, for every period there are two
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policy parameters on the tax side (τl,t, dt). Note that the tax system is potentially progressive
(if dt > 0) or regressive (if dt < 0).
The government uses tax revenues to finance education subsidies to tertiary education, θt, to
early childhood education, ig0,t, . . . , i
g
ja−1,t and exogenous government spending
Gt = gy · Yt,
where the share of output gy = GtYt commanded by the government is a parameter to be calibrated
from the data.26
In addition, the government administers a pure pay-as-you-go social security system that
collects payroll taxes τss,t and pays benefits pt, j(γ, q), which depend on the wages a household
has earned during her working years, and thus on her characteristics (γ, q) as well as on the time
period in which the household retired (which, given today’s date t can be inferred from the cur-
rent age j of the household). In addition, the introduction of social security is helpful to obtain
more realistic life-cycle saving profiles and an empirically more plausible wealth distribution.
Since the part of labor income that is paid by the employer as social security contribution is
not subject to income taxes, taxable labor income equals (1−0.5τss,t) per dollar of labor income
earned, i.e.
Yt = (1 − 0.5τss,t)wt,qγη j,q`. (15)
2.5 Time Line
(i) A child is born at age j = 0 with innate ability h0, drawn from a distribution that is
dependent on parental innate ability, hp0 .
(ii) Childhood is described by ages j0, . . . , ja − 1 during which the human capital accumu-
26Once we turn to the determination of optimal tax and subsidy policies we will treat G rather than gy as constant.
A change in policy changes output Yt and by holding G fixed we assume that the government does not respond to
the change in tax revenues by adjusting government spending (if we held gy constant it would).
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lation process takes place. Parents decide on their investments into the education of their
children as well as the per capita consumption of the household.
(iii) Turning ja-years old, children form an own adult household and make the college de-
cision. Prior to the decision parents make inter-vivos transfers B, based on children’s
acquired ability h ja and innate ability h0. After these transfers have been made, children
draw η from Πn(η) and make their college decision based on the state variables { ja, A =
B/(1 + r(1 − τk)), h0, h ja , η}. After the decision is made non-college children (from now
on households) draw the fixed effect γ and start working. Households attending college
draw the college completion shock, which depends on acquired human capital h ja . Col-
lege dropouts pay fewer college fees, face tighter borrowing limits and lower time losses
from studying, all of which stands in for the shorter time period they attend college (which
reflects the subperiod structure of the model at age ja for households that attend college).
Given time losses, both groups can work for non-college wages during their studies until
age ja + 1.
(iv) At age ja + 1 college graduates and dropouts draw their productivity shock from a distri-
bution contingent on qualification and acquired human capital and redraw their idiosyn-
cratic income shock from a college specific distribution, η ∈ Πq(η). Ages between ja + 1
and j f −1 can be summarized as working without children: qualification q, productivity
type γ, age-productivity profile  j,q, and idiosyncratic shock η determine wages, wt,qγη j,q,
and households face a standard labor-leisure choice in every period. This will change be-
tween j f − 1 and j f when children enter the utility function.
(v) The age between j f , . . . , j f + ja − 1 is referred to as working as parents of children. At
the beginning of period j f kids enter the household and draw their innate ability based
on the innate ability of parents following (8). Parents then maximize over per capita con-
sumption of the household, their labor supply and their investments into their children’s
human capital, i.e. ipj=0, . . . , i
p
ja−1. Hence, a change of state variables takes place: par-
ent’s innate human capital is replaced by the innate human capital of their children and
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acquired human capital of the child is added.27
(vi) When parents are at the age of j f + ja their children become adults. Observing the
acquired human capital of their children parents transfer monetary resources B to their
kids (inter-vivos transfer). Parents draw utility from the expected value function of their
children at that age according to the altruism parameter ν˜. After that children are no
longer part of parents’ value functions, implying the state space is reduced by hc0 and h
c
ja
.
(vii) While working as parents of adults at ages j f + ja + 1, . . . , jr − 1 the model reduces to
a standard consumption, labor-leisure choice model.
(viii) During retirement at ages jr, . . . , J households receive income from savings and social
security pt, j(q, γ), which is dependent on their labor characteristics.
The timeline of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
27The innate human capital of the child is still relevant, as its future children will draw their innate ability from
it.
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Figure 1: Time Line
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3 Solving the Household Problem
In our model, households live through various stages and are facing different maximization
problems, which we will now display recursively. Part of these periods can be solved by the
standard endogenous grid method by Carroll (2005). This includes all ages in which house-
holds only have to deal with a labor-leisure and savings choice. Given the tax code (14) we use,
there is different regions with respect to labor taxes. A detailed description of the household
problem, first order conditions as well as the computational solution method that is being used
can be found in Appendix B.1.
In period j f , . . . , j f + ja−1 parents are shaping kids’ human capital h through investments ipk
into h′, while in period jt inter-vivos transfers B constitute kid’s assets at the college decision.
Therefore, in both cases the endogenous grid method by Carroll (2005) needs to be extended.
In Section 3.2 we will show that a hybrid method combining (i) the endogenous grid method
for the savings, labor and consumption decision with (ii) maximizing over the level of the value
function for optimal investments or inter-vivos transfers is not feasible. We will develop an
alternative that delivers accurate results.
In addition, in Section 3.3, we extend the model of Krueger and Ludwig (2013) by taste
shocks in order to avoid kinks in the value function and jumps in first order conditions, which
are caused by the discrete college decision.
3.1 Recursive Problem of Households
Childhood at j = 0, . . . , ja − 1. Children draw innate ability h0 according to (8). During
childhood kids consume and receive parental (ipj=0, . . . , i
p
ja−1) and governmental (i
g
j=0, . . . , i
g
ja−1)
investments, which we sum up to I j=0, . . . , I ja−1.
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College decision at ja. Children become adults and form own households. Their acquired
human capital is stored as the period ja value of the endogenous state variable h. Before making
the college decision, a child receives an inter-vivos transfer B from parents (leading to assets
A = B/(1 + r(1− τk))).28 Next, children draw the idiosyncratic productivity shock η. Therefore,
the state space at age ja is given by { ja, A, h0, h, η}. Initial human capital, h0, is part of the state
space, because it is linked to the innate human capital of future children. In order to store the
college decision, we denote by λ the following indicator function:
λ( ja, A, h0, h, η) =

1 if Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, A, h0, h,¬n, η)] > Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [V ( ja, A, h0, n, η)]
0 otherwise.
(16)
Youngsters attending college are subject to the completion shock described by (32). Non-
college households draw the productivity shock γ ∼ pi(γ, n) already at age ja, whereas college
households (q = c and q = d) draw it in period ja + 1. Therefore, the expected value functions
at age ja write explicitly:
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, A, h0, h,¬n, η)] = pic(h) [V ( ja, A, h0, h, c, η)] + . . .
· · · + (1 − pic(h)) [V ( ja, A, h0, h, d, η)] ,
and
Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h
[
V ( ja, A, h0, n, η)
]
= piγ(h)
[
V
(
ja, A, h0, h, n, γh, η
)]
+ . . .
· · · + (1 − piγ(h))
[
V
(
ja, A, h0, h, n, γl, η
)]
.
Households with λ( ja, A, h0, h, η) = 1 will attend college and out of these households, a frac-
tion 1 − pic(h) will dropout from college.
28For all ages j > ja assets A brought into the period generate gross revenue (1 + r(1 − τk))A. Given our timing
assumption inter-vivos transfers B generate gross revenue of B. Thus the initial asset state of households of age ja
is A = B/(1 + r(1 − τk)).
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As described above, college graduates and college dropouts have to spend different amounts
of time for studying, pay different fees and are subject to different borrowing constraints. To
simplify notation we define by
Ψ(q) =

1 if q = c
φ if q = d
0 if q = n
implying that, depending on their qualification status, households spend time Ψ(q)ξ(h) for
studying, pay college fees Ψ(q)(1−θt−θpr)κwt,c and are allowed to borrow up to a limit Ψ(q)A j,t.
College period ja until ja + 1. Non-college households draw their productivity type γ and
join the workforce. Their dynamic problem then reads as
V ( ja, A, h0, n, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1]
A′≥0
{
u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( ja + 1, A′, h0, n, γ, η′)]} ,
subject to
(1 + τc)C + A′ + Tt(Yt) = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt,nγη j,n`,
where we defined Rnt = 1 + (1 − τk,t)rt and took Yt from (15).
The problem of households in college reads as
V ( ja, A, h0, h, q, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1−Ψ(q)ξ(h)]
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{u(C, 1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h) − `)+
βEγ|h,η′∈Πq(η′)
[
V ′
(
ja, A′, h0, q, γ, η′
)]}
,
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subject to
(1 + τc)C + A′ + Ψ(q)(1 − θt − θpr)κwt,c + Tt(Yt) = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt,nη j,q`.
Expectations are formed with respect to γ the agent will draw given q and h as well as η redrawn
from initial distribution Πq(η′).
Working without children at ja + 1, . . . , j f − 2. The state space of all households is now
given by { j, A, h0, q, γ, η}. The problem reads as:
V ( j, A, h0, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1]
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{
u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, h0, q, γ, η′)]}
subject to
(1 + τc)C + A′ + Tt(Yt) = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt,qγη j,q`.
Preparing for parenthood at j f − 1. At this stage the “soon-to-be” parents have to form
expectations about the initial human capital their children will be born with (h′0):
V ( j, A, h0, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1−`]
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{
u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η,h′0 |h0
[
V ′
(
j + 1, A′, h′0, h
′, q, γ, η′
)]}
subject to
(1 + τc)C + A′ + Tt(Yt) = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt,qγη j,q`.
As soon as parents’ innate ability is mapped into innate ability of their children according to
equation (8), h0 is replaced by the human capital of their children, h′0. The latter matters for two
reasons: (i) it becomes part of the human capital process and (ii) it determines innate ability
of future grandchildren. Also note that at birth acquired human capital equals innate human
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capital (implying h′0 = h
′ in V ′).
Working as parents of children at j f , . . . , j f + ja − 1. In this period, children are living
in the household and parents maximize utility from per capita consumption, own leisure and
investments into their children. When the parent is of age j, the children living in the household
are of age jk = j− j f . Now, the additional state variable relevant to the household is the acquired
human capital of children at age jk, which is stored in the current period state variable h. Fur-
thermore, initial human capital of children, now denoted as h0, continuous to be an element of
the state space, because it determines the innate ability of grandchildren. The problem therefore
reads as:
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1]
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
ipk≥0
{
u
(
C
1 + ζ f
, 1 − `
)
+ . . .
· · · + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, h0, h′, q, γ, η′)]} ,
subject to
(1 + τc)C + A′ + Tt(Yt) + i
p
k f = R
n
t A + (1 − τss)wt,qγη j,q`,
where human capital accumulation follows (9).29
Children become adults at j f + ja. Before children leave the household they receive inter-
vivos transfers B from their parents which determines their initial assets A = B/(1 + r(1 − τk)).
Parents can perfectly observe the innate ability h0 of their children as well as their acquired
human capital at the child’s age ja. The shock η′ on children’s earnings realizes after the inter-
29Human capital investments are made to each of the f children within a household, which is why ipk has to be
scaled by f in the budget constraint.
3.1 Recursive Problem of Households 31
vivos transfer decision has been made:
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],B≥0
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{
u (C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)]}
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, A, h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [V ( ja, A, h0, n, η)]}] ,
subject to
(1 + τc)C + A′ + B f + Tt(Yt) = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt,qγη j,q`.
Working as parents of adults at ja+ j f , . . . , jr−1. When children have left the household,
the state space collapses to ( j, A, q, γ, η). Despite the missing initial human capital, h0, the
problem is identical to the one at ages ja + 1, . . . , j f − 2. Lifetime utility of the children is no
longer part of parents’ utility (which causes a discontinuity in the value function).
Retirement at jr, . . . , J. Households receive pension payments and income from savings.
Debt from college is fully repaid. The maximization problem now reads as:
V ( j, A, q, γ) = max
C,A′≥0
{
u(C, 1) + βV ′
(
j + 1, A′, q, γ
)}
subject to
(1 + τc)C + A′ = Rnt A + pt, j(q, γ).
Productivity type and qualification are still part of the state vector as they determine pension
benefits.
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3.2 Hybrid Solution Methods
In this chapter we will show, by comparing decisions based on different cash-on-hand levels,
that the solution method used in Krueger and Ludwig (2013)30 does not address the trade-off
between consumption, savings and investments correctly. Thereby it systematically underes-
timates the investment choice. In addition, the region in which households are borrowing
constraint is not identified correctly, when situations occur in which savings are zero but in-
vestments are positive.
At ages j f , . . . , j f + ja − 1 parents are nurturing kids’ human capital h, shaping it through
investments ipk into h
′, while in period jt, inter-vivos transfers B constitute kids’ assets at the
college decision. Both cases make an extension of the endogenous grid method by Carroll
(2005) necessary. Moreover, given the recursive structure of the model, our solution approach
has to deal with the issue that both the value function and its derivative regarding inter-vivos
transfers and investments are unknown at this point.
In Appendix B.2 and B.3 we describe two hybrid methods, searching for optimal decisions
within these periods. The first one is borrowed from Krueger and Ludwig (2013) and is com-
bining (i) the endogenous grid method for the consumption, leisure and savings decision with
(ii) maximizing over the level of the value function in order to find optimal investments or vivos
transfers (HybLevEndo hereafter). The second method, developed in thesis, also maximizes
over the level of the value function for optimal investments and vivos transfers, but it replaces
the endogenous grid method in step (i) by the exogenous grid method (HybLevExog hereafter).
Although essentially following the same idea, we will show that only HybLevExog delivers
accurate results. By comparing decisions based on different cash-on-hand levels, HybLevEndo
does not examine the trade-off between consumption, savings and investments correctly. In
order to illustrate the deviating outcomes and their origin, in Section 3.2.1 we develop a simple
30Please note that as Krueger and Ludwig (2013) do not model human capital investments, this issue does only
appear in the period of inter-vivos transfers in their model. However, in this thesis, the problem would also occur
in periods in which parents invest in the human capital of their children.
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two period model and derive its analytic solution. In Section 3.2.2 we then solve this model
numerically under both methods and compare their respective results.
3.2.1 Analytical Solution of a Two-Period Model
We consider a two period model in which households receive utility from consumption in both
periods and investments in the first period. The latter is weighted with altruism parameter ν < 1.
In period 0, households start with cash-on-hand X ≥ X, where X > 0 is some minimum cash-on-
hand level implied by the exogenous income process, while in period 1 they receive exogenous
income B ≥ 0. Households split their assets among the two periods in order to maximize the
sum of utility from consumption and investments:
u = ln(C0) + ln(C1) + ν ln(i0 + i¯) (17)
A′0 = X −C0 − i0
C1 = A′0 + B
A′0 ≥ 0
i0 ≥ 0.
In the absence of interest rate and discount factor, combined with a concave utility function,
households will try to choose C0 = C1. At the same time there will be a threshold at some C0 =
C1 > 0 at which uc becomes sufficiently small relative to ui so that the household starts choosing
i0 > 0. Investments i0 and savings A′0 have to be non-negative. Governmental investments i¯ can
be understood as some minimum level, provided by the state. That way we induce that optimal
investment decisions might be zero, standing in for a situation in which parents are poor and
children are rich (in terms of human capital), such that parents will choose to investment i0 = 0.
Apparently, the combination of X and B determines whether or not the household is borrowing
constraint (A′0 ≥ 0 is binding). In addition, the household will either choose to invest i0 ≥ 0 or
be bound by this restriction (because the optimal unconstraint investment would be i∗0 < 0).
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We start by examining the situation in which the constraint A′0 ≥ 0 is not binding. By
substituting C1 = A′0 + B = X −C0 − i0 + B we can rewrite the maximization problem as:
u = ln(C0) + ln(X + B − (C0 + i0)) + ν ln(i0 + i¯)
i0 ≥ 0.
The first-order condition for this interior solution with respect to consumption is
1
C0
=
1
X + B − (C0 + i0) , (18)
while the first-order condition with respect to investments reads as
1
X + B − (C0 + i0) = ν
1
i0 + i¯
. (19)
Now, by rewriting (18) and (19) we get:
C0 =
X + B − i0
2
(20)
C0 = X + B − 1 + ν
ν
i0 − i¯
ν
. (21)
Equating (20) with (21) leads to:
i0 =
ν(X + B) − 2i¯
2 + ν
. (22)
Having a closer look at the numerator, we can make the following case distinction:
(i) X + B < 2 i¯
ν
: In this case i0 ≥ 0 is binding and i?0 = 0, while, following (20), the interior
solution for consumption would be C0 = C1 = X+B2 and A
′
0 =
X−B
2 . Hence, we get the
following sub-cases:
(a) X < B. Then C0 = X, C1 = B, i0 = 0, A′0 = 0.
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(b) X ≥ B. Then C0 = C1 = X+B2 and A′0 = X−B2 .
(ii) X + B ≥ 2 i¯
ν
: Then i?0 is given by (22). Using this in (20) we get
C0 = C1 =
X + B + i¯
2 + ν
. (23)
and A′0 is given by
A′0 =
X − (1 + ν)B + i¯
2 + ν
. (24)
Again, the relation of X and B determines in which sub-case the household is:
(a) X < (1 + ν)B − i¯: The constraint household is forced to choose A′0 = 0 and C1 = B.
However, she will hold on to the intra-temporal Euler equation between consump-
tion and investment which is given by:
1
C0
= ν
1
i0 + i¯
and therefore
C0 =
1
ν
(
i0 + i¯
)
. (25)
Plugging this into the budget constraint X = C0 + i0, we get
X =
1
ν
i¯ +
1 + ν
ν
i0
⇔ i0 = νX − i¯1 + ν .
This leaves us with two new sub-cases:
1. X < i¯
ν
: Then i0 = 0 and C0 = X.
2. X ≥ i¯
ν
: Then i0 = νX−i¯1+ν and C0 follows from the intra-temporal Euler equa-
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tion (25):
C0 =
X + i¯
1 + ν
. (26)
(b) X ≥ (1 + ν)B − i¯: This could be referred to as the real interior solution. Optimal
investments i?0 are given by (22) and C
?
0 as well as C
?
1 are given by (23), while A
′?
0
is described by (24).
Summing up, this simple model leaves us with five sub-cases. First, for low combinations
of X and B, we are in a region in which uc dominates ui, so that households are not yet investing.
However, the question is whether the household chooses C0 = C1 voluntarily (case (i.a)), which
is the case for X ≥ B, or whether she is borrowing constraint (case (i.b)) and forced to set
C0 = X as well as C1 = B. Second, there is cases in which the sum of X and B is high
enough in order for uc to loose its dominance over ui, but first period resources X are relatively
small compared to second period resources B, tying the household to the borrowing constraint.
Whether or not (cases ii.a.1 and ii.a.2) the household invests in this situation is determined by
the intra-temporal Euler equation. However, it is worth noticing that the latter is a situation in
which the household is borrowing constraint and investing at the same time. Lastly, in case
resources are high and X is relatively large compared to B, the household is completely in the
interior solution (case (ii.b)). Figure 2 displays four different scenarios with respect to second
period exogenous income B. Driven by first period resources X (x-axis), the various areas are
traversed.
3.2.2 Endogenous vs. Exogenous Hybrid Method
The full algorithms of HybLevExog and HybLevEndo are described in Appendix B.3 and Ap-
pendix B.4 respectively. In the main part, we want to focus on the key difference between the
two methods, which essentially boils down to two aspects: HybLevEndo does not address the
trade-off between consumption, savings and investments correctly and thereby systematically
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Figure 2: Decisions as a Function of Cash-On-Hand (COH)
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underestimates the investment choice. In addition, HybLevEndo has troubles to find the region
in which households are borrowing constraint.
Before we can examine this in detail, we first have to briefly recall how endogenous grid
method algorithms operate. An exogenous savings grid is generated and, given the recursive
structure of the model, for each of these savings grid points, the part of the Euler equation related
to the next period is automatically determined (see for example first-order-condition (67) given
cash-on-hand definition (45)). Therefore, only consumption and leisure of the current period
have to be adjusted accordingly, such that the first-order-condition is balanced and the respective
savings grid point is in fact the optimal choice. The sum of decisions (consumption, leisure and
savings) endogenously determines cash-on-hand via the budget constraint, which in turn pins
down the corresponding asset level (which is important for the second difference explained
below).
First-Order-Conditions
Now investments come into play, and thus a second variable, in addition to savings, affects
the part of the Euler equation that is related to the next period. The question arises how both
investments (or inter-vivos transfers respectively) and savings can be pinned down together and
how a corresponding investment grid can be spanned. Krueger and Ludwig (2013) redefine the
exogenous savings grid points as gross savings (A¯′0 = A
′
0 + i0), and each grid point is assigned
a corresponding investment grid Gi0 = {0, . . . , i¯0} with i¯0 = A¯.31 Thereby the savings grid point
fixes the sum of savings and investments, for which the optimal combination is then searched.
As mentioned above, we also have to deal with the fact that we neither know the value
function, nor its derivative with respect to inter-vivos transfers or human capital investments
(see equations (60) and (64) for the respective vivos transfers of vivos and investments). To
solve this problem, we guess the kid’s value function and solve by iterating over the resulting fix
point problem, which we describe in Appendix B.1.3. Thus, searching for the optimal solution,
31For the sake of simplicity we assume a borrowing constraint of zero for now. The detailed version can be
found in Appendix B.4.2.
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given a fixed exogenous gross savings grid point A¯′0 = A
′
0 + i0, works as follows:
We assume to be back in the two period model described above. Further, we abstract from
the fix point problem (equation (17) is known). Given an exogenous income of B = 0 (Figure
2(a)) implies that the household cannot be borowing constraint. Let us suppose we search for
the optimal choices for exogenous gross savings A¯′0 = 10. First of all, the corresponding grid
Gi0 = {0, . . . , i¯0 = 10} would be spanned. Given investments i¯0 consumption tomorrow is
determined by C1 = A′0 + B = A¯
′
0 − i0 + 0. By the first order condition between savings and
consumption today, we further know that C0 = C1, implying C0 = A′0. HybLevEndo would now
evaluate the resulting utility levels for all investment grid points in Gi0 as displayed in Table 2.
i0 A C0 C1 X u uc ui
0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 4.95 0.10 0.25
1.11 8.89 8.89 8.89 18.89 4.94 0.11 0.16
2.22 7.78 7.78 7.78 17.78 4.82 0.13 0.12
3.33 6.67 6.67 6.67 16.67 4.63 0.15 0.09
4.44 5.56 5.56 5.56 15.56 4.36 0.18 0.08
5.56 4.44 4.44 4.44 14.44 3.99 0.23 0.07
6.67 3.33 3.33 3.33 13.33 3.49 0.30 0.06
7.78 2.22 2.22 2.22 12.22 2.74 0.45 0.05
8.89 1.11 1.11 1.11 11.11 1.40 0.90 0.05
10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 - - 0.04
Table 2: HybLevEndo and A¯ = 10 (B = 0, i¯ = 2, ν = 0.5)
Table 2 identifies the underlying problem: (i) HybLevEndo evaluates utilities based on dif-
ferent cash-on-hand levels X and (ii) the lower the investment, the higher the endogenous cash-
on-hand level. The chain of events leading to this pattern is the following: given the gross
savings definition, smaller investments lead to higher net savings (which are interchangeably
with C1 in this two period model). Via the first-order condition between savings (C1) and con-
sumption (C0), this also leads to higher consumption in period 0. Thus, a decrease in i0 increases
both C0 and C1. In other words, the smaller the investment, the larger will be resources X that
can be divided among C0,C1 and i0. Thereby HybLevEndo overestimates the importance of
consumption and savings relative to investments.
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As can bee seen in Figure 2(a), roughly at a cash-on-hand level of X = 8, optimal invest-
ments start to be positive, while Table 2 shows that HybLevEndo would still return an optimal
investment of zero for much higher values of X = 10. Thus, fist-order-conditions between uc
and ui would be needed, in order for HybLevEndo to evaluated the situations correctly. A solver
searching in the neighborhood of the falsely identified utility maximum cannot find the correct
solution. Table 3 shows that HybLevEndo would only exhibits positive investments for very
high exogenous gross savings grid points.
i0 A C0 C1 X u uc ui
0.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 28.00 5.62 0.07 0.25
1.56 12.44 12.44 12.44 26.44 5.68 0.08 0.14
3.11 10.89 10.89 10.89 24.89 5.59 0.09 0.10
4.67 9.33 9.33 9.33 23.33 5.42 0.11 0.08
6.22 7.78 7.78 7.78 21.78 5.16 0.13 0.06
7.78 6.22 6.22 6.22 20.22 4.80 0.16 0.05
9.33 4.67 4.67 4.67 18.67 4.29 0.21 0.04
10.89 3.11 3.11 3.11 17.11 3.55 0.32 0.04
12.44 1.56 1.56 1.56 15.56 2.22 0.64 0.03
Table 3: HybLevEndo and A¯ = 14 (B = 0, i¯ = 2, ν = 0.5)
Having identified this problem of HybLevEndo, we developed the alternative solving algo-
rithm HybLevExog. The starting point of each computation is today’s resources X. In this way,
the comparison of household choices is always based on the same cash-on-hand level. As a
result, savings and investment are weighed on the same basis, and their respective first-order-
conditons are taken into account implicitly. To illustrate the results in detail, we performed
a computational exercise, in which the two period model is solved under the two different
approaches. Figure 3 summarizes results for a scenario with exogenous income in period 1
of B = 3 (red dots show numerical results, black dots represent the analytic solution). The
left hand side displays results for investments, savings and period 0 consumption under Hy-
bLevEndo, whereas the right hand side shows their respective counterpart under HybLevExog.
While HybLevEndo underestimates the effect of investments and thereby chooses values for
consumption and savings that are too high, HybLevExog matches the analytic solution derived
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in the previous section.
Borrowing Constraint
Now we get to the second issue. One crucial part for the accuracy of the endogenous grid
method in light of borrowing constraints is to determine where they start to be binding for the
household. In order to find this border, the lowest exogenous savings grid point is set to the
borrowing constraint and the corresponding solution is then evaluated (this is shown in detail
in Appendix B.2.1). The definition of gross savings A¯′0 = A
′
0 + i0 makes that harder, as we can
see from Figure 2(d) that situations can occur, in which the household is borrowing constraint,
but still chooses i0 > 0. This problem does not exist with HybLevExog. The region in which
the borrowing constraint is binding for the household is determined by the endogenous choice
of savings, which is disconnected from the investment decision.
Nevertheless, the occurrence of the borrowing constraints leads to a special case, in which
also HybLevEndo delivers accurate results. If the borrowing constraint is always binding (B =
15), then the inter-temporal first-order-condition becomes obsolete. Thus, HybLevEndo weighs
up consumption against investments based on the same cash-on-hand level - basically as Hy-
bLevExog does - and identifies the right solution.
Figure 4 shows results under two special scenarios, i.e. always and never borrowing con-
straint, in order to disentangle the general inaccuracy from issues with the borrowing constraint.
In summary, HybLevEndo only delivers accurate results when the household is always borrow-
ing constraint (Figure 4 (a) and (b)), but it does not start working if we set off the borrowing
constraint (Figure 4 (c) and (d)), which is due to the issues described in this chapter.
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Figure 3: Savings and Investments Under Different Solution Methods
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Figure 4: HybLevEndo in Special Scenarios
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3.3 Taste Shocks at College Decision
The fist economic action of an household is the college choice. The young adult decides based
on her innate and acquired human capital, her assets received as vivos transfers from her parents
and the idiosyncratic shock she has drawn. Looking at an agent with a sufficiently high human
capital, we can split her decision in two parts: low assets imply a more demanding working life,
which makes an increased wage and thereby attending college more valuable. The richer she is
in terms of assets, the lower the importance of labor income and at some asset level the value
function of not attending college takes over. It is worth noticing that there is a special case,
potentially leading to a third area, in which a minimum asset level is required for this agent to
be able to afford attending university. We cover this in Section B.7.
(a) Value function (b) College indicator function
Figure 5: Situation at College Without Taste Shocks
The left part of Figure 5 illustrates an example in which the two value functions of attending
and not attending college are competing. At an asset level of about 10 not attending college
becomes the better option and overtakes its adversary. The resulting value function of this
agent is defined as the maximum of V(n) and V(¬n). Figure 5(b) displays college indicator
functions for different acquired human capital levels. Apparently, in this example, for agents
with a human capital level h ja ≤ 0.25 the value function of not attending college dominates the
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college option for all asset levels. The model mechanics behind that are a high time deduction
due to low human capital on the one hand and a low probability of succeeding in college on
the other. In combination, this makes not attending college the better choice, even for low asset
levels. In Figure 5(a) we can see that at the asset level splitting the two regions, there is a kink in
the value function, which in turn leads to a jump in marginal products and first order conditions.
In addition, these properties spill over to the maximization problem of parents in the period of
inter-vivos transfers. As children are hit by the idiosyncratic income shock in between receiving
these vivos transfers and making the college decision, parents need to form expectations over
the value function of the kid:
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],B≥0
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{
u (C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)]}
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, A, h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [V ( ja, A, h0, n, η)]}] ,
where taking the maximum of V (¬n) and V (n) is equivalent to max (V(¬n),V(n)) in Figure
5(a).
We introduce Gumbel iid taste shocks to our model, which enables us to create a value
function that is smooth over the whole asset grid. This is a useful method in dealing with kinks
in value functions and discontinuities in policy functions caused by discrete choices, which has
been applied in recent work, e.g. Iskhakov et al. (2015) and Busch (2019). Conceptually, the
idea is that given a group of households with the same characteristics, one part attends college
and the other part does not, which is caused by taste shocks that are drawn randomly. Thereby,
the college indicator function is transferred into a choice probability, which is determined by
the distance in value functions. Regarding Figure 5(a), for low assets the likelihood of attending
university is higher and decreasing in assets, while at about asset level 10 the likelihood of not
attending university exceeds the 50% level.
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The parental value function at age j f + ja with taste shocks reads as
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,l∈[0,1],B≥0
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{
u (C, 1 − l) + βEt [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)]} (27)
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
σ
(
Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h
[
Vt (·, n, η)]
σ
+ log
(
1 + exp
[
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vt (·,¬n, η)] − Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [Vt (·, n, η)]
σ
]))]
,
(28)
which we develop in Section B.6. In addition, given our assumption of a continuum of house-
holds, the choice probabilities are also the fractions of agents with the respective characteristics
actually choosing this option. Figure 6 shows the value function and the corresponding choice
probabilities of attending college. By introducing taste shocks we are able to create smooth
(a) Value function (b) College Choice Probabilities
Figure 6: Situation at College With Taste Shocks
value functions.32 The extent of smoothing induced by the taste shocks is determined by the
variance of the Gumbel distribution (σ).
32Please note that the expectation operator in E [max (V(¬n),V(n))] comes from uncertainty with respect to the
taste shock that will be drawn.
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3.4 Policy Functions Education
In this section we want to concentrate on policy functions connected to the educational mechan-
ics in the model, in particular, we focus on the interplay of human capital investments, vivos
transfers and the college decision. Human capital has an impact on several aspects in our model.
Regardless of the college decision, it determines the likelihood for all households which pro-
ductivity type they will draw (see equation (33)) in their respective qualification group. If the
household decides to go to college, human capital also influences the likelihood of succeeding
in graduating (see equation (31)). Finally, students have to spend time on studying, which is
deducted from their time endowment during college (see equation (32)).
All functions are chosen such that it has no added value, should a human capital greater than
one be achieved, which makes it the natural upper bound for h ja. In addition, this implicitly sets
an upper limit for parents’ investments in human capital. Further, the substitution elasticity of
the human capital function has a major impact on investment behavior. Following Cunha and
Heckman (2007), we have chosen a function that exhibits a higher elasticity during primary
education than during secondary education.
Furthermore, due to dynamic complementarity, high human capital can not be built up in
a single period without investing in education before and after. If investments during primary
education are insufficient, the resulting gaps in the subsequent secondary education phase can
not be easily compensated by high investments. On the other hand, the fruits must be harvested
during secondary education if they have been sown early on, since otherwise they will expire.33
These are roughly the mechanisms of human capital formation and they are also reflected in the
policy functions of our model.
Figure 7 shows human capital investments during primary and secondary education as a
function of parents’ cash-on-hand. While all other characteristics of parents and the human
capital of their children are kept constant, parents differ with respect to their current idiosyn-
33In Appendix A.1 we give a more detailed overview of the six empirical facts of the literature on human capital
and how they are linked to dynamic complementarity and self-productivity.
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(a) Investments of parents in primary education (b) Investments of parents in secondary education
Figure 7: Parental Investments in Primary and Secondary Edu.
Note: Age in both figures refers to model age of parents. Respective model age of kids is 2 and 14 in terms of real
age.
cratic shock (yc) and their productivity type (kc).34 It is worth noticing, that the underlying
investment level of the government is positive (igj > 0 for all j = 0, . . . , 3), so that a certain level
of education is provided, even if parents do not invest additionally.
First of all, it is noticeable that given cash-on-hand investments in primary education are
higher than in secondary. This is related to human capital being more malleable in this phase
and coincides with both the data of human capital literature.35 In both periods, parents already
start to invest with minimum cash-on-hand. Thereafter, investments gradually increase until a
certain point is reached. As indicated, this upper bound comes from the fact that investments
leading to human capital above a certain level are not worthwhile, as they neither increase the
likelihood of drawing the better productivity type, nor complete college, or make studying less
time-consuming.
Two other aspects in Figure 7 are interesting: (i) investments are decreasing after a certain
level of income is reached and (ii) this is happening sooner for households with better financial
conditions (kc=2 and yc=2). We have to work this out in two steps.
34For both shocks “one” stands in for the negative and “two” for the positive realization
35In Section 4.11 we will see, that this is also reflected in the lifecycle plots of the calibrated model.
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(a) Investments Low Productivity Parents in Sec-
ondary Edu.
(b) Investments High Productivity Parents in Sec-
ondary Edu.
Figure 8: Secondary Investments Given Abilities
Note: Age in both figures refers to model age of parents. Respective model age of kids is 14 in terms of real age.
Figure 8 represents parents’ investments (again ceteris paribus) as a function of cash-on-
hand, given four different human capital levels of children. The acquired human capital (aec)
level of 5 represents the upper bound described above. It is defined as the level at which, even
with zero parental investments (given the current, positive investment level of the government),
in the next period the highest reasonable human capital will be reached. Thus, for aec = 5 we
have zero investments for all cash-on-hand levels.36 It should be said that this upper level is of
a more theoretical nature and the fraction of households at this level will be close to zero in the
calibrated model.
At the lower end of the human capital spectrum, parents’ investments also stay at zero, but
for a completely different reason. We are in the secondary education period: the elasticity of
substitution is low, but we have to invest so that the sown fruits do not expire. In order to
explain the missing investments of parents, the government comes into play, because the level
it provides is already sufficient. Last but not least - and this is the most important area for the
calibrated version of the model - it is noticeable that more is invested in kids with higher human
36This will help us in the computation of the model in defining reasonable investment grids, which is further
described in Section B.3.3.
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capital (aec = 4) than for the lower (aec = 3). It can be explained by dynamic complementarity:
∂2 f j(h j, I j)
∂h j∂I j
> 0.
As the return on investments is higher, when the child is more able (e.g. due to higher invest-
ments during primary education), the acquired human capital level has a positive impact on
today’s investments.
(a) Vivos transfers (b) College Choice Probability
Figure 9: Vivos Transfers and the College Decision
Note: Age in both figures refers to model age of parents. Respective model age of kids is 18 in terms of real age.
Finally, we are able to bridge the gap between Figure 9 and Figure 7, which explains the
hump-shaped course of human capital investments. Figure 9(a) shows parents’ transfers as a
function of their cash-on-hand. Figure 9(b) shows the college decision probability (which will
be explained in detail in Section 3.3) as a function of assets, which at that point is determined
by parents’ vivos transfers. There are different phases to be distinguished: first of all, a certain
asset level is necessary so that young households can generally afford to attend college. If this
is exceeded, the college decision depends primarily on the skills of the respective household.
But for extremely high cash-on-hand levels, the choice probability of attending college is de-
creasing, which has a rather theoretical background and will play only a very limited role for
the calibrated model:
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The incentive to reach for higher education in our model is purely driven by the prospect
on higher wages. However, if the household receives extremely high transfer payments from
parents, work, and in turn education, becomes less important. Therefore, in Figure 9(b), the
likelihood of going to college drops off at some point, and this also explains the drop in human
capital investment in Figures 7 and 8: extremely rich parents know that they will later make
large transfer payments and therefore invest less in the human capital their children.
Again, the fraction of these special cases in the distribution of the calibrated model will be
negligible. The purpose for this description was to analyze the different model mechanisms
very precisely.
3.5 A Glance at the Numerical Computation
The research question we want to answer in this work is of purely economic nature. Nonethe-
less, due to the complex structure of the model, much of this work involved designing and pro-
gramming a solution algorithm, as has already been shown in this section (and Appendix B). But
that was not sufficient, because the “curse of dimensionality” has caught us with full force. That
becomes clear, when we recap the problem and its state variables in periods j f , . . . , j f + ja − 1,
when children are part of the household:
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1]
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
ipk≥0
{
u
(
C
1 + ζ f
, 1 − `
)
+ . . .
· · · + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, h0, h′, q, γ, η′)]} .
Although we use relatively coarse grids, each with five human capital levels, we come to a total
of 5 · 5 · 20 · 3 · 2 · 2 = 6, 000 different combinations, with twenty asset grid points, three degrees
of education, and two each of idiosyncratic shock and productivity type - per period.
However, there is the additional burden that we had to switch to the exogenous grid method
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due to the shortcomings of the hybrid method incorporating the endogenous grid method men-
tioned above. Thus, we lose the well known speed gains of the endogenous grid method by
Carroll (2005) during j f , . . . , j f + ja − 1. In periods of human capital investments and transfer
payments, the high dimensionality in addition with the necessity of the relatively slow exoge-
nous grid method will further be combined with a level search over the value function (via
Golden Search Algorithm), in order to arrive at optimal investments and transfer payments.
As a consequence, we would not have been able to solve the model without parallelizing
the solution algorithm and running it on a high performance computer, simply because the
computational time would have been too long. To outline the speed gain, we ran the same
test program under the prerequisites listed in Table 4. Within this program, the household
problem had to be solved given six different levels of college subsidies by the government. In
each iteration the household problem had to be solved several times, in order for the fix point
problem in the value function of children to converge for a tolerance level of e-07.
Architecture Parallized Threads Time
2.50 GHz, 16GB RAM, 4 Cores no 1 ≈3000 mins
2.50 GHz, 16GB RAM, 4 Cores yes 4 ≈1500 mins
2.10 GHz, 192GB RAM, 40 Cores (CSC Skylake) no 1 ≈141 mins
2.10 GHz, 192GB RAM, 40 Cores (CSC Skylake) yes 40 ≈70 mins
Table 4: Comparison Computational Time
Following Amdahl’s law, given we had the privilege to work on a 40-core high performance
computer, we were able to parallize roughly 50% of the workload, given we had a time im-
provement of 14070 = 2.
37 A brief overview of how we parallized the model can be found in
Appendix B.8.
37The first two lines of Table 4 are rough approximations and are showing the computational time on a regular
computer. They are supposed to express our gratitude to the Center for Scientific Computing (CSC) of the Goethe
University Frankfurt, as well as the financial support by the state Hesse, without which this work would not have
been possible. Without parallization and the use of the CSC cluster this work would not have been completed
before February 2045, approximately.
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4 Calibration
This section describes our assumptions on functional forms and parameters chosen. The cal-
ibration parameters are also summarized in Table 19, where we make explicit the distinction
between first stage parameters (calibrated outside the model) and second stage parameters (cal-
ibrated by minimum distance methods using the model). Also, please note that as one period in
the model lasts for four years, there is adjustments that have to be made, e.g. the capital output
ratio KY and the time discount factor β. The adjustments are described in C.9.
4.1 Demographics
The total fertility rate f in the economy is assumed to be f = 1.14, reflecting the fact that a
mother on average has about 2 f = 2.28 children. This number also determines the population
growth rate, cf. equation 1. Each period in the model has a length of four years. Children are
born with age 0 and form households at biological age 18. We discard the first two years of
childhood and accordingly set ja = 18−24 = 4. Hence, children live as dependent members in
adult households for ages 0, . . . , 3, which corresponds to the biological age bins 2−5, 6−9, 10−
13, 14 − 17. Households require 4 actual years to complete a college education and therefore
exit college at model age jc = ja = 4. They have children at biological age 30, which is model
age j f = 7. Retirement occurs at biological age 66 (age bin 62 − 65 is the last working period
of life), hence jr = 16. The maximum life span is 101 years, i.e., the last period households are
alive is biological age bin 98 − 101 and accordingly J = 24.
4.2 Preferences
The per period utility function u is specified as the usual nested Cobb-Douglas-CRRA specifi-
cation
u(C, `) =
(
Cµ`1−µ
)1−σ − 1
1 − σ .
4 CALIBRATION54
We a priori choose the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) 1/σ to equal 1/4. We then
calibrate the discount factor to match a capital output ratio of 3. The adult equivalence scale
parameter for child consumption is set to ζ = 0.3.
4.3 Human Capital Grid and Intergenerational Transmission
We discretize initial and acquired human capital. Initial human capital h0 is assume to lie
in [0, . . . , h¯0] with h¯0 < 1. As we argue below, our parametrization of the human capital ac-
cumulation process implies a natural upper bound on acquired human capital at age ja of 1.
Choosing the upper bound on initial human capital h¯0 < 1 then implies that also those kids born
with the highest possible innate human capital benefit from investments by their parents (and /
or the government).
To determine the transmission of innate human capital, we assume that the probability of
drawing a given h0 conditional on the human capital of parents h
p
0 can be described by truncated
triangular kernels with the following properties for all i = 1, . . . , n grid points of the innate
human capital grid:
pih(h0 | hp0) = p¯ih − ∆pihp0
∣∣∣h0 − hp0 ∣∣∣ (29)
n∑
i=1
pih(h0,i | hp0) = 1.
We take n = 5 grid points for the innate (and acquired) human capital grids. We set h¯0 = 0.5
and p¯ih = 0.25. For each h
p
0 the slope parameter ∆pihp0
then follows from the requirement that
probabilities sum to one.
4.4 The Human Capital Process
As pointed out by Cunha and Heckman (2007) as well as by Caucutt and Lochner (2017), both
dynamic complementarity (∂
2 ft(h0,h j,I j)
∂h j∂I j
> 0) and self-productivity (∂ ft(h0,h j,I j)
∂h j
> 0) should be incor-
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porated in human capital production functions, which is satisfied by the following specification:
h j+1 = (1 − δ)h j +

hυ jj
(
ψi j
)(1−υ j)
for φ j = 0(
υ jh
φ j
j + (1 − υ j)
(
ψi j
)φ j) 1φ j otherwise. (30)
where σ j = 11−φ j is the substitution elasticity across the two production factors.
To calibrate (30) we relate to the estimates of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
Accordingly, we restrict δ = 1. With respect to σ j and υ j we assume that σ j is decreasing in
age (reflecting decreasing substitutability of the two production factors) whereas υ j is increasing
in age (reflecting increasing self-productivity of human capital). Specifically, we assume that
{σ j} ja−1j=0 = {1.5, 1.5, 0.5, 0.5}, which is directly based on the estimates in Cunha, Heckman and
Schennach (2010) for their cognitive skill process, controlling for non-cognitive skills (Table
4 of their paper). We also base {υ j} ja−1j=0 on these estimates which gives {υ j} ja−1j=0 = { 0.480.48+0.16 =
0.75, 0.75, 0.830.83+0.04 = 0.95, 095}. Finally, the investment productivity parameter ψ is to a value
of 10.
As for the time requirement for college studies, we assume a simple truncated linear function
as
ξ(h ja) = max
{
0, 1 − λ, 1 − λh ja
}
, (31)
where 1 − λ only applies in cases where λ < 1. Together with the specification of the proba-
bilities in (32) and (33), see below, this assumption ensures that the rational upper bound of h ja
chosen by parents is about one.38 This is convenient for constructing human capital grids in the
computational implementation. We calibrate λ to match the fraction of households not attending
college Φn. According to Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) this fraction is 54%, implying a fraction
of college attendance of 46%. Also, they find a dropout rate of 50%, implying that the fraction
of dropouts equals the fraction of college graduates and is Φc = Φd = 0.46 · 0.50 = 0.23.
38In case λ < 1 and without 1 − λ in (31) parents would have an incentive to invest such that their children’s
human capital at age ja exceeds one.
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Thus, by matching the fraction of non-college households and the dropout rate we meet all
three moments. We will calibrate the latter by the success probability in college, which we
assume is given by
pic(h ja) = min
{
1 − exp(−µc), 1 − exp(−µch ja)
}
(32)
and µ > 0 (see 4.10 for C.3 for details on calibration of both college attendance and dropout
rate). Accordingly, the success probability will be equal to zero for h ja = 0 and cannot be larger
than 1. Increasing µc increases the curvature of the function and we calibrate this curvature to
match the mentioned college dropout rate of 50%.
In addition, we assume (exogenously) that dropouts spend 50% of their time in college and
hence set φ = 0.5, which is in line with data.39
4.5 Labor Productivity Process
Recall that a household of age j with education q ∈ {n, d, c}, fixed effect γ and idiosyncratic
shock η earns a wage of
wt,q j,qγη,
where wq is the qualification-specific wage per labor efficiency unit in period t. Also recall
that wt,n = wt,d, because we assumed non-college workers and college dropouts to be perfect
substitutes in final production. This assumption can be justified on the basis of the estimates
by Altonji and Zimmerman (2017).
We calibrate the various components of the wage process as follows. First, the age- and
qualification-specific component of labor productivity {ε j,q} is estimated from PSID data (cf.
Ludwig, Schelkle and Vogel 2012), assuming that {ε j,d} = {ε j,n}. Average non-college and
dropout wages are normalized to wt,n = wt,d = 1, while the average wage for college graduates
wt,c is used to scale up the estimated wage profile to match an average college wage premium
39See Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) and Manski and Wise (1983).
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Parameter Interpretation Value Stage
Population
ja Age at HH form. (age 18) 4 1
jc Age, coll. compl. (age 21) 5 1
j f Fertility Age (age 30) 7 1
jr Retirement Age (age 66) 16 1
J Max. Lifetime (age bin 98-101) 24 1
Labor Productivity
{ j,s} Age Profile Estimates (PSID) 1
piη Transition probability of Markov process Cf. Table 6 1
ση Log-State of Markov process Cf. Table 6 1
∆γs Spread of γs [∆n,∆c] = [0.33, 0.24] 1
µγ Curvature parameter in drawing γh 0.2 1
Preferences
1/σ Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution (IES) 0.25 1
ζ Equivalence Scale 0.3 1
β Time Discount Rate (per annum) 0.95 2
ν Altruism Parameter (Avg. Transfers) 0.5 1
µ Leisure Share (Fraction of h worked) 0.5 1
Wages and Returns
wn,d Mean Wages Dropouts and Non-College 1 1
wc Mean wages of college graduates 1.76 2
r Rate of Return 3.3% 1
Borrowing Constraints
φbc Tightness of Borrowing Constraint in College 0.75 1
Ability and Education
{σ j} Substitution Elasticity in Human Capital Production {1.5, 1.5, 0.5, 0.5} 1
{υ j} Productivity of Own Human Capital {0.75, 0.75, 0.95, 0.95} 1
ψ Investment Productivity of Human Capital Investments 10 1
µc Curvature in probability for success in college q = c, pi(q = c | h) 1.14 2
λ Time Costs of College 1.81 2
p¯ih Probability to draw parental human capital 0.25 1
κ Resource Cost of Coll. 0.203 1
φ Dropout time in college 0.5 1
h¯0 Upper limit of initial human capital 0.5 1
Government Policy
θ Public Tertiary Education Subsidy 38.8% 1
θp Private Tertiary Education Subsidy 16.6% 1
τl Labor Income Tax Rate 25.84% 2
d Tax Deduction Rate 27.1% 1
τc Consumption Tax Rate 5.0% 1
τk Capital Income Tax Rate 28.3% 1
τss Social Security Payroll Tax 12.4% 1
ρss Pension Contribution Rate 7.4% 2
b Debt to GDP Ratio 60% 1
gy Government Consumption to GDP Ratio 17% 1
i¯g/wc Investment level in non-tertiary education 0.049 2
ζ
g
e,t Age profile of investments in non-tertiary education 0.52 1
Table 5: Calibration
Note: Table summarizes the parameter values for the benchmark economy, including the empirical targets the
parameters are calibrated to. Stage: 1: first stage (calibrated outside the model), 2: second stage parameter.
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in the model of 80% (see 4.10 and C.3 the detailed calibration strategy), in line with U.S. data
for the later part of the 2000’s (see, e.g., Heathcote et al. 2010).
Second, we choose the stochastic mean reverting component of wages η as a two state
Markov chain with education-specific states for log-wages {−σs, σs} and transition matrix
Π =
 pis 1 − pis1 − pis pis
 .
In order to parameterize this Markov chain we first estimate the following process on the
education-specific PSID samples selected by Karahan and Ozkan (2012):
log wt = α + zt
zt = %zt−1 + ηt,
where α is an individual-specific fixed effect that is assumed to be normally distributed (with
cross-sectional variance σ2α). The estimation results are summarized in the left part of table 6,
where again college dropouts and non-college workers are treated the same.40
Estimates Markov Chain
Group % σ2η σ
2
α pis σs Es
Non-College/Dropouts 0.928 0.0192 0.0644 0.871 0.250 {0.755, 1.244}
College 0.969 0.0100 0.0474 0.941 0.191 {0.811, 1.188}
Table 6: Estimates for Earnings Process and Markov Chain for Wages
Note: The left part of this table summarizes the estimates of the AR(1) stochastic earnings process from the PSID,
separately for unskilled and skilled individuals. The right part summarizes the corresponding discretized earnings
process used in the model economy.
For each education group we choose the two numbers (pis, σs) such that the two-state Markov
chain for wages we use has exactly the same persistence and conditional variance as the AR(1)
40For the details of the sample selection we refer the reader to Karahan and Ozkan (2012) and we thank the
authors for providing us with the estimates for the process specified in the main text. In their paper they estimate
a richer stochastic process (which, if implemented in our framework, would lead to at least one additional state
variable).
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process estimated above.41 This yields parameter choices given in the right part of table 6.
After de-logging, the wage states are normalized so that the mean of the stochastic com-
ponent of wages equals 1. We observe that college educated agents face somewhat smaller
wage shocks, but that these shocks are slightly more persistent than for non-college educated
households.
Third, the fixed component of wages γs. We again set γn = γd and take a two-state spec-
ification for each. We normalize the mean of each γs to one and specify an education group
specific spread ∆γs such that γs ∈ {γl,s = 1 − ∆γs , γh,s = 1 + ∆γs}, which we calibrate to match
the variance of the fixed effect estimates reported in Table 6.
Finally, we assume that the probability to draw the high realization, γhs is given by
piγ(h ja) = min
{
1, hµγja
}
(33)
for some parameter µγ ∈ (0, 1). Together with our functional form assumption on the time
requirement for studying in college described above, this functional form assumption implies
that there is a rational upper bound of about one on the human capital at age ja.
4.6 Education Costs and Subsidies
Education at a glance (OECD 2012, Table B3.2b) reports that the share of tertiary education
expenditures borne by public and private subsidies is θ = 38.8% and θpr = 16.6%. We borrow
the resource costs for college education κ = 0.203 from Krueger and Ludwig (2016).
In order to reduce the dimensionality, we split non-tertiary education into two phases, i.e.
igj,t = i¯
gζ
g
e,t for j = 0, 1 (34)
igj,t = i¯
gζ
g
l,t for j = 2, 3, (35)
41The (unconditional) persistence of the AR(1) process is given by % and the conditional variance by σ2η whereas
the corresponding statistics for the Markov chain read as 2pis − 1 and σ2s , respectively.
For a model where a period lasts 4 years and the AR(1) process is estimated on yearly data, the corresponding
statistics are %4 and (1 + %2 + %4 + %6)σ2η.
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with i¯g > 0, ζge,t ∈ [0, 1] and ζgl,t = 1 − ζge,t. The former stands in for the overall investment level
of the government into non-tertiary education, while ζge,t determines how these investments are
distributed into primary and secondary education. We calibrate ζge,t using data of OECD (2017)
on public spending on education and receive ζge,t = 0.52 (see 4.10 for the complete computation
of ζge,t.), implying higher investments at ages 0 and 1.
Regarding education subsidies, we want the relation of tertiary and non-tertiary education
to be reasonable. Following OECD (2017), the ratio of non-tertiary to tertiary government
education spending in the US is E
e
Ec = 2.62. In our model total expenditures on tertiary education
are given by
Ec =
(
Φ j,c + φΦ j,d
)
κw0,cθ0, (36)
where total expenditures on non-tertiary education are denoted by
Ee =
ja−1∑
j=0
igj,tΦ j,0 = i¯
g
t
(
ζ
g
e,tΦ j,0 + ζ
g
e,tΦ j,1 + ζ
g
l,tΦ j,2 + ζ
g
l,tΦ j,3
)
. (37)
Thus, we use the non-tertiary investment level i¯g in order for our model to hit the target of
Ee
Ec = 2.62 (for details see 4.10 and C.2).
4.7 Borrowing Constraints
The borrowing constraints faced by agents pursuing a college degree allow such an agent to
finance a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] of all tuition bills with credit. We specify a constant (minimum)
payment rp such that at the age of retirement all college loans are repaid. Formally
A ja,t = φ(1 − θt − θpr)κwt,c.
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and for j = ja + 1, . . . , jr:
A j,t = (1 + rt)A j−1,t−1 − rp
and rp is chosen such that the terminal condition A jr ,t = 0 is met.
The parameter φ to be calibrated determines how tight the borrowing constraint for college
is. Note that in contrast rp is not a calibration parameter but an endogenously determined
repayment amount that insures that households do not retire with outstanding student loans.
The maximum amount of publicly provided student loans for four years is given by $27,000
for dependent undergraduate students and $45,000 for independent undergraduate students (the
more relevant number given that our students are independent households).42 Relative to GDP
per capita in 2008 of $48, 000, this given maximum debt constitutes 14% and 23.4% of GDP per
capita. Compare that to the 31% of total costs computed above, this indicates that independent
undergraduate students can borrow at most approximately 75% of the cost of college, and thus
we set φ = 0.75. The justification for our choice of φ again clarifies that it should best be thought
of as an education policy parameter that is being held fixed in our optimal policy analysis.
4.8 Government
In the initial steady state the policy parameters to be chosen are (τk, τl, τc, τp, d, b, gy). We pick
b = 0.6 and gy = 0.17 to match a government debt to GDP ratio of 60% and government
consumption (net of tertiary education expenditure) to GDP ratio of 17%. Consumption taxes
can be estimated from NIPA data as in Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) who find τc ≈ 0.05.
For the capital income tax rate, we adopt Chari and Kehoe’s (2006) estimate of τk = 28.3% for
the early 2000’s. Given these assumptions on b and gy, the marginal tax rate on labor income τl
is then endogenously calibrated to balance the government’s budget accordingly (see 4.10 and
for details)
The social security payroll tax is set to τss = 12.4% (excluding Medicare). We model social
42Note that about 66% of students finishing four year colleges have debt, and conditional on having debt the
average amount is $23, 186 and the median amount is $20, 000.
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security benefits pt, j(γ, q) as a linear function of average wages earned during a household’s
working life. Pensions of an agent with qualification q and productivity type γ are:
pt, j = ρssγwt,q.
Given the payroll tax τss we calibrate ρss to clear the equilibrium condition of the pension
market (see 4.10 for details):
τss
∑
q
wt,qLt,q =
J∑
j= jr
Nt, j
∫
pt, j(γ, q)dΦt, j
= ρss
J∑
j= jr
Nt, j
∫
γwt,qdΦt, j. (38)
Finally, we calibrate the labor income tax deduction Zt = dt YtNt to match a deduction rate of
dt = 27.1%, which is in line with Krueger and Ludwig (2016). The endogenous calibration
is necessary, as we have to solve the model given a tax deduction Zt, without knowledge of
the resulting aggregate production Yt (see 4.10 for C.1 for calibration strategy and computation
respectively).
4.9 Prices
We start with a small open economy (partial equilibrium) variant of our model. We exogenously
set relative prices for non-college agents and dropouts to wt,n = wt,d = 1. We calibrate college
wages wt,c to match an average college wage premium in the model of 80% as stated above.
In addition, we choose an annual interest rate of 4.1%, which is consistent with a general
equilibrium in a production economy featuring Cobb-Douglas production with a capital output
ratio of 3, a capital elasticity parameter of α = 0.33 and a depreciation rate of capital of δ = 0.07.
We calibrate time discount factor β to match KY = 3 (see 4.10 and C.1 for calibration strategy
and computation respectively).
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4.10 Calibration of Second Stage Parameters
The benchmark model is calibrated to hit the following five economic moments: fraction of non-
college agents, college dropout rate, college wage premium, capital output ratio and the ratio
of non-tertiary to tertiary education subsidies. The computation of the distributional moments
takes place in the aggregation, which we describe in detail in Section C.8. Table 7 displays
the real moments, their counterpart in the model and the parameters used to hit the respective
targets.
Target Data Model Parameter Value
Fraction non-college 0.560 0.560 time costs college (λ) 1.81
Dropout rate 0.500 0.500 curv. coll. success (µ) 1.14
College wage premium 1.800 1.800 wage of graduates (wt,c) 1.76
Capital output ratio 3.000 2.999 time discount rate (β) 0.95
Non-tertiary / tertiary edu 2.620 2.624 invest. level / wage (i/w) 0.049
Table 7: Summary Economic Second Stage Parameters
The model was able to match all five economic targets of interest very precisely. In addition,
parameters τl, ρss and Z were chosen to balance government budget, pension market and tax
progressivity: ∥∥∥∥∥∥τ∗l − T ∗t − τcCt − τkrtKtYdt
∥∥∥∥∥∥ = 0, (39)∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ρ∗ss − τss
∑
q wt,qLt,q∑J
j= jr Nt, j
∫
γwt,qdΦt, j
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ = 0, (40)∥∥∥∥∥Z∗ − d YtNt
∥∥∥∥∥ = 0. (41)
For all parameters p ∈ (τl, ρss,Z) the benchmark model matches the respective targets satisfying
f (p) = ‖p∗ − p‖ < 0.001 ∀p. A detailed computation of the five economic targets summarized
in Table 7 and equations (39)-(41) can be found in Appendix C. Here we give a brief explana-
tion of our calibration strategy.
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Let Ψ be a vector of second stage parameters, m(Ψ) a vector of simulated moments and mT
a vector of economic targets. In addition, let Γ be a vector of governmental instruments, g(Γ) a
vector of simulated moments and gT a vector of respective targets. In a double nested fix point
iteration, we operate as follows:
(i) m˜T = ω · mT + (1 − ω)m(Ψ).
(ii) For all ψi ∈ Ψ solve ||mi(ψi) − m˜Ti || < .
(iii) Given ψi from (ii) solve the government budget until convergence:
(a) Compute g˜T = ω · gT + (1 − ω)g(Γ).
(b) For all γi ∈ Γ solve ||gi(γi) − g˜Ti || < .
Loop over (a) and (b) until ||g˜T − gT || <  and compute m(Ψ).
Loop over (i) to (iii) until ||m˜T − mT || < .
This calibration strategy has two advantages: although we have a fixed point problem in
eight dimensions, it delivers results in decent speed, while it simplifies splitting economic from
other targets. This makes the execution of policy experiments now following straightforward.
4.11 Lifecycle Plots of Benchmark Model
There is a consensus in human capital literature that different stages of the education process
have different characteristics. As discussed in Section 2.2.3 and Appendix A.1, much of this
can be explained by a human capital process that exhibits dynamic complementarity. This
implies that a lack of investments in primary education has lasting effects, as it can hardly
be compensated at later stages, which is closely related to the first empirical fact Cunha and
Heckmann (2010) discuss: “[. . . ] ability gaps between individuals and across socioeconomic
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groups open up at early ages”. One possible explanation would be that young families are
often financially unable to provide sufficient primary education for their children, which then
becomes a permanent disadvantage for children due to dynamic complementarity. This causal
link is discussed very carefully in Caucutt and Lochner (2017), who quantify the importance of
borrowing constraints for human capital investments, earnings, and intergenerational mobility.
These mechanisms are of fundamental importance to the underlying question in this essay.
Therefore, in this part we take a critical look at the crucial life-cycle profiles of our calibrated
model.
Figure 10 (a) shows how children’s human capital evolves in the benchmark model, given
six different combinations of parental education and productivity type. The four investments
take place at the parents’ age 30, 34, 38 and 42, while the corresponding age of the children
is 2, 6, 10, and 14 years, before they leave the household at the age of 18 and face the college
decision. Parents differ in schooling (q=n stands in for non-college households, q=d for college
dropouts and q=c for college graduates) and productivity type (γl stands in for low productivity
and γh for high productivity). The first empirical fact is accurately reflected: after the first two
investments of parents (ages 30 and 34), the resulting human capital gap reaches its maximum.
The two subsequent investments during secondary education do not lead to further differences,
but rather to maintaining the gap that has already been created.
In addition, there is a second, very interesting aspect. Having a closer look at the starting
point - the innate human capital - differences are already apparent, but they develop differently.
First of all, it should be noted that children whose parents did not attend college and are of
the low productivity type, have the lowest initial human capital, and remain at the lower end
of the ability distribution for the whole range of primary and secondary education. Almost
the opposite is the case for children whose parents are college graduates and have drawn the
high productivity type γh. However, on closer inspection, it can be seen that the average initial
human capital of children of college graduates and dropouts hardly differs, but their subsequent
development does.
This is explained by Figure 10 (b), which shows the average investments of the respective
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(a) Human Capital Development Kids (b) Human Capital Development Parents
Figure 10: Ability Gaps Open Up Early
Note: qualification q = {n, d, c}, productivity γ = {γl, γh} and age stands in for the type of parent, while the
development of average human capital of children of the respective groups is plotted. Households become parents
at the age of 28, implying corresponding ages of children are 2 to 18.
parents. When parents have drawn the low productivity type, they invest significantly less in
comparison to parents with the same qualification but high productivity type. That even leads
to children from non-college households with γh, ranked second to last in innate ability, rising
to be the runner up in terms of human capital at adulthood.
The question arises as to what is behind the different investment behavior of parents. Figure
11, presenting their respective financial situation, provides the explanation. Parents with q=n
(non-college) and q=d (dropouts) receive the same wages, if they are of the same productivity
type γ. Further, parents who did not attend college were not subject to time deduction ξ(h ja)
for studying and were thereby able to earn a higher income for one period. In addition, college
dropouts still carry around negative assets caused by tuition fees. This results in a cash-on-hand
ranking of parents in the phase of primary and secondary education investments (age 30-42 in
Figure 11 (b)) that reflects the investment behavior and thereby highlights the intergenerational
connection between the financial situation of parents and the human capital development of
children, which is completely detached from the nature component (innate ability).
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(a) Assets (b) Cash-On-Hand
Figure 11: Life-Cycle Profiles
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5 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
Starting from the benchmark model, we will perform two univariate and one bivariate policy
experiment, in which the government can choose different (i) college subsidies, (ii) non-tertiary
investments or (iii) combinations of both. We stay in partial equilibrium, which means that
wages and the interest rate are not adjusting to the economic responses induced by the differing
policies. However, the government budget as well as the pension market are cleared via τl and
ρss satisfying (39) and (40) respectively. The results in all three partial equilibrium experiments
indicate that optimal policies require higher governmental investments in primary, secondary
and tertiary education compared to the benchmark model.43
In the first experiment the government optimizes social welfare by setting college subsidies
θ, reducing the burden of tuition fees (κwc(1 − θ − θpr)). The relevant range of college subsidies
is between 0.0% and 350%,44 why at all times the investment level in non-tertiary education of
the benchmark model (i¯g/wc = 0.0486) is maintained. In the second experiment college sub-
sidies are fixed to the benchmark value (θ = 38.8%), while the government optimizes over the
non-tertiary education investment level, which contributes to primary and secondary education.
Governmental investments i¯g/wc will be displayed in the range of 0.017 and 0.340.45
Each set of policy parameters T = {θ, i¯g, τl, ρss} corresponds to another partial equilibrium,
which will be assessed by the following Utilitarian social welfare function:
S WF(T ) =
∑
j
Nt, j
∫
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) Φt, j. (42)
43The complete results can be found in the tables in Appendix D. In the main part we only focus on the most
important aspects.
44Please note that for θ > 100%, the government not only covers all tuition fees, it also pays parts of the living
expenses for students.
45In the univariate experiments we evaluate welfare for six different values of college subsidies and non-tertiary
education investments respectively. In the bivariate experiment we allow for both measures to deviate from the
banchmarkl values and evaluate welfare for all 36 combinations of college subsidies and non-tertiary education
investments.
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Regarding social welfare, the mechanisms behind potential increases or decreases are what
interests us most. Besides policies leading to an overall increase in output and consumption,
creating a more equal distribution can also enhance welfare, which is due to the concavity of
utility functions. We can observe that college subsidies affect social welfare more through the
channel of overall wealth, whereas an increase in non-tertiary investments additionally causes
a more equal income and consumption distribution.
Lastly, after we analyzed both instruments separately, we allow for various combinations
of both college subsidies and non-tertiary investments, which enables the government to take
advantage of the described interplay of the different phases within the education process. To
give a first impression, Table 8 summarizes the borders as well as the optimal policy parameters
of the three experiments.
Experiment Range θ Range i¯g/wc Result
College subsidies 0.0% − 350% 0.0486 θ∗ = 175%
Non-tertiary investments 38.8% 0.017 − 0.340 i¯g∗/wc = 0.2594
Both 0.0% − 350% 0.017 − 0.340 θ∗ = 263%, i¯g∗/wc = 0.2594
Table 8: Results Policy Experiments Partial Equilibrium
Note: welfare is evaluated based on grids of the policy parameters. Thus, if welfare is maximized for the same
policy parameter in different experiments, that should not be confused with a general best policy.
5.1 College Subsidies
In the first experiment non-tertiary investments of the government are fixed to the value of the
benchmark model, while the government can set different college subsidies θ.46 Tuition fees
are given by κwc(1 − θ − θpr). During their studies, students can work part time for average
non-college wages, given a reduced time endowment of 1 − ζ(h ja). Another financial option is
to borrow up to A j,t and stretch out repaying tuition fees over the life-cycle. Additionally, agents
46Table 20 in Appendix D shows a detailed list of the results for various economic moments.
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might have received vivos transfers from their parents, also relaxing the financial bottleneck in
a situation of relatively low wage income. In any case, subsidies make college attendance easier
to afford, in particular in partial equilibrium, in which prices do not respond to a higher fraction
of college attendance and a constant college wage premium.47 However, since we allow for
subsidies larger than 100%, the government has the option not only to cover tuition fees but
also to provide students with positive assets to cover living expenses. Figure 12 displays social
welfare as a function of college subsidies. The optimal policy calls for a much higher college
subsidy (175%) than in the benchmark model. Nevertheless, there is a turning point, implying
that there are different mechanisms working against each other.
Figure 12: Experiment College Subsidy (*Benchmark Model)
Table 9 summarizes outcomes of the policy experiment that are related to production. Higher
college subsidies combined with a higher college attendance rate lead to an increase in govern-
ment expenditures κwcθ(Φc + φΦd). As a result, the required labor tax rate that clears the
47Please note that the average college wage premium of the respective wage groups changes a little bit, as there
are shifts in human capital and thus in productivity types for different college subsidy levels (the definition of the
college wage premium is described in equation (101). What remains unchanged in partial equilibrium is resource
costs of labor wnd and wc.
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government’s budget is increasing throughout the whole experiment (it is worth noticing that
this relation will not always be monotonic, which we will see in the bivariate experiment: when
the positive effect of college subsidies on aggregate labor, and thereby the tax base, exceeds
the increase in government expenditures the labor tax decreases when college subsidies go up).
The development of aggregate labor supply with respect to the increase in college subsidies is
hump-shaped. Hence, labor taxes start to rise only marginally, as the increase in government
expenditures goes hand in hand with an increase in labor supply (and in consequence the tax
base). From the point at which labor supply falls, while costs continue to rise, the increase in
labor taxes are much higher. This is also the area in which the positive impact of subsidies is
tipped and further increases lead to a reduction in welfare.
In addition, welfare is also rising relative to the benchmark model when college subsidies are set
to zero. The bivariate experiment will show that this pattern only applies for low levels of hu-
man capital investments of the government. The cause lies in the effect of subsidies on equality
in the economy, which increases (in partial equilibrium) for low levels of college subsidies.48
College Subsidy 0.0000 0.388* 0.8750 1.7500 2.6250 3.5000
Social Welfare -0.9345 -0.9499 -0.9076 -0.8437 -0.8536 -0.8859
Labor Tax 0.2245 0.2584 0.2642 0.2966 0.3509 0.4160
Aggr. Labor 0.7731 0.8767 0.9005 0.8807 0.8507 0.8061
Aggr. Output 0.3994 0.4530 0.4653 0.4550 0.4396 0.4165
Table 9: Results Production
Note: * is the benchmark model. Bold letters mark policy measure with highest social welfare.
Table 10 shows the outcomes of the policy experiment related to education. Starting at the
lower end, an increase in college subsidies leads to higher human capital investments by parents,
which is linked to dynamic complementary. If college costs are decreased, children will be able
to afford college, which in turn increases the return on investments in primary and secondary
education. Thus, parents react with higher education investments, which leads to a rise in the
48We will discuss this in more detail shortly. Note, however, that this mechanism does neither translate to
the small open economy nor to the general equilibrium version of the experiment. In both cases, in the absence
of college subsidies, the fraction of non-college households reaches its maximum, which further decreases wnd
relative to wc and inequality rises as opposed to the partial equilibrium case we are examining here.
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aggregate human capital level. This is perfectly in line with the findings of Caucutt and Lochner
(2017), who highlight the importance of early investment responses to post-secondary subsidies.
Further, it is worth noticing, that vivos transfers are also increased until the threshold θ > 100%
is passed and subsidies exceed tuition fees.
College Subsidy 0.0000 0.388* 0.8750 1.7500 2.6250 3.5000
Social Welfare -0.9345 -0.9499 -0.9076 -0.8437 -0.8536 -0.8859
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035 0.0037 0.0035 0.0033
Aver. Human Capital 0.3764 0.3899 0.4037 0.4083 0.3997 0.3964
Aggr. Vivos Transfers 0.0042 0.0047 0.0051 0.0048 0.0039 0.0028
Fraction Non-College 0.8097 0.5591 0.4125 0.2879 0.1152 0.0077
Fraction Graduates 0.1070 0.2205 0.2880 0.3202 0.3361 0.3352
Fraction Dropouts 0.0832 0.2205 0.2995 0.3919 0.5488 0.6571
Table 10: Results Education
Note: * is the benchmark model. Bold letters mark policy measure with highest social welfare.
However, while the general human capital level is increased by higher college subsidies, this
measure does not have a positive effect on children at the lower end of the income distribution.
This can be seen in Figure 13, which shows the human capital development from the benchmark
model and the social optimum of this policy experiment. By comparison, average human capital
of children from parents who graduated college (q = c) and are high productive (γh) stands out
further than before. The increase in the labor tax rate may have hit this group the hardest, but
they also benefited most from negative tuition fees. Average human capital of children from the
middle of the distribution is also increased by higher subsidies. It is only the two groups at the
bottom of the distribution whose human capital the measure has not impacted positively. In fact,
there is even a slight decrease for children of parents that dropped out of college (q = d) and
drew the low productivity type (γl). As can be seen on the left end (age 30 of parents, i.e. age
2 of children), this is not due to lesser innate human capital. The gap opens up during primary
education and remains constant afterwards, which is a reproduction of the first empirical fact
stated in Cunha and Heckman (2010).49 In summary, an increase in subsidies has yield higher
49See Appendix A.1 for a detailed discussion on the empirical literature on human capital development.
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human capital on average, but did not produce a more equal distribution - it has rather led to the
opposite.
(a) Social Optimum (θ = 175%) (b) Benchmark Model (θ = 39%)
Figure 13: Comparison Human Capital Development
Note: qualification q = {n, d, c}, productivity γ = {γl, γh} and age stands in for the type of parent, while the
development of average human capital of children of the respective groups is plotted. Households become parents
at the age of 28, implying corresponding ages of children are 2 to 18.
These effects spill over to the distribution of income and consumption. Apart from en-
dogenous effects, the group of non-college households does not benefit from college subsidies,
but has to participate in the higher tax burden. In addition, comparing the outcome from the
benchmark model and the social optimum, they suffer the biggest drop in average net wage
income.50 Apparently, part of theses changes are due to shifts from non-college households to
either college graduates or dropouts, but it is worth noticing that average wages of non-college
households increase in the non-tertiary investment experiment. The same applies for the Theil
Index,51 which increases for income52 and consumption as college subsidies increase, and de-
creases, as investments in non-tertiary education are raised.
The different and partly opposing effects are clarified once more in the following special
case. As can be seen in Figure 12, welfare falls when college subsidies are raised from zero
50It drops from 0.7684 to 0.6771 which is a decrease of 11.88%, while average net wage income of college
graduates drops by only 5.03% (from 1.4951 to 1.4158).
51In Section D.1 we display the computation of the inequality measures.
52Please note that overall income stands in for net wage income plus net income from assets.
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to the level of the benchmark model. Roughly speaking, redistributive measures are welfare-
enhancing if they benefit a group with higher marginal utility than the group that was redis-
tributed from. The described increase in subsidies improves households that were in college
even under zero college subsidies, coming from rather high-income households. The group of
non-college households with a rather low income has to take on the cost of college subsidies (in
the form of higher labor taxes), but does not receive financial compensation. In this scenario, the
negative effect on them outweighs the positive effect on students and the marginal households
who go to college due to the implementation of college subsidies.53
College Subsidy 0.0000 0.388* 0.8750 1.7500 2.6250 3.5000
Social Welfare -0.9345 -0.9499 -0.9076 -0.8437 -0.8536 -0.8859
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 0.8167 0.7684 0.7165 0.6771 0.6161 0.5263
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 0.9182 0.8628 0.8646 0.7991 0.7086 0.6289
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 1.5894 1.4951 1.5013 1.4158 1.3195 1.2001
Aggr. Cons 0.4127 0.4223 0.4403 0.4343 0.4111 0.3793
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3800 0.3574 0.3387 0.3227 0.2939 0.2899
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.4106 0.3860 0.3923 0.3720 0.3356 0.3040
Aver. Cons College 0.6616 0.6230 0.6356 0.6109 0.5746 0.5289
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.3746 0.3800 0.3881 0.3940 0.3971 0.3953
Theil Index Overall Net Income 0.2765 0.2844 0.2914 0.2961 0.3004 0.2990
Theil Index Consumption 0.1126 0.1188 0.1226 0.1187 0.1169 0.1146
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.3498 1.3318 1.3437 1.3557 2.0875 2.1505
Var LN Overall Income 0.8248 0.8327 0.8447 0.8609 1.6055 1.6850
Var LN Consumption 0.3145 0.3290 0.3384 0.3328 0.3319 0.3271
Table 11: Results Equality
Note: * is the benchmark model. Bold letters mark policy measure with highest social welfare.
In summary, increased welfare is triggered by higher overall productivity, driven by an
increase in aggregate human capital. The latter is due to higher parental investments in primary
and secondary education, which are an endogenous reaction to increased college subsidies.
Production and aggregate consumption increase until the burden of taxation starts to outweigh
these positive effects. At that point labor supply declines, which, in combination, also explains
53As already mentioned, this does not translate into the small open economy and the general equilibrium version
of the model and occurs only in partial equilibrium when the level of non-tertiary human capital investments by
the government is low.
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the decline in human capital for very high level of college subsidies: in our model, higher
future wages are the only reason for parents to invest into the human capital of their children.
This incentive decreases with a higher tax progessivity and a lower future labor supply of the
child. Last but not least, we can note that an increase in college subsidies does not lead to a
more equal distribution of human capital and therefore not to a more equal distribution of wage
income, overall income and consumption.
5.2 Non-Tertiary Investments
In this experiment, college subsidies θ are fixed to the status quo, while the government can set
different levels of non-tertiary investments.54 The social optimum requires higher non-tertiary
education investments than the benchmark model (see Figure 14). The dynamics are different
compared to the previous experiment of college subsidies: non-tertiary education investments
have a larger impact on human capital than college subsidies, and, in particular, human capital
of children from low income households is increased by this measure. Higher and more equal
distributed human capital leads to both an increase in production and to a more equal distribution
of income and consumption.
Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0170 0.049* 0.0978 0.1786 0.2594 0.3401
Social Welfare -1.0646 -0.9499 -0.9000 -0.8347 -0.8020 -0.8231
Labor Tax 0.2187 0.2584 0.2815 0.2946 0.3081 0.3390
Aggr. Labor 0.7615 0.8767 0.9187 0.9254 0.9052 0.8861
Aggr. Output 0.3935 0.4530 0.4747 0.4781 0.4677 0.4579
Table 12: Results Production
At first sight, at the macroeconomic level, an increase of investments in non-tertiary ed-
ucation leads to a similar outcome as an increase in college subsidies: labor, production and
consumption increase in comparison to the benchmark model. At some point, there is a re-
versal, which is related to the increase of labor taxes making up for education expenditures.
54A detailed list of the results for various economic moments can be found in Table 21 in Appendix D.
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The incentive to work diminishes, aggregate labor decreases and social welfare is declining if
investments are further increased.
Figure 14: Experiment Non-Tertiary Investments (*Benchmark Model)
The reaction of parental investments into primary and secondary education with respect to
governmental investments is hump-shaped. At the lower end, parents react with an increase of
their education expenditures, which has two sources. On the one hand overall resources increase
when education investments of the government are raised, and, in addition, this pattern fits
the facts of human capital production. Due to dynamic complementarity and self-productivity,
higher investments of the government in one period increase the return on investments of parents
in all other periods. However, when public investments have exceeded a certain point, marginal
returns of additional investments become very small and parental investments are crowded out.
The proportion of non-college households is developing very similar to the previous policy
experiment. But as non-tertiary investments of the government lead to a stronger increase of hu-
man capital than the endogenous response of parents to higher college subsidies, more students
graduate from college successfully.
Figure 15 displays the human capital development given governmental investments have
been doubled compared to the benchmark model. Starting with innate human capital in the first
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Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0170 0.049* 0.0978 0.1786 0.2594 0.3401
Social Welfare -1.0646 -0.9499 -0.9000 -0.8347 -0.8020 -0.8231
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0014 0.0030 0.0019 0.0008 0.0004 0.0001
Aver. Human Capital 0.1701 0.3899 0.5107 0.6720 0.8027 0.8744
Aggr. Vivos Transfers 0.0126 0.0047 0.0032 0.0022 0.0010 0.0000
Fraction Non-College 0.8122 0.5591 0.3920 0.2328 0.1404 0.0901
Fraction Graduates 0.1112 0.2205 0.3188 0.4494 0.5392 0.5844
Fraction Dropouts 0.0767 0.2205 0.2892 0.3178 0.3204 0.3255
Table 13: Results Education
four years, skills develop almost completely accordingly. In the second investment period, at
the age of 6 (age 34 of parents), we can observe that human capital of children from households
with high productivity types (γh) overtakes human capital of their respective counterparts with
the same qualification status, implying that parents’ income (and thereby investments) continue
to be a factor, even though a much lesser one.
Figure 15: Human Capital Development Given i¯g/wc = 0.0978
Nevertheless, the entire distribution is much denser. Accordingly, we find a more equal
distribution of average net wage income and overall income (see Table 14). The average net
income of college households is falling as they are most affected by the increase in progres-
sive labor tax (in Table 21 in the appendix it can be seen that average gross wage income of
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college graduates is increasing). Both average net wage income and average consumption of
non-college households are monotonically increasing in governmental non-tertiary investments,
which is in sharp contrast to the effect of college subsidies. Accordingly, the Theil Index with
respect to income and consumption reflects the same picture.
Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0170 0.049* 0.0978 0.1786 0.2594 0.3401
Social Welfare -1.0646 -0.9499 -0.9000 -0.8347 -0.8020 -0.8231
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 0.6757 0.7684 0.7830 0.7748 0.7850 0.8275
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 0.9372 0.8628 0.8501 0.8553 0.8546 0.8313
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 1.6256 1.4951 1.4740 1.4821 1.4753 1.4349
Aggr. Cons 0.3738 0.4223 0.4467 0.4822 0.5026 0.4948
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3280 0.3574 0.3623 0.3608 0.3618 0.3680
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.4183 0.3860 0.3792 0.3821 0.3806 0.3655
Aver. Cons College 0.6778 0.6230 0.6118 0.6159 0.6119 0.5864
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.3992 0.3800 0.3730 0.3671 0.3576 0.3459
Theil Index Overall Net Income 0.3028 0.2844 0.2786 0.2732 0.2653 0.2574
Theil Index Consumption 0.1338 0.1188 0.1137 0.1090 0.1029 0.0977
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.2898 1.3318 1.3175 1.3047 1.2761 1.2232
Var LN Overall Income 0.8294 0.8327 0.8201 0.8071 0.7851 0.7575
Var LN Consumption 0.3516 0.3290 0.3160 0.3032 0.2850 0.2679
Table 14: Results Equality
To sum up, while the effects on aggregate labor and production are similar, the two policies
deviate regarding their distributional consequences. An increase in the non-tertiary education
expenses of the government causes the level of human capital across all households to increase,
while the tax burden continues to be borne especially by the highest-earning group. This results
in a more equal income and consumption distribution. Moreover, the overall impact on human
capital is higher, which causes not only the number of enrollments but also the fraction of
graduates to increase substantially.
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5.3 Tertiary and Non-Tertiary Education Measures
In the third experiment, the government has both instruments at its disposal and can thereby
balance the interplay of college subsidies and investments in non-tertiary education.55 The re-
sults indicate that considering only one of the two experiments separately could lead to wrong
conclusions, since the effectiveness of college subsidies depend on investments - and vice versa.
Figure 16 illustrates welfare as a function of college subsidies and investments in non-tertiary
education. Welfare is maximized in a combination of college subsidies (θ=263%) and non-
tertiary investments (i¯g∗/wc=0.2594). Thus, both policy measures are both above their respec-
tive values from the benchmark model. College subsidies even exceed their optimal value from
the univariate experiment.
Figure 16: Experiment Tertiary and Non-Tertiary Education
We begin with a closer look at the bottom left corner of Figure 16, where both policy instru-
ments exhibit their lowest value. Starting there, if the government were to perform the univariate
55For this experiment we combined the grids from the two univariate experiments, each consisting of six values
for college subsidies and non-tertiary investments. This results in 36 different combinations that were evaluated in
this experiment.
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college subsidy experiment, it would find that initially this has a positive, but only weak effect,
before welfare drops sharply through a further increase in subsidies.56 The reason is, that this
policy instrument is limited by the fact that affordable college education can only be a powerful
tool, if the human capital level in the economy is high enough. Otherwise, the financial burden
of tuition fees might be taken away, but a lack of human capital is the limiting component.
This is underlined by Figure 17. The case just described (minimum investments and maximum
subsidies) does not lead to a much higher human capital level (17(a)), but to higher college
enrollment (17(b)). Since the human capital level has not increased, this drives up the dropout
rate to its climax (17(c)) and the proportion of college graduates is almost unchanged (17(d)).
Thus, the incentive appears not to be the prospect of a good degree (higher wage), but rather the
financial benefit of negative tuition fees.
Performing the same thought experiment in the other direction (constant minimum subsidies
and investments are increased) clearly shows that the effectiveness of non-tertiary education in-
vestments also depends on whether households can financially afford to attend college. This is
an analogy to the fourth empirical fact of the human capital literature that Cunha and Heckman
(2010) emphasize: early investments have to be followed up by late investments. In other words,
fruits may have been sown by early investments and raised human capital, but they have to be
harvested in the form of college education in order to pay off sustainably.
The importance of the interplay between subsidies and investment becomes particularly
clear, when we consider Figure 17(a) and Figures 17(b) together: given maximum non-tertiary
investment, aggregate human capital is always at a high level, regardless of college subsidies.
However, if subsidies are set to zero, the college attendance rate drops to an extremely low
value - despite the high human capital. The reason becomes apparent, when we have a closer
look at Figure 18. Increased investments require a higher labor tax rate to balance the govern-
56Actually, welfare even decreases slightly when subsidies are raised from zero to the benchmark value of
38.8%, which follows the same dynamic as the special case described in the previous section.
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(a) Average Human Capital (b) Fraction College Enrollment
(c) Dropout Rate (d) College Graduates
Figure 17: Human Capital and College
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ment’s budget. This weakens the incentive for college education, which, given the absence of
college subsidies, is on top of that very expensive in this scenario. As a result, enrollment drops
although human capital is on a much higher level than in the benchmark model.
Figure 18: Labor Tax Rate
Figure 18 brings yet another finding to light. Higher college subsidies combined with a
higher college attendance rate lead to an increase in government expenditures κwcθ(Φc + φΦd).
However, the development of τl with respect to subsidies is U-shaped. This implies, that for low
levels of college subsidies, an increase leads to a raise in revenues that exceed the additional
college expenditures.57
5.4 Summary Partial Equilibrium Experiments
The experiments in partial equilibrium have shown that the two policy instruments affect welfare
through different channels. College subsidies increase aggregate human capital via the mech-
anisms known from human capital literature: better study prospects increase the (expected)
57The sharp drop in the lower left corner is related to the two special cases discussed, in which welfare decreased
when college subsidies were introduced. In these cases, labor taxes increase strongly with the introduction of
college subsidies, while the subsidies only benefit a rather small group on the top of the income distribution.
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return on non-tertiary investments, leading to an endogenous response of parents who increase
their primary and secondary education expenditures. This results in higher aggregate produc-
tion and consumption. However, college subsidies do not increase human capital of the kids
from the lowest income group, which is why inequality in net labor income increases when
subsidies are raised.
An increase in non-tertiary investments, on the other hand, affects children from all income
groups, and the resulting human capital distribution is moving to a higher level as well as closer
together. In addition to the increase in human capital, production and aggregated consumption,
the investments in non-tertiary education thereby result in a more equal distribution of average
net labor incomes and consumption, which has a positive effect on welfare, given concave utility
functions and the social welfare evaluation we perform.
BM OptSubs OptIvst BivOpt
Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0491 0.0491 0.2594 0.2594
College Subsidy 0.3880 1.7500 0.3880 2.6250
Social Welfare -0.9499 -0.8437 -0.8020 -0.6672
Labor Tax 0.2584 0.2966 0.3081 0.4169
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0030 0.0037 0.0004 0.0003
Aver. Human Capital 0.3899 0.4083 0.8027 0.8003
Fraction Non-College 0.5591 0.2879 0.1404 0.0132
Fraction Graduates 0.2205 0.3202 0.5392 0.5798
Fraction Dropouts 0.2205 0.3919 0.3204 0.4070
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.3800 0.3940 0.3576 0.3635
Theil Index Overall Income 0.2844 0.2961 0.2653 0.2714
Theil Index Consumption 0.1188 0.1187 0.1029 0.0931
Table 15: Comparison Univariate and Bivariate Optima
The bivariate experiment has shown that the effectiveness of early and late education sub-
sidies are highly dependent on each other and therefore difficult to assess separately. College
subsidies can do little if non-tertiary investments are not above a certain level. Otherwise aver-
age human capital is not sufficient for the low-cost college education to be taken advantage of.
Conversely, non-tertiary investments increase human capital, however, this will not be unuti-
lized if there is not a minimum of college subsidies provided and well-educated young adults
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can afford college education.
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6 Small Open Economy
Since the economy was in partial equilibrium in the previous experiment, wages were fixed to
the values of the benchmark model. Thus, although both policy instruments have increased
college attendance and the proportion of college graduates, wages of labor types Lnd and Lc
remained unchanged. In the small open economy, the interest rate remains constant,58 but wages
adapt to the firm’s maximization problem,59 and an increasing proportion of skilled relative to
unskilled labor leads to a decline in wc/wnd.60 As a result, college subsidies, unlike in partial
equilibrium, will also cause a more equal income distribution, which is in line with the findings
of Krueger and Ludwig (2016). Both measures result in a smaller college wage premium, which
leads to a decrease in human capital expenditures of parents and a more equal distribution of
skills. Non-tertiary investments overcompensate this effect and shift average human capital to
a higher level. The best policy mix in the bivariate experiment implies an investment level that
exceeds the optimal level from the univariate experiment, which highlights the importance of
the interplay of primary, secondary and tertiary education.
In the partial equilibrium experiment, we have described the different mechanisms of college
subsidies and non-tertiary investments very detailed. In this section, we focus on the differences
between the effects of the political measures in partial equilibrium and the small open economy.
Besides endogenous prices, the experiments are the same as in the previous chapter.61,62 Figure
19 gives a first impression of the results of the two univariate experiments.
58This intermediate step allows us to disentangle the effects from the labor market and the capital market. An
outlook on general equilibrium will be given in Section 6.4. Endogenous wages appear to be the more important
mechanism for the question at hand. In addition, due to faster convergence than in general equilibrium experiments,
the small open economy setup enables us to perform bivariate experiments in a timely manner.
59The computation of the firm’s maximization problem is shown in Appendix C.5.
60In Appendix C.7, we show how the equilibrium in the small open economy is established.
61Please note that social welfare is still evaluated following equation (42).
62The tables in Appendix E show the results of this chapter in more detail.
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(a) College Subsidies (b) Non-Tertiary Investments
Figure 19: Results Univariate Experiments (SOE)
6.1 College Subsidies
The impact of college subsidies in the small open economy on aggregate output is very similar
to partial equilibrium.63 Wage adjustments, however, make the changes in aggregate labor
somewhat weaker, which is why labor taxes fluctuate a little less than in partial equilibrium.
Welfare in the benchmark model is higher than in the absence of college subsidies, unlike in
partial equilibrium. This is due to the low wages of non-college households and dropouts, when
college education is very expensive. It is worth noticing, that tuition fees κwc(1 − θ − θpr)
are proportional to the factor price of skilled labor, wc. Thus, in the small open economy, the
increase in tuition fees is amplified when college subsidies are set to zero.
Wage adjustments affect educational choices of households. Subsidies in tertiary educa-
tion continue to allow more young households to afford college. As describes above, due to
dynamic complementarity, this increases the return on parental investments in primary and sec-
ondary education. When prices are endogenous, this positive effect on education expenditures
has two adversaries. When subsidies are raised, the fraction of graduates increases, which leads
63An extension of the results in Table 16 can be found in Table 22 in Appendix E.
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to decreasing wages of college graduates. In addition, the outside option (not attending col-
lege) becomes more attractive, since the wage for low-skilled labor goes up when Lnd becomes
smaller.
College Subsidy 0.0000 0.388* 0.8750 1.7500 2.6250 3.5000
Social Welfare -1.0732 -0.9509 -0.8930 -0.8371 -0.8384 -0.8479
Labor Tax 0.2523 0.2584 0.2651 0.2970 0.3396 0.3840
Aggr. Labor 0.8340 0.8767 0.8834 0.8755 0.8529 0.8298
Aggr. Output 0.4309 0.4530 0.4565 0.4523 0.4407 0.4287
Av-Wage Non-College 0.9255 1.0079 1.0178 1.0233 1.0855 1.0175
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.0700 1.1121 1.1662 1.1921 1.1367 1.1637
Av-Wage Graduates 2.3524 1.8646 1.7740 1.6216 1.5916 1.5444
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0038 0.0030 0.0028 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024
Aver. Human Capital 0.4008 0.3899 0.3840 0.3747 0.3729 0.3710
Fraction Non-College 0.7186 0.5591 0.4930 0.3453 0.2003 0.1177
Fraction Graduates 0.1581 0.2205 0.2469 0.2888 0.2988 0.3162
Fraction Dropouts 0.1233 0.2205 0.2601 0.3660 0.5010 0.5661
Av. College Wage Premium 2.4850 1.7974 1.6594 1.4606 1.4184 1.3564
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.4219 0.3800 0.3720 0.3642 0.3633 0.3589
Aggr. Cons 0.4052 0.4223 0.4295 0.4212 0.4031 0.3836
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3316 0.3574 0.3594 0.3490 0.3468 0.3068
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.3682 0.3860 0.4040 0.4007 0.3663 0.3536
Aver. Cons College 0.7688 0.6230 0.5965 0.5335 0.5026 0.4657
Theil Index Consumption 0.1478 0.1188 0.1122 0.1024 0.0992 0.0962
Table 16: Results College Subsidy Experiment (SOE)
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. Beside factor prices wq, average wages
(“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
These two negative effects on the incentive to invest in primary and secondary education
dominate, which leads to a decline in aggregate human capital investments of parents. Com-
pared to partial equilibrium (see Table 10), we can see that private aggregate human capital
investments in the small open economy are only larger when college subsidies are zero, which
underlines the importance of the college wage premium for parental education expenditures.
Accordingly, the direction of development of the three qualification groups is the same, but
stronger in comparison to partial equilibrium.
In the small open economy, college subsidies reduce both the inequality in income and con-
sumption. For non-college households and dropouts, in the range between 0%−87.5%, average
consumption even increases with college subsidies, which is in sharp contrast to the previous
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chapter (see Table 11). In addition to the adjustment of wages, there is a second component
which impacts the distribution of wages significantly. Figure 20 shows the development of hu-
man capital, given welfare-maximizing college subsidies of θ = 175%. The effect on human
capital of children from high-income households is reversing compared to partial equilibrium
(see Figure 13): the decline in parental human capital investments, caused by the endogenous
reduction in the college wage premium, affects them the strongest. They stay at the top, but the
distribution moves closer together. In partial equilibrium, their human capital was increased,
because parents endogenous reaction was only driven by better prospects on college education
for their children, but not the counteracting effect of a decline in the college wage premium.
Figure 20: Human Capital Development (θ = 175%)
6.2 Non-Tertiary Investments
In the small open economy, the optimal non-tertiary investment level of the government64 is
smaller compared to partial equilibrium. The main difference is, that the effect on college at-
64Please note that we express non-tertiary investments of the government relative to college wages wc, i.e. i¯/wc.
Therefore, the investment levels displayed in this chapter deviate from the partial equilibrium analysis. However,
the underlying investment level of the government i¯ remains unchanged.
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tendance is weaker, which is caused by a decrease in the endogenous college wage premium.
Average productivity of the respective qualification groups is increased by governmental in-
vestments, but the effect on tax revenues is outweighed by additional education expenditures.
As a result, labor taxes increase strongly. Combined with declining college wages, this even
leads to a drop in college attendance for very high levels of primary and secondary education
expenditures by the government. At that turning point, social welfare takes its highest value.65
Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0131 0.049* 0.1051 0.2013 0.2972 0.3914
Social Welfare -1.2314 -0.9499 -0.8923 -0.9050 -0.9797 -1.1379
Labor Tax 0.2333 0.2588 0.2912 0.3541 0.4234 0.5018
Aggr. Labor 0.7808 0.8767 0.8917 0.8935 0.8866 0.8715
Aggr. Output 0.4034 0.4530 0.4607 0.4617 0.4581 0.4503
Av-Wage Non-College 0.7512 1.0079 1.1321 1.2370 1.3072 1.3439
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.0198 1.1121 1.1533 1.1879 1.1997 1.2037
Av-Wage Graduates 2.5359 1.8646 1.7185 1.6229 1.5767 1.5599
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0024 0.0030 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Aver. Human Capital 0.1922 0.3899 0.4898 0.6513 0.7946 0.8724
Fraction Non-College 0.7809 0.5591 0.5206 0.5350 0.5589 0.5723
Fraction Graduates 0.1310 0.2205 0.2506 0.2714 0.2793 0.2812
Fraction Dropouts 0.0880 0.2205 0.2288 0.1936 0.1617 0.1466
Av. College Wage Premium 3.2578 1.7974 1.5094 1.3260 1.2288 1.1860
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.4845 0.3800 0.3539 0.3296 0.3088 0.2879
Aggr. Cons 0.3675 0.4223 0.4259 0.4043 0.3705 0.3252
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.2875 0.3574 0.3809 0.3783 0.3562 0.3166
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.3625 0.3860 0.3856 0.3645 0.3305 0.2882
Aver. Cons College 0.8474 0.6230 0.5562 0.4839 0.4224 0.3621
Theil Index Consumption 0.1868 0.1188 0.1018 0.0895 0.0808 0.0752
Table 17: Results Non-Tertiary Investments Experiment (SOE)
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. Beside factor prices wq, average wages
(“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
6.3 Tertiary and Non-Tertiary Education Measures
The best policy mix calls for non-tertiary investments of the government of i¯/wc = 0.2013
and college subsidies of θ = 175%. Thus, optimal primary and secondary investments of the
65Maximum college attendance is given by 1 − 0.5206 = 0.4794.
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government are higher when college subsidies exceed the benchmark value. Further, in Figure
21, the interdependence of the two policy instruments becomes clear once again.
(a) Social Welfare (b) College Wage Premium
Figure 21: Results Bivariate Experiment (SOE)
For the representation of (b) the axes had to be sorted in descending order. Please note that due to convergence
issues and time restrictions with respect to high performance computing resources, for three edge cases displayed
in these figures, we had to approximate the results by extrapolation. However, given these points are not in the
neighborhood of the best policy mix, that does not change the results (for the sake of completeness, these edge
cases are: min. investments / min. subsidies, min. investments / max subsidies, max. investments / max subsidies).
Given minimum primary and secondary education expenditures by the government, welfare
decreases (almost) monotonically in college subsidies. Human capital is too small for college
subsidies to make a significant difference in the fraction of college graduates. Hence, there is
no reduction in the college wage premium and, the caused tax increase due to the college sub-
sidies even leads to a redistribution from rather poor to rather rich households, which decreases
welfare.66
The dependence works in both directions. The optimal investment level in non-tertiary
education by the government, given college subsidies of either 38.8% or 87.50%, is given by
i¯/wc = 0.1051, which is below the level of the best policy mix (i¯/wc = 0.2013, θ = 175%).
66See Figure 25 in Appendix E for more results on college enrollment, college graduation and the labor tax rate.
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6.4 An Outlook on General Equilibrium
In contrast to the small open economy, in general equilibrium changes in supply and demand
on the capital market will lead to adjustments of the interest rate.67 Changes in the interest
rate affect, among other things, the return on assets, which is another component that has an
impact on the distribution of overall income. We performed the univariate experiments under
general equilibrium in the same fashion as for the small open economy. The results of the two
experiments can be found in Tables 24 and 25 as well as in Figure 26 in Appendix E.
(a) Small Open Economy (b) General Equilibrium
Figure 22: Comparison Results Non-Tertiary Investments
However, compared to the small open economy, the results change quantitatively only
marginally, while the qualitative results remain unchanged. As an example, Figure 22 shows
the results of the univariate non-tertiary investment experiments for both small open economy
and general equilibrium.
This suggests that the endogenisation of wages is the more influential effect, compared to
endogenous changes on the capital market, for the underlying research question. The incentive
to reach for higher education in our model is to achieve a higher wage. By switching from
67See Appendix C.7 for a detailed description.
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partial equilibrium to the small open economy setup, both policy measures had a direct impact
on this incentive. In addition, these effects were very different for the two groups: an increase
in high-skilled labor reduced college wages and increased wages for low-skilled labor. The
different qualification groups have different asset holdings, but changes in the interest rate will
most likely be less influential for educational decisions than the endogenization of the premium
for higher education.
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7 Conclusion
We have extended the model of Krueger and Ludwig by (i) linking the prospect of successful
college completion to human capital, (ii) introducing taste shocks in order to deal with potential
issues caused by the discrete college choice and (iii) incorporating the human capital process
during primary and secondary education. In addition, we detected inaccuracies in the solution
method used in Krueger and Ludwig (2013), caused by a miss-specification of the trade-off
between consumption, savings and investments, which has led to an underestimation of inter-
vivos transfers and human capital investment choices.68 We developed a valid alternative. This
results in a large-scale OLG model, that accounts for the core mechanisms of the human cap-
ital literature and allows for endogenous responses within the whole human capital process
of primary, secondary and tertiary education, to changes in college subsidies and non-tertiary
education investments by the government. By embedding this setup into a large-scale OLG
environment, we were able to compare the different paths of impact of the policy measures in a
realistic framework.
In partial equilibrium, non-tertiary education investments and college subsidies deviate re-
garding their distributional consequences. Both measures increase average human capital,
which leads to higher aggregate production and consumption. However, while primary and
secondary education expenses of the government increase the human capital level for children
from all household types, college subsidies do not increase the human capital investments from
education and income-poor parents, which leads to an increase of inequality. When wages re-
spond to shifts in the labor market, both policy measures increase equality. This is accomplished
by an endogenous decrease in the college wage premium, which lowers the return on parental
human capital investments. The key difference between the two measures is, that while both
policy instruments result in a more equal distribution of human capital, non-tertiary investments
of the government compensate for the decreased human capital expenditures of parents and shift
68The latter only applies for this thesis, as Krueger and Ludwig (2013) do model inter-vivos transfers, but no
human capital investment choices.
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average human capital to a higher level.69
The bivariate experiments underline the interdependence of the two policy measures. Ben-
efits of college subsidies can only be claimed if young adults have the skills to successfully
complete college. Early human capital investments remain unused, if college education can
only be afforded by a small fraction in the population. In all experiments we have performed,
the best policy mix calls for an increase in primary, secondary and tertiary education invest-
ments by the government, financed by higher labor taxes relative to the current status quo.
Outlook on Further Potential Work
In a first step, the calibration could be expanded in order to relate parental education investments
more closely to income and expenditures.70 This can be accomplished by using the investment
multiplier in the human capital production function as additional calibration parameter (see
equation (30)). In addition, college attendance could also be tied to human capital, standing
in for access restrictions of colleges. That could improve the subsidy experiment, by limiting
enrollment for the sole sake of receiving negative tuition fees. In addition, it would further
wash-out potential kinks in value functions and is rather straightforward to implement.
Financial constraints occur more often when families are young. In addition, primary edu-
cation is extremely important for all consecutive stages of human capital development. Thus,
another very interesting policy experiment would be to let the government not only choose the
level of non-tertiary education, but also to allow for shifts between primary to secondary ed-
ucation. Given we used ζge,t in equations (34) and (35) in order to match primary relative to
secondary education expenditures by the government, this experiment is easy to implement.
Investments are of purely monetary nature in the developed model. In addition, governmen-
tal and parental investments are considered to be perfect substitutes. This allows for situations,
in which parental investments in primary and secondary education are fully crowded out by the
69This result is succinctly summarized by the following quote: “[...] an equity-efficiency trade-off exists for late
investments, but not for early investments” (see Cunha and Heckman (2010), page 2).
70See, e.g., Kaushal, Magnuson and Waldfogel (2011).
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government. That could be changed by introducing complementarity between governmental
and parental investments. Apparently, this is also connected to the literature on time invest-
ments and a more complex extension would be to include that into the model. In the current
version, higher efficiency of high-educated parents in shaping the human capital of their chil-
dren is accounted for by a better access to financial resources. Distinguishing between time
and money investments,71 among other things, would add opportunity costs to this process.
Whether or not this extension has a large impact on the results could be an interesting topic in
itself, because we still know little about how sensitive these type of models react to the choice
of the human capital production function.72
71See, e.g., Abbott (2019).
72Thanks to Lance Lochner for pointing that out to us.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 97
Bibliography
[1] Abbott, B., Gallipoli, G. (2017), “Human capital spill-overs and the geography of inter-
generational mobility”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 25, 208-233.
[2] Abbott, B. (2017), “The Substitutability of Parental Investments of Time and Expendi-
ture”, Working Paper.
[3] Abbott, B. (2019), “Incomplete Markets, The Substitutability of Time and Money, and
Parental Investments in Children”, Working Paper.
[4] Aiyagari, S. (1994), “Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving”, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109(3), 659-684.
[5] Auerbach, A., Kotlikoff, L. (1987), “Dynamic fiscal policy”, Cambridge University Press.
[6] Becker, G. (1993), “A treatise on the family”, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[7] Benabou, R. (2002), “Tax and education policy in a heterogeneous-agent economy: What
levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency?”, Econometrica, 70(2), 481-
517.
[8] Bewley, T. (1986), “Stationary monetary equilibrium with a continuum of independently
fluctuating consumers”, Contributions to mathematical economics in honor of Gérard
Debreu, 79.
[9] Blankenau, W. and X. Youderian (2015), “Early childhood education expenditures and the
intergenerational persistence of income”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 18 (2015),
334-349.
[10] BMBF (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung) (2012), “Die wirtschaftliche
und soziale Lage der Studierenden in Deutschland 2012”, 20. Sozialerhebung des
Deutschen Studentenwerks.
[11] Bohacek, R., Kapicka, M. (2008), “Optimal Human Capital Policies”, Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 55, 1-16.
BIBLIOGRAPHY98
[12] Bohacek, R., Kapicka, M. (2012), “A quantitative analysis of educational reforms in a
dynastic framework”, Manuscript, University of California Santa Barbara.
[13] Borjas, G. J. (2003), “The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining the im-
pact of immigration on the labor market”, The quarterly journal of economics, 118(4),
1335-1374.
[14] Bovenberg, A., Jacobs, B. (2005), “Redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese
twins”, Journal of Public Economics, 89(11-12).
[15] Busch, C. (2019), “Occupational Switching and Wage Risk ”, In Revision, 01-02.
[16] Carroll, C., Hall, R., Zeldes, S. (1992). “The buffer-stock theory of saving: Some macroe-
conomic evidence”, Brookings papers on economic activity, 1992(2), 61-156.
[17] Carroll, C. (2005). “Solving Dynamic Stochastic Optimization Problems Using the
Method of Endogenous Gridpoints”, Society for Economic Dynamics.
[18] Caucutt, E. M., Lochner, L. (2017), “Early and Late Human Capital Investments, Borrow-
ing Constraints, and the Family”, NBER Working Paper 18493.
[19] Chamley, C. (1986), “Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infi-
nite lives”, Econometrica, 54, 607-622.
[20] Conesa, J., Krueger, D. (2006). “On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code”,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(7), 1425-1450.
[21] Conesa, J., Kitao, S., Krueger, D. (2009). “Taxing capital? Not a bad idea after all!”,
American Economic Review, 99(1), 25-48.
[22] Cunha, F., Heckmann, J. (2007), “The Technology of Skill Production”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 97(2): 31-47.
[23] Cunha, F., Heckmann, J. (2010), “Investing in Our Young People”, National bureau of
economic research., No. w16201.
[24] Cunha, F., Heckman, J., Lochner, L., Masterov, D. (2006), “Interpreting the Evidence On
Life Cycle Skill Formation”, Handbook of the Economics of Education, 1, 697-812.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 99
[25] Cunha, F., Heckman, J., Schennach, S. (2010), “Estimating the Technology of Cognitive
and Noncognitive Skill Formation”, Econometrica, 78(3): 883-931.
[26] Fehr, H., Kindermann, F. (2012), “Optimal taxation with current and future cohorts”, CE-
Sifo Working Paper 3973.
[27] Findeisen, S., Sachs, D. (2016), “Education and optimal dynamic taxation: The role of
income-contingent student loans”, Journal of Public Economics, 138, 1-21.
[28] Gourinchas, P.-O., Parker, J. A. (2002), “Consumption Over the Life Cycle”, Economet-
rica, 70.1 (2002): 47-89.
[29] Heckman, J., L. Lochner, Todd, P. (2005), “Earnings Functions, Rates of Return and Treat-
ment Effects: The Mincer Equation and Beyond”, NBER Working Paper 11544.
[30] Heckman, J., L. Lochner, Taber, C. (1998), “Tax Policy and Human-Capital Formation”,
American Economic Review, 88, 293-297.
[31] Heckman, J., L. Lochner, Taber C. (1999), “Human Capital Formation and General Equi-
librium Treatment Effects: A Study of Tax and Tuition Policy”, Fiscal Studies, 20,
25-40.
[32] Huggett, M. (1993), “The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance
economies”, Journal of economic Dynamics and Control, 17(5-6), 953-969.
[33] Huggett, M. (1997), “The one-sector growth model with idiosyncratic shocks: Steady
states and dynamics”, Journal of monetary economics, 39(3), 385-403.
[34] Iskhakov, F., Jørgensen, T., Rust, J., Schjerning, B. (2015). “Estimating discrete-
continuous choice models: The endogenous grid method with taste shocks”, Discus-
sion Papers 15-19, University of Copenhagen.
[35] Jacobs, B., Bovenberg, A. (2010), “Human capital and optimal positive taxation of capital
income”, International Tax and Public Finance, 17(5), 451-478.
[36] Judd, K. (1985), “Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model”, Journal of
public Economics, 28(1), 59-83.
BIBLIOGRAPHY100
[37] Karabarbounis, M. (2012), “Heterogeneity in labor supply elasticity and optimal taxation”,
2012 Meeting Papers (Vol. 655), Society for Economic Dynamics.
[38] Katz, L., Murphy, K. (1992). “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and De-
mand Factors”, The quarterly journal of economics, 107(1), 35-78.
[39] Kaushal, N., Magnuson, K., Waldfogel, J. (2011), “How is family income related to in-
vestments in children’s learning?”, Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools,
and Children’s Life Chances, chapter 9, 187-206.
[40] Krueger, D., Ludwig, A. (2013), “Optimal Progressive Taxation and Education Subsidies
in a Model of Endogenous Human Capital Formation”, American Economic Review
P&P, 103(3), pp 496-501.
[41] Krueger, D., Ludwig, A. (2016), “On the Optimal Provision of Social Insurance: Progres-
sive Taxation versus Education Subsidies in General Equilibrium”, Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 77, pp 72-98.
[42] Lee, S., Seshadri, A. (2019), “On the intergenerational transmission of economic status”,
Journal of Political Economy, 127(2), 000-000.
[43] Lochner, L., Monge, A. (2011), “Credit Constraints in Education”, forthcoming, Annual
Review of Economics.
[44] Ludwig, A., Schön, M. (2014), “Endogenous Grids in Higher Dimensions: Delaunay
Interpolation and Hybrid Methods ”, Computational Economics 51.3 (2018): 463-492.
[45] Manski, C. F., Wise, D. A. (1983), “College choice in America”, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
[46] McFadden, D. (1978), “Modeling the choice of residential location”, in A. Karlqvist, L.
Lundqvist, F. Snickars, and J.Weibull, eds., Spatial Interaction Theory and Planning
Models, North-Holland, 1978, 75-96.
[47] McFadden, D. (1978), “Modeling the choice of residential location”, Transportation Re-
search Record, Nr. 673.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 101
[48] OECD, “Education at a Glance - Public spending on education”,
https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/public-spending-on-education.htm, 2017.
[49] Piketty, T., Saez, E. (2013), “Optimal labor income taxation”, Handbook of public eco-
nomics (Vol. 5, pp. 391-474), Elsevier.
[50] Restuccia, D., Urrutia, C. (2004), “Intergenerational Persistence of Earnings: The Role of
Early and College Education”, American Economic Review, 94, 1354-1378.
[51] Rust, J. (1994), “Structural estimation of Markov decision processes”, Handbook of
Econometrics, 4, 3081-3143.
[52] Solon, G. (1999), “Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market”, Handbook of la-
bor economics, Vol. 5. Amsterdam, New York and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-
Holland, 1999, pp. 1761-800.
[53] Solon, G. (2002), “Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility”,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 59-66.
[54] Stinebrickner, Ralph, Stinebrickner, T. R. (2003), “Understanding Educational Outcomes
of Students from Low-Income Families: Evidence from a Liberal Arts College with a
Full Tuition Subsidy Program”, Journal of Human Resources, 38(3), 591-617.
[55] Stokey, N. (1998), “Shirtsleeves to Shirtsleeves: The Economics of Social Mobility”,
Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory: The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lec-
tures 1983-1997, Cambridge University Press, 210-241.
[56] Wiegand, J. (1997), “Intergenerational earnings mobility in Germany”, University College
London, Mimeo.

103
A Appendix to Chapter 2
This section contains supplementary material for Chapter 2.
A.1 Our Model in Light of the Human Capital Literature
Cunha and Heckman (2007) and (2010) (CH hereafter) provide a theoretical framework that
summarizes, organizes and interprets a variety of empirical facts about the development of
human capital. We want to pick up these facts and critically analyze if our model can reflect
them by linking these facts to the mechanisms of human capital development. As mentioned
above, these key mechanisms are dynamic complementarity
∂2 f j(h j, I j)
∂h j∂I j
> 0,
as well as self-productivity
∂ f j(h j, I j)
∂h j
> 0,
both of which are taken into account by our model. In the periods of primary and secondary
education, we use a CES production function, such as Cunha and Heckman suggested and as
was estimated in the extensive work of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) (CHS here-
after). Dynamic complementarity and self-productivity in the context of college attendance and
productivity types has been described in Section 2.2.3. While dynamic complementarity comes
from the positive impact of human capital on the expected wage spread, self-productivity is
reflected by higher skills leading to a higher (expected) qualification, which is expressed in col-
lege completion and productivity type.
The first empirical fact CH highlight is that differences in people’s abilities form very early
in life, which is well documented in Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (2006). They
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display the human capital development of children from different income percentiles, showing,
on the one hand, that most of the divergence in skills of children is already existent at the age
of eight - after that it develops almost parallel.73 On the other hand, they point to a correlation
between human capital development and income of parents. The interplay of dynamic comple-
mentarity and borrowing constraints is used to explain this empirical fact: if early investments
fail to appear because of financial restrictions of parents, and at the same time, due to dynamic
complementarity and (the lack of) self-productivity it is very difficult to compensate for this in
later stages of life, this is exactly the pattern that arises. In addition, this is closely related to the
second empirical fact: the effects of credit constraints are age dependent. In this context, Cau-
cutt and Lochner (2017) (18) investigate the importance of borrowing constraints of families at
early stages. They find that a $10, 000 increase in discounted annual income of parents when
children are at the age of zero to eleven reduces high school drop out rates by 2.5 percentage
points, while it increases college attendance by 4.6 percentage points. Both dynamic comple-
mentarity and borrowing constraints are present in our model and in the resulting life-cycle
profiles this first empirical fact is represented (see Figure 10(a)).
The third fact that CH address is deviating returns at different ages on investments tar-
geted toward disadvantaged children. On the one hand, this is pretty close to the definition of
self-productivity. Assuming that early investments during primary education of disadvantaged
children are very small, this would result in relatively low skills at the beginning of secondary
education. In view of this, self-productivity implies a low return on investments within this
period targeted at disadvantaged adolescents. Of course, this is also linked to dynamic com-
plementarity, as it makes substituting missing investments from early periods much harder and
thereby weakens the effect of investments in secondary education, given low investments in
primary education. Thus, if a government had to choose how to distribute investments among
primary and secondary education, this interplay is crucial, which is also emphasized by the
fourth fact CH examine: early investments have to be followed up by late investments. Again,
dynamic complementarity is the main mechanism behind this fact. Early investments are nec-
73They use PIAT Math scores as a proxy for human capital.
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essary for later investments to be effective. However, if late investments fail to appear then the
early sown fruits are not harvested. Given all these mechanisms are incorporated, our model is
able to address facts three and four as well. In Section 3.4 we will show, how they are reflected
in the policy functions of the model.
Caucutt and Lochner (2017) refine their above statement as follows: “An important conse-
quence of dynamic complementarity is that studying the impacts of a policy change exclusively
in that period can be misleading. For example, a large literature considers the effects of college-
age policies on schooling and labor market outcomes holding early investment and adolescent
achievement levels fixed. [. . . ] Our quantitative analysis highlights that ignoring these earlier
investment responses can lead researchers to under-estimate the total wage impact of college-
age investment subsidies by almost 60%.” (see (18), page 4). This result essentially goes
through all of the facts just summarized. Subsidizing college education increases the incentive
for parents to invest in their children in early stages, and they will do so if they are financially
capable. Through this endogenous response of parents, the average human capital of young
adults in college will be higher, which in turn reinforces the effectiveness of college subsidiza-
tion. This result underlines the importance of considering the whole human capital process in
order to analyze the various policy instruments and their effectiveness. This is where this theses
comes in, with both college subsidies and non-tertiary investments as instruments available to
the government, and a complete endogenous human capital process within the family.
A.1.1 Adjacent Research
In our model we summarize abilities in scalar h. In this section, we will critically compare this
to the alternative of modeling human capital as a vector of different types of skills and work out
that it is the better choice for us to work with a skill scalar, given the research question we want
to answer.
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Two of the six empirical facts on human capital development analyzed in CH are still pend-
ing. The first one is, that there are critical and sensitive periods in human capital production.
Critical periods arise when abilities can only be built in certain periods of life. An example is
the ability to speak a foreign language without accent, which becomes almost impossible after
a certain age. Examples for skills exhibiting sensitive periods are coordination and IQ, whose
further development become increasingly difficult after the age of ten. Non-cognitive character-
istics such as patience and emotional stability are generally considered more malleable during
the age of 12 to 16. Technically, both of these properties would rather need a skill vector as
opposed to the human capital scalar. An ability featuring a critical period would exhibit perfect
complementary for this particular type of skill in all other periods except for the critical one,
while other types of abilities are malleable in the whole development process.74 In the same
spirit, an ability type featuring a sensitive period would exhibit a very low elasticity in all other
than the sensitive period.
The sixth and last empirical fact mentioned in CH is closely connected: noncognitive skills
foster cognitive skills and are an important product of successful families and successful inter-
ventions in disadvantaged families. Here, too, a vector of at least two skill types would be nec-
essary, if a distinction is important for the question under consideration. CHS estimate human
capital functions for both one-skill and cognitive and non-cognitive skill models. Based on their
estimates, they develop a theoretical model to answer the following question: If a government
were to maximize aggregate schooling, in which children should it invest. They arrive at the
conclusion, that a model with an underlying two-type human capital process would conclude
that these investments should be distributed to young disadvantaged children, while a model
with an underlying one-type technology would shift resources more to relatively advantaged
children.75
The important difference to our model is the question at hand. CHS analyze which children
74Taking our function from above, i.e. h ja = m(h0, I0, . . . , I3), age 0 would be a critical period for h ja if
∂m(h0,I0,...,I3)
∂I j
= 0 for j = 1, 2, 3, but ∂m(h0,I0,...,I3)
∂I0
> 0.
75As mentioned above, that comes from the fact that returns on investments are higher, given higher investments
in the past and therefore a higher human capital stock in the period the investment is made.
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should receive education subsidies, when the government wants to maximize human capital.
Thus, in their model government measures are contingent on the characteristics of children.
In contrast, our question is about the aggregate interaction of primary, secondary and tertiary
education in a quantitative model, in which policy instruments are not made dependent on the
characteristics of children. In addition, the government maximizes welfare instead of schooling,
implying it is also about distributional aspects. Summing up, the subdivision into two skill types
would be a further complication of our model, analytically and computationally, but would
not make a contribution to the underlying question. The key mechanisms we need to adopt
are dependencies and differences between the periods when human capital is shaped, which is
captured by the interplay of dynamic complementarity and self-productivity.76
76We would especially like to thank Lance Lochner for the very helpful exchange on this topic.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
This chapter contains supplementary content for Chapter 3.
We solve the household problem in the different stages of the life-cycle of households by either
the endogenous grid method or a hybrid method incorporating the exogenous grid method.
Therefore, in both cases it is useful to express households’ value functions in terms of cash-
on-hand. We start this chapter we briefly introducing the cash-on-hand definition and highlight
its interplay with labor given our tax code. In Section B.1.3 we apply this definition to the
recursive household problem described in Chapter 3.1. The solution methods applied for the
different stages are then displayed in Sections B.2 and B.3 respectively.
B.1 Reformulation of the Household Problem
B.1.1 Cash-On-Hand Definition and Asset Regions
In order to shorten notation we denote the net-capital return by:
Rnt = 1 + (1 − τk,t)rt. (43)
In addition, we define age specific gross wages by
wt, j,q = wt,q j,q. (44)
Further, we define cash-on-hand as available financial resources under maximum labor sup-
ply ` = 1:
X′ = Rnt A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1,qγη′ j+1,q
= Rnt A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′. (45)
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This has the desirable effect making cash-on-hand tomorrow completely determined by choices
from today, in particular, independent of the labor choice in the next period, which helps ap-
plying the endogenous grid method by Carroll (2005). In a similar fashion we make use of
redefining gross savings as
A¯′ = A′ + ipk f + B f . (46)
As this only effects periods parents either invest into human capital of their children or grant
vivos transfers, so it is further explained below. Due to the tax free amount within our tax
system, i.e. Tt(Yt) max
{
0, τ`,t (Yt − Zt)}, we will have agents paying Tt(Yt) = 0 and agents pay-
ing Tt(Yt) > 0. Thus, it is straightforward to compute the labor choice l¯ splitting agents into
these two groups. Setting Yt = (1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη` = Zt we get:
¯` =
Zt
(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη. (47)
So there will be asset rich households choosing to work below ¯` avoiding and asset poor
households working ` > Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη paying labor taxes. Figure 23 displays these different
asset regions graphically. The expenditure side of the budget constraint differs accordingly:
A¯′ =

X − (1 + τc,t)C − T (Yt) − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) if l > ¯`
X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) else.
(48)
Plugging in Yt = (1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη` and rearranging the equation leads us to a more detailed
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version of (48) (equation (49) is developed in Appendix B.1.2):
A¯′ =

X − (1 + τc)C + τ`,tZt − (1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `)
− τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ) if ` > ¯`
X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) else.
(49)
But for the sake of simplicity we will use (48) in the remainder of this section. Nevertheless,
the following term is important for the first-order-conditions and we refer to it as net-wage:
wnt, j,q =

(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη if ` > ¯`
(1 − τss) wt, j,qγη else.
(50)
B.1.2 Savings Under New Cash-On-Hand Definition
Here we develop equation (49):
A¯′ =

X − (1 + τc)C + τ`,tZt − (1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη
X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `).
We start with the usual budget constraint:
Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη` = (1 + τc)C + A¯′ + T (Yt).
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(a) ` = 0 and µ` > 0 (` ≥ 0 binding) (b) 0 ≤ ` < Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη and T (Yt) = 0
(c) ` = Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη and T (Yt) = 0 (d) ` >
Zt
(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη and T (Yt) > 0
Figure 23: Labor as a function of cash-on-hand
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Next, we incorporate our cash-on-hand definition X = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ) where 1ξ
stands in for time deduction due to college:
Rnt A = (1 + τc)C + A¯
′ + T (Yt) − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη` | + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
⇔ X = (1 + τc)C + A¯′ + T (Yt) + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `)
which leads to:
A¯′ =

X − (1 + τc)C − T (Yt) − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) if ` > ¯`
X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) else.
With this notation we describe the budget constraint. But as households are maximizing with
respect to leisure 1 − `n = 1 − 1ξ − `, some more steps are required. Plugging in T (Yt) =
τ`,t((1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη` − Zt) we get:
A¯′ = X − (1 + τc)C + τ`,tZt −τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη` − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `)︸                                                                   ︷︷                                                                   ︸
ltx
.
and as
ltx = −τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη` − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `)
= −τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη` − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) +
(
τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
−τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
)
= τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
= − (1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
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we get:
A¯′ =

X − (1 + τc)C + τ`,tZt − (1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `)
− τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ) if ` > ¯`
X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ − `) else.
B.1.3 Recursive Problem of Households in Terms of Cash-On-Hand
Retirement at age J, . . . , jr
V ( j, X, q, γ) = max
C,X′
{
u(C, 1) + βV ′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ
)}
subject to
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + pt+1, j+1(q, γ)
A¯′ = A′ = X − (1 + τc)C ≥ 0.
We solve for optimal consumption building the Lagrange function
L(C, µA′) = u(C, 1) + βV ′
 j + 1,Rnt+1(X − (1 + τc)C) + pt+1, j+1(q, γ)︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
X′(C)
, q, γ
 + µA′(X − (1 + τc)C),
where µA′ is the multiplier on the non-negativity constraint. First order and envelope conditions
are:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ
) − µA′ = 0 (51)
EVLP : VX ( j, X, q, γ) = βRnt+1V
′
X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ
)
+ µA′ . (52)
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Given households choose (1 + τc)C = X in the last period, we compute:
uC(C, 1)
(1 + τc)
= VX ( j, X, q, γ) . (53)
Applying the endogenous grid method for solving periods J − 1, . . . , jr is straightforward.
Given an exogenous savings grid point A′ we receive X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + pt+1, j+1(q, γ). Now bal-
ance equation (51) to receive optimal consumption of the respective period and compute cor-
responding VX ( j, X, q, γ) using (53). Next we can compute endogenous cash-on-hand today
via X = A′ + (1 + τc)C and move on to the next period.
Working as parents of adults at jr − 1, . . . , ja + j f
The problem reads as
V ( j, X, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],X′
{
u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′)]} (54)
subject to
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − Tt(Yt) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t
as described in equation (48). In addition to the borrowing constraint on A′, we also have ` ≥ 0
or 1 − (1 − `) ≥ 0. Thus, we solve for consumption and leisure with the Lagrange function
L(C, 1 − `, µA′ , µ`) = u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, X′(C, 1 − `), q, γ, η′)]
+ µA′A′(C, 1 − `) + µ`(1 − (1 − `)).
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The following first order and envelope conditions can be developed:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)] − µA′ = 0 (55)
FOC1−` : u1−`(C, 1 − `) − wnt, j,q
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′
)
− µ` = 0 (56)
EVLPX : VX ( j, X, q, γ, η) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′ , (57)
In order to solve for optimal consumption, leisure and savings we graze the asset regions
and apply the endogenous grid method, which is described in B.2.
Children become adults at age ja + j f
Parents’ optimization problem in the vivos transfer period is the following:
V ( j, X, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],X′,B≥0
{
u (C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)]}
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vc ( ja, Xc, h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [Vc ( ja, Xc, h0, n, η)]}] ,
subject to77
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − T (Yt) − B f ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t.
Given our timing assumption inter-vivos transfers B generate gross revenue of B, implying
that children’s assets are described by Ac = B/Rkt and R
k
t A
c = B. This leads to either Xc =
B+ (1−τss)wt, ja,nη˜(1−Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) in case the kid attends university or Xc = B+ (1−τss)wt, ja,nη˜γ˜
in case the kid decides not to attend university and joins workforce immediately. Due to our
timing assumption, the actual realization of the kids η-shock and everything that follows does
not translate into utility of the parent. It is just the expectation about it and the parent receives
utility directly after transferring the money to the kid. Compared to the previous problem h0
77Note that due to our fertility assumption one parent has f children and vivos are given to each child, it has to
be adjusted in the parent’s budget constraint.
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and h are now part of the state space of V .
In addition to borrowing and time constraint we have B ≥ 0 which determine kid’s cash-on-hand
Xc. The Lagrange function reads as:
L(C, 1 − `, B, µA′ , µ`,µB) = u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, X′(C, 1 − `), q, γ, η′)]
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vc ( ja, Xc, h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [Vc ( ja, Xc, h0, n, η)]}]
+ µA′A′(C, 1 − `, B) + µ`(1 − (1 − `)) + µBB.
The first-order-conditions are:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)] − µA′ = 0 (58)
FOC1−` : u1−`(C, 1 − `) − wnt, j,q
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)]
+ µA′
)
− µ` = 0 (59)
FOCB : ν˜
η∑
pin(η)
∂
(
max
{
Eη′ |η
[
Vc
(
λcq(·) = 1
)]
; Eη′ |η
[
Vc
(
λcq(·) = 0
)]})
∂B
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)] − µA′ − µB = 0
(60)
EVLPX : VX
(
j, X, q, γ, η, hc0, h
c
ja
)
= βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)]
+ µA′ , (61)
where wnt, j,q is described in (50). We solve for optimal vivos transfers by a hybrid method in-
corporating the exogenous grid method and describe that in Chapter B.3.2. However, there is
another issue at this stage, namely we do not know Vc(·) (nor its derivative). But what we do
know is that (given prices) value functions have to be the same across generations at the same
stage in the lifecycle. Thus, whatever we assume for the value function of the kid at the age of
ja should coincide with the value function of parents at that age j f years ago. This leaves us
with a fixed point problem we will solve as follows.
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Fix Point Problem
(i) Guess kids’ value functions at age ja as a function of cash-on-hand, i.e. guess:
Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, X, h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [V ( ja, X, h0, n, η)]}].
(ii) Given this guess solve for optimal vivos transfers as described in Chapter B.3.2
(iii) Going backwards in time solve all periods from j f + ja − 1 until arriving at parents age ja
(iv) Compare the resulting value function with your current guess from step (i)
• If it is sufficiently close: STOP
• Else update guess from step (i) with the computed value function and start over
Working as parents of children at age j f + ja − 1, . . . , j f
The problem reads as
V ( j, X, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],X′,ipk≥0
{
u
(
C
1 + ζ f
, 1 − `
)
+ βEη′ |η
[
V ′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, h′, q, γ, η′
)]}
,
subject to78
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − T (Yt) − ipk f ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t
h′ = f
(
h, ipk , i
g
k
)
78For the same reason as for vivos transfers, in the parent’s budget constraint human capital investments have to
be scaled by the fertility rate.
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further described in equation (30). The Lagrange function reads as:
L(C, 1 − `, ipk , µA′ , µ`, µi) = u
(
C
1 + ζ f
, 1 − `
)
+ βEη′ |η
[
V ′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, h′, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′A′(C, 1 − `, ipk ) + µ`(1 − (1 − `)) + µiipk .
First-order-conditions and envelope conditions are:
FOCC :
uC( C1+ζ f , 1 − `)
(1 + τc)(1 + ζ f )
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)] − µA′ = 0 (62)
FOC1−` : u1−`
(
C
1 + ζ f
, 1 − `
)
− wnt, j,q
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)]
+ µA′
)
− µ` = 0 (63)
FOCipk : −βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)]
+ β
∂h′
∂ipk
Eη′ |η
[
V ′h′
(
Z′
)] − µA′ + µi = 0 (64)
EVLPX : VX (Z) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
Z′
)]
+ µA′ (65)
EVLPh : Vh (Z) = β
∂h′
∂h
Eη′ |η
[
V ′h′
(
Z′
)]
, (66)
where we summarized the state space in Z = { j, X, q, γ, η, h0, h}. Kids are part of the household
which is why per capita consumption is given by C1+ζ f . Human capital of the child today is
denoted by h and it is fostered by investments leading to human capital tomorrow (h′) following
human capital production (30). We will solve for optimal investments in a similar fashion as
for vivos transfers in the previous period. Nevertheless, it is more complicated, because in the
vivos transfer period children only contributed to the value function via an additive term leav-
ing first-order-conditions for consumption and leisure unaffected (see equations (58) and (59)).
Regarding the current situation, investments into kids’ human capital do effect V ′X′ (Z
′) in (62)
and (63), which requires multidimensional interpolation and we describe the solution method
for the investment periods in Chapter B.3.3.
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Preparing for parenthood at j f − 1
V ( j, X, h0, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],X′
{
u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η,h′0 |h0
[
V ′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′, h′0, h
′)]}
subject to
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − T (Yt) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t.
Parents’ h0 is mapped into kids’ innate human capital h′0 following (8) and for period j f acquired
and innate and acquired human capital of the kid are identical (i.e. h′0 = h
′ in V ′). The first-
order-conditions read as:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η,h′0 |h0
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′, h′0, h
′)] − µA′ = 0
FOC1−` : u1−`(C, 1 − `) − wnt, j,q
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η,h′0 |h0
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′, h′0, h
′)] + µA′) − µ` = 0
EVLPX : VX ( j, X, h0, q, γ, η) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η,h′0 |h0
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′, h′0, h
′)] + µA′ .
The only difference at this stage is that parents have to take into account the upcoming draw-
ing of h′0 given h0. This makes the computation of Eη′ |η,h′0 |h0
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′, h′0, h
′)] a bit
more complicated, but does not change the way we arrive at optimal decisions as described for
periods working as parents of adults.
Working without children at j f − 2, . . . , ja + 1
V ( j, X, h0, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],X′
{
u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′)]}
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subject to
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − T (Yt) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t.
We are basically back to the problem at ages jr − 1, . . . , ja + j f , only with h0 as additional state
variable. First order and envelope conditions are:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′
)] − µA′ = 0
FOC1−` : u1−`(C, 1 − `) − wnt, j,q
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′
)
− µ` = 0
EVLPX : VX ( j, X, h0, q, γ, η) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′ .
College period at ja + 1 until ja
Non-college agents draw their productivity type from pi(γ|n) which in turn determines cash-on-
hand X = B + (1− τss)wt, j,nγη. They face the exact same problem as agents in the stage working
without children, i.e.
V ( j, X, h0, n, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],X′
{
u(C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, X′, h0, n, γ, η′)]}
subject to
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,nγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − T (Yt) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t
and identical first-order-conditions. Students, on the other hand, start with X = B + wt,n j,qη˜(1−
τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) and solve:
V
(
ja, X, h0, h ja , q, η
)
= max
C,X′
`∈[0,1−Ψ(q)ξ(h ja )]
{
u(C, 1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja) − l) + βEγ|h,η′∈Πq(η′)
[
V ′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′
)]}
,
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subject to79
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,nη(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja) − l) − T (Yt) − Ψ(q)(1 − θt − θpr)κwt,c ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t.
First order and envelope conditions are:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja) − `)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1Eγ|h,η′∈Πq(η′)
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′
)] − µA′ = 0
FOC1−` : u1−`(C, 1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja) − `) − wnt, j,n
(
βRnt+1Eγ|h,η′∈Πq(η′)
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′
)
− µ` = 0
EVLPX : VX
(
ja, X, h0, h ja , q, η
)
= βRnt+1Eγ|h,η′∈Πq(η′)
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, h0, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′ ,
where students have to form expectation over both η and γ.
College decision ja
The college indicator function is described by
λ( ja, X, h0, h, η) =

1 if Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, X, h0, h,¬n, η)] > Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [V ( ja, X, h0, n, η)]
0 otherwise.
The expected value functions at age ja write as:
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, X, h0, h,¬n, η)] = pic(h) [V ( ja, X, h0, h, c, η)] + . . .
· · · + (1 − pic(h)) [V ( ja, X, h0, h, d, η)] ,
79In terms of computation there is a special case which is covered in Section B.7. Summing up, there can be a
minimum asset level required for certain h ja agents to be able to afford college in the first place. Low h ja means
high time deduction ξ(h ja ) and therefore low possible wage income. That can imply that even in case a student
works all time she has left, it is still insufficient to cover tuition fees without violating the borrowing constraint.
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and
Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h
[
V ( ja, X, h0, n, η)
]
= piγ(h)
[
V
(
ja, X, h0, h, n, γh, η
)]
+ . . .
· · · + (1 − piγ(h))
[
V
(
ja, X, h0, h, n, γl, η
)]
.
Cash-on-hand is given by X = B + (1 − τss)wt, j,nγη in case the agent decides not to attend
university and X = B + (1 − τss)wt, j,nη(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) otherwise. Uncertainty of attending
college is due to the completion shock given by (32), whereas the non-college option implies
being subject to the productivity γ−shock described in (33) already at age ja. Recall that we
defined Ψ(q) in order to shorten notation as follows:
Ψ(q) =

1 if q = c
φ if q = d
0 if q = n.
B.2 Solving via Endogenous Grid Method
We demonstrate how we apply the Endogenous Grid Method by solving the household problem
for parents of adults described in equation (54). First order and envelope conditions were given
by:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)] − µA′ = 0 (67)
FOC1−` : u1−`(C, 1 − `) − wnt, j,q
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′
)
− µ` = 0 (68)
EVLPX : VX ( j, X, q, γ, η) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′ , (69)
B.2 Solving via Endogenous Grid Method 123
From equations (67) and (69) we get:
VX ( j, X, q, γ, η) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
=
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
. (70)
In order to solve for optimal consumption and leisure we now graze the asset regions de-
scribed in figure (23) as follows:
(i) Check whether we are in the region where agents choose not to work (Figure 23.a):
Labor ` = 0 implies wnt, j,qγη = (1 − τss) wt, j,qγη (see (50)). Use ` = 0 in (67) to obtain C.
Next compute µ` via (68).
(a) If µ` > 0 (even for maximum leisure 1 − ` = 1 utility gain of (1 − `) ↑ higher than
corresponding utility drop of X′ ↓, implying agent would like to choose ` < 0) so
we have `∗ = 0. Next, rearrange (48) and cash-on-hand definition (45) to receive
endogenous cash-on-hand as well as assets today:
X = A¯′ + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) + (1 + τc)C
X = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
⇒ A = X − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
Rkt
and compute VX following (70).
(b) Else proceed to next step.
(ii) Check whether we are in the region where agents choose ` ∈
(
0, Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη
]
(Figure
23.b):
Given wnt, j,q = (1 − τss) wt, j,qγη, would the solution for optimal leisure imply `∗ ∈
(
0, ¯`
]
?
Two unknowns in equations (67) and (68), solving them gives us C and 1 − `.
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(a) If ` < ¯` then
X = A¯′ + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) + (1 + τc)C
A =
X − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
Rkt
and compute VX following (70).
(b) Else proceed to next step.
(iii) Check whether agent is at the border of being a (labor-) taxpayer (Figure 23.c):
Set ` = ¯` = Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη and compute optimal C from (67). Plug C and (1 − ¯`) in (68) in
order to compute µ`. At this point increasing ` implies becoming a taxpayer, so we need
to compute µ` with wnt, j,q =
(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη.
(a) If µ` > 0 the agent would prefer to work less given this wage. But as we ruled out
` < ¯` in the previous step ` = ¯` = Ztwt, j,qγη(1−0.5τss) it has to be. Once more we compute:
X = A¯′ + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) + (1 + τc)C
A =
X − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
Rkt
and compute VX following (70).
(b) Else proceed to next step.
(iv) After eliminating all other possibilities, it has to be the interior solution with T (Yt), τ`,t > 0
(Figure 23.d):
Solve equations (67) and (68) under net wage wnt, j,q =
(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη
in order to receive C and 1 − `. Back out
X = A¯′ + (1 + τc)C + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) + Tt(Yt)
A =
X − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
Rkt
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and compute VX following (70). Note that ` ≥ 1 can be excluded (for borrowing uncon-
straint households) via Inada Conditions, in particular lim`→1
∂u(C,1−`)
∂(1−`) = ∞.80
B.2.1 Smart Savings Grid Construction
The choice of the exogenous savings grid is crucial for the endogenous grid method. We want a
high density of grid points where policy functions have high curvatures. We also want to avoid
agents falling off the grids in the forward iteration. So before applying the solution methods
described above we develop an agent-specific81 savings gridGS = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}. In this section
we abstract form vivos and transfers, because these periods have to be treated differently and
we take care of that in Section B.3.
Determining the lowest savings grid point
We know that A′ = −A j,t can be either a situation in which the household chooses zero savings,
i.e. she is on the edge of being borrowing constraint, or she is borrowing constraint and would
like to choose A′ < −A j,t. So let us denote the lowest possible savings grid point by A′l , which
is given by A′l = −A j,t in period t and compute C(A′l) as well as l(A′l), assuming we are in the
interior solution. Cash-on-hand X(A′l) and asset level A(A
′
l) will then be determined by:
X = A′ + (1 + τc)C + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) + Tt(Yt)
A =
X − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
Rnt
.
(i) A(A′l) < −A j,t−1 −  for tolerance level . This violates the borrowing constraint making
A′l an invalid savings grid point. Further, this implies that the agent cannot possibly be
borrowing constraint in period t, because entering the period with any valid asset level
Avalid ≥ A j,t−1 > A(A′l) has to lead to savings A′(Avalid) > A′l = −A j,t. Our task now is to
80We deal with borrowing constraint households in Section B.5.3.
81Note that agent specific stands in for a combination of age, γ- and η-shock, qualification, innate human capital
and acquired human capital.
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find the lowest valid savings grid point in period t which is the one leading to endogenous
assets A = A j,t−1. We could do so by letting a solver search for A(X(A
′))+ A j,t−1 = 0 under
tolerance level , i.e. find
− < A(X(A′)) + A j,t−1 < 
over A′. However, we could get a problem whenever we receive an asset level 0 <
A(X(A′) + A j,t−1 <  and in the forward iteration for assets Afwd we get 0 < Afwd <
A(X(A′) + A j,t−1. In this case we would have to extrapolate. We can avoid that by solving
A(X(A′)) + A j,t−1 +  = 0 instead, i.e. find
− < A(X(A′)) + A j,t−1 +  <  (71)
implying −2 < A(X(A′)) + A j,t−1 < 0. These asset holdings violate the borrowing con-
straint theoretically, but they are numerically indistinguishable from −A j,t−1. So we can
built the state contingent grid GS = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} with s1 = A′ received from (71).
(ii) A(A′l) ≥ A j,t−1 − . This tells us that an household entering period t with asset level A(A′l)
would choose A′ = −A j,t, implying it is a valid and interior solution. However, this also
tells us that she is borrowing constraint in period t whenever she enters the period with
an asset level A with −A j,t−1 ≤ A < A(A′l). So we set s2 = −A j,t and solve at grid points
GS = {s2, . . . , sn} the way we are used to. In order to have a solution for the borrowing
constraint situation (which is possible as opposed to CASE 1), we save the following
solution on an extra grid point s1 = −A j,t:
Set assets today to the minimum A = −A j,t−1. This leads to cash-on-hand today X(s1) =
Rnt (−A j,t−1)+(1−τss)wt, j,qγη. Now solve for consumption and leisure via the intra-temporal
Euler equation (87) and (91), which we describe in Section B.5.3. Note that usually we
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should have X(s1) < X(s2) as
X(s1) = Rnt (−A j,t−1) + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη < Rnt A(A′l) + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη = X(s2)
and our case distinction A(A′l) ≥ A j,t−1 − . But, although unlikely, due to numerical
inaccuracies we have X(s1) < X(s2) compute the solution at x1 = ωx2(s2) for some ω
close to one.
Determining the highest savings grid point
On the one hand sn should be as high as possible, because we do not want to restrict the space
our policy functions live in. On the other hand we want to prevent agents from falling of the
grid. That could happen in case we choose a maximum savings grid point sn = A¯′ that might
lead to cash-on-hand tomorrow of X′(sn) > X′n, where X
′
n is the highest cash-on-hand level in
the endogenous cash-on-hand-grid of t + 1.
Cash-on-hand t +1 is given by X′ = Rkt+1A
′+ (1−τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′. As wages tomorrow differ
with the idiosyncratic income shock η′ for each shock there is an asset level A¯′(η′) satisfying:
Rnt+1A¯
′(η′) + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′ = X′n.
And as better shocks imply higher wages, i.e. wt+1, j+1,qγη¯′ > wt+1, j+1,qη′, we have A¯′(η¯′) <
A¯′(η′). Therefore, choosing sn = A¯′(η¯′) ensures X′(sn) = Rnt+1s2 + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη¯′ ≤ X′n.
Formally speaking we choose sn such that sn = minη′ {A′(η′)}, or even more precisely, we set it
to s∗n = 0.99 · sn in order to deal with computational inaccuracies.
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B.3 Solving via Hybrid Exogenous Grid Method
In Chapter 3.2 we have shown that a hybrid method incorporating the exogenous grid method
is feasible for periods with two endogenous state variables, which applies to the vivos transfer
period as well as to the periods parents invest into the human capital of their children in our
model. Before we start, we briefly demonstrate how the exogenous grid method works, given
our definition of cash-on-hand and tax code.
B.3.1 Solving via Exogenous Grid Method
Again, we use the household problem for parents of adults described in equation (54) in order
to demonstrate the exogenous grid method. First order and envelope conditions were given by:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
− βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)] − µA′ = 0 (72)
FOC1−` : u1−`(C, 1 − `) − wnt, j,q
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′
)
− µ` = 0 (73)
EVLPX : VX ( j, X, q, γ, η) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
+ µA′ , (74)
From equations (72) and (74) we get:
VX ( j, X, q, γ, η) = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
(
j + 1, X′, q, γ, η′
)]
=
uC(C, 1 − `)
1 + τc
. (75)
Households’ budgets read as:
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,qγη′
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − Tt(Yt) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t.
In contrast to the endogenous grid method, the exogenous grid method starts the solution
with an exogenous asset level A which, given our cash-on-hand definition, also determines
X = Rnt A + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη. The asset grid GA = {A1, A2, . . . , An} is spanned such that the
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household cannot ”fall off” and no extrapolation is required. For the lower end we simply set
A1 = −Ψ(q)A j,t. For the upper end we look at the asset grid for the respective household and
identify the highest asset level A′max a solution is stored for. Then we set An such that it is
impossible for the household to save A′ > A′max. In the same fashion as in the endogenous grid
method we now graze the asset regions described in figure (23) as follows, given an asset level
Ai from GA:
(i) Check whether we are in the region where agents choose not to work (see regions in
Figure 23.a and an analytic description in Section B.5.2):
Given assets and labor ` = 0 we know X = Rnt A + (1− τss)wt, j,qγη and net wage wnt, j,qγη =
(1 − τss) wt, j,qγη. In contrast to the endogenous grid method we do not know A′ and in turn
V ′X′(·), so we need to balance equation (72) with a solver. However, each consumption
level C pins down savings via A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη. As we know that
the consumption level balancing (72) has to be between C =  and C¯ = X82, we hand this
bracket over the solver and receive C(` = 0) as well as A′(` = 0). Next, we compute µ`
via (73).
(a) If µ` > 0 optimal labor is ` = 0:
i. If savings A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t we have found a
valid solution and can compute VX following (75).
ii. Else the household is borrowing constraint. The solution is found via the intra-
temporal Euler equation as described in Section B.5.3.
(b) Else proceed to next step.
(ii) Check whether we are in the region where agents choose ` ∈
(
0, ¯` = Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη
]
(Figure
23.b):
Given net wage wnt, j,q = (1 − τss) wt, j,qγη, would the solution for optimal leisure imply
82This is due to the Inada Condition. In case limC→0 ∂u(C,1−`)∂C = ∞ and (72) has to be larger than zero. On the
contrary, if C = X we not only have a small marginal utility of consumption today, it also minimizes potential
savings and thereby drives up V ′X′ , implying (72) has to be smaller than zero.
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`∗ ∈
(
0, ¯`
]
? Given we are searching for an interior solution, we know that the intra-
temporal Euler equation (87) between consumption and leisure has to hold. So we can
(i) guess a consumption level C and (ii) back out the corresponding leisure level via the
intra-temporal Euler equation. With consumption and leisure we (iii) also know savings
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) and (iv) are able to compute X′ as well
as (v) the right hand side of equation (72) in order to verify our choice of C. Again,
given that optimal consumption has to be between C =  and C¯ = X, we let a solver
perform steps (i)-(v) in this interval until it found optimal consumption and leisure given
wnt, j,q = (1 − τss) wt, j,qγη.
(a) If ` < ¯` then
i. If savings A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t we have
found a valid solution and can compute VX following (75).
ii. Else the household is borrowing constraint. The solution is found via the intra-
temporal Euler equation as described in Section B.5.3.
(b) Else proceed to next step.
(iii) Check whether agent is at the border of being a (labor-) taxpayer (Figure 23.c):
Set ` = ¯` = Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη and compute optimal C from (72) as described in step (i) under
` = 0. Plug C and (1− ¯`) in (73) in order to compute µ`. Note that increasing ` implies be-
coming a taxpayer, so we need to compute µ` with wnt, j,q =
(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη.
(a) If µ` > 0 the agent would prefer to work less given this wage. But as we ruled out
` < ¯` in the previous step, we found a solution in ` = ¯`. Once more we perform the
following check:
i. If savings A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − ¯`) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t we have
found a valid solution and can compute VX following (75).
ii. Else the household is borrowing constraint. The solution is found via the intra-
temporal Euler equation as described in Section B.5.3.
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(b) Else proceed to next step.
(iv) After eliminating all other possibilities, it has to be the interior solution with T (Yt), τ`,t > 0
(Figure 23.d):
The solution method is identical to the one in step (ii) under ` ∈
(
0, ¯`
]
, with the difference
being that now labor taxes have to be taken into account. Thus, we solve for optimal con-
sumption, leisure and savings under net wage wnt, j,q =
(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη
as described above.
(a) If savings A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t we have found a
valid solution and can compute VX following (75).
(b) Else the household is borrowing constraint. The solution is found via the intra-
temporal Euler equation as described in Section B.5.3.
Note that ` ≥ 1 can be excluded (for borrowing unconstraint households) via Inada Con-
ditions, in particular lim`→1
∂u(C,1−`)
∂(1−`) = ∞.
B.3.2 Solving for Inter-Vivos Transfers
Solving for vivos transfers leaves us with two issues. First of all, going recursively, we do not
know kids’ value functions when parents are of age ja + j f . The resulting fix point problem is
described in B.1.3 (Children become adults at age ja + j f ) and considered solved in this chapter.
Thus, the goal is to solve the following household problem:
V ( j, X, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,`∈[0,1],X′,B≥0
{
u (C, 1 − `) + βEη′ |η [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)]}
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vc ( ja, Xc, h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [Vc ( ja, Xc, h0, n, η)]}] . (76)
Under the exogenous grid method we start the solution with an exogenous asset level A, which
also determines cash-on-hand X = Rnt A + (1−τss)wt, j,qγη. Usually we would now start to search
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for the optimal trio of consumption, leisure and savings as just described. But in order to find
optimal vivos transfers, we add an intermediate step:
Given the cash-on-hand level we know that optimal vivos transfers cannot be larger than X, as
this would leave the household with negative resources for consumption and leisure. In fact,
setting maximal vivos transfers to B¯ = X + Ψ(q)A j,t would violate the borrowing constraint by
definition:
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − T (Yt) − B ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t | B = X + Ψ(q)A j,t
= −(1 + τc)C − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `) − T (Yt) ≥ 0.
Thus, for all household types {q, γ, η, h0, h} and each exogenous savings grid point in GA =
{A1, A2, . . . , An} we act as follows:
(i) Given parents’ assets A, span vivos transfer grid GB(A) = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} from B1 = 0 to
Bn = B¯ = X.83
(ii) For all vivos transfer grid points in GB(A) perform the following steps:
(a) Given vivos grid point Bi compute the parents’ utility from the expected value func-
tion of the kid:84
ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vc ( ja, Xc(Bi), h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [Vc ( ja, Xc(Bi), h0, n, η)]}] .
(b) Adjust parents’ cash-on-hand to ”net cash-on-hand” to Xn = X − Bi. Then solve for
consumption, leisure and savings as described in B.3.1, with the only difference in
disposable Xn instead of X and therefore C¯ = Xn.
83In order to prevent numerical issues, we use B¯ = X −  in order to have positive resources to split between
consumption, leisure and savings.
84Note that due to our timing kids’ assets are denoted by A = BiRnt so they start the period with resources AR
n
t = Bi.
The wage part in cash-on-hand is (i) depending on the idiosyncratic shock the kid draws after the vivos transfer
has been made and (ii) her subsequent college decision.
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(c) The results from (a) and (b) sum up to the value function (76) for the respective
combination of A and Bi.
(iii) Evaluate at which point in GB(A) the value function is the highest.
(iv) Hand this point and its neighborhood over to Golden Section Search algorithm and let it
perform steps (a)-(c) in order to find optimal B∗ and resulting choices C∗, `∗ and A′∗.
(a) If A′∗ ≥ Ψ(q)A j,t then B∗, C∗, `∗ and A′∗ are the optimal choice given Ai.
(b) Else the household is borrowing constraint under the respective asset level Ai.
The solution for borrowing constraint households is now straightforward. Spanning the
vivos transfer grid works the same way as for unconstraint households. Evaluating parents’
utility follows the intra-temporal Euler equations for consumption and leisure, which is de-
scribed in Section B.5.3. It is worth noticing that borrowing constraint does not necessarily
imply B∗, as shown in the two-period model in 3.2.1.
B.3.3 Solving for Human Capital Investments
First of all we construct a (i) reasonable and (ii) exogenous grid for kids’ acquired human capital
Ghja . Thereby we kill two birds with one stone: by (i) we again make sure not to store policy
functions on irrelevant grid points, which makes our solution more precise. In addition, (ii)
enables us to avoid issues coming along with interpolations on grids with two endogenous state
variables as discussed in Ludwig and Schön (2014) (44), further explained below.
In order to do so we use our knowledge of human capital grid at age ja. Due to our definition
of college completion, time deduction and fixed effect probabilities, we know that every human
capital level h ja > h¯ ja = 1 can be excluded as it does not gain any additional utility for the
kid (see equations (31), (32) and (33)). Accordingly we can span the Ghja =
{
h ja , . . . , h¯ ja
}
with
h ja =  and h¯ ja = 1.
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Given h¯ ja = 1 we can choose the highest grid point of Ghja−1, h¯ ja−1, such that h ja(h¯ ja−1, ipk =
0, igk) = h¯ ja = 1, following human capital production function (30), because every human capital
above would lead to h ja > h¯ ja and therefore a waste of resources. Assuming δ = 1 and φ j , 0
we get:
h¯ j+1 =
(
υ jh¯
φ j
j + (1 − υ j)
(
ψi j
)φ j) 1φ j | i j = ipj + igj = igj
υ jh¯
φ j
j = h¯
φ j
j+1 − (1 − υ j)
(
ψigj
)φ j
h¯ j =
 h¯
φ j
j+1 − (1 − υ j)
(
ψigj
)φ j
υ j

1
φ j
. (77)
Under φ j = 0 we get:
h¯ j+1 = h¯
υ j
j
(
ψi j
)(1−υ j) | i j = ipj + igj = igj
h¯υ jj
(
ψigj
)(1−υ j)
= h¯ j+1
h¯ j =
 h¯ j+1(
ψigj
)(1−υ j)

1
υ j
. (78)
For cases with δ < 1 we use a solver search for h¯ j by solving:
h j+1(h¯ j, i
p
k = 0, i
g
k) − h¯ j+1 +  = 0, (79)
under tolerance level . That implies − < h j+1(h¯ j, ipk = 0, igk) − h¯ j+1 +  <  and therefore
−2 + h¯ j+1 < h j+1(h¯ j, ipk = 0, igk) < h¯ j+1.
A similar thought applies for the lowest grid point. We want prevent agents to fall off the
grid. Thus, we choose hcja−1 such that h
c
ja
(hcja−1, i
p = 0, ig) = hcja = . Under δ = 1 and φ j , 0 we
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get it by plugging that into (77):
h j =

φ j − (1 − υ j)
(
ψigj
)φ j
υ j

1
φ j
, (80)
while for φ j , 0 we use (78) to receive:
h j =
 (
ψigj
)(1−υ j)

1
υ j
. (81)
Again, for δ < 1 a solver computes h j:
h j+1(h j, i
p
k = 0, i
g
k) − h j+1 −  = 0, (82)
implying − < h j+1(h j, ipk = 0, igk) − h j+1 −  <  and therefore h j+1 < h j+1(h j, ipk = 0, igk) <
2 + h j+1. Once we know the upper and lower bound, we can span Ghja−1 =
{
h ja−1, . . . , h¯ ja−1
}
.
For all periods j f + ja − 2, . . . , j f we can operate in the same manner to receive exogenous h j
and h¯ j.
Building up on these thoughts, we can also put some structure on the grid for parents invest-
ments into human capital of children, Gi
p
k
j , as well. Parents will never invest such that h
′ > h¯′,
so we define ip
h¯′ as the investment leading to h
′ = h¯′. Therefore, the highest grid point in Gi
p
k
j is
denoted by i¯pk, j = min {ih¯′; ip = X}, where the latter distinction comes from the same thought as
the maximum vivos transfer. Now we are all set to start solving for household types q, γ, η, h0, h
in GA = {A1, A2, . . . , An} by performing the following steps:
(i) Given kids’ h and parents’ A we know i¯pk, j and can span an investment gridG
ipk
j = {ip1 , . . . , ipn}
with ip1 = 0 and i
p
n = i¯
p
k, j.
(ii) For all investment grid points in Gi
p
k
j go through the following steps:
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(a) Given ipi and h compute h
′ following (30).
(b) Adjust parents’ cash-on-hand to ”net cash-on-hand” to Xn = X − ipi . Then solve for
consumption, leisure and savings as described in B.3.1, with one more difference
other than disposable Xn:
Constructing Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′ (Z
′)
]
now requires a separated interpolation method
(c) Compute parents’ value function, again interpolating in both dimensions X′ and h′
(iii) Evaluate under which investment grid point in Gi
p
k
j the value function has its maximum
(iv) Hand this point and its neighborhood over to Golden Section Search algorithm and let it
perform steps (a)-(c) in order to find optimal ik∗p and resulting choices C
∗, `∗ and A′∗.
(a) If A′∗ ≥ Ψ(q)A j,t then ik∗p , C∗, `∗ and A′∗ are the optimal choice given Ai.
(b) Else the household is borrowing constraint under the respective asset level Ai (the
respective solution is described in B.5.3).
This solution method applies for all ages j f + ja − 1, . . . , j f .
B.4 An Incorrect Hybrid Solution Method
This part belongs to Chapter 3.2 in which we compare two hybrid methods, incorporating either
the exogenous or the endogenous grid method. The latter is described here and does not deliver
proper results, which is shown in Chapter 3.2.2.
This hybrid method is used in Krueger and Ludwig (2013) (40). However, as they took human
capital of the child as exogenously given, in their work only one period - the vivos transfer
period - was affected. In our model we endogenize the human capital of children, which would
make this mistake spillover to ages j f , . . . , j f + ja as well. To work out the source of the error
as good as possible, and to set the record straight, we now describe the method in detail.
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B.4.1 Solving for Inter-Vivos Transfers
The endogenous grid method acts in the spirit “Let’s assume the agent would transfer assets
A′ from t to t + 1, how would her other choices today have to look like (given what we know
about t+1) for these savings to be the optimal choice.” Savings A′ then define her cash-on-hand
tomorrow, which in turn gives us all we need for the computation of the first-order-conditions
(e.g. see the right hand side of equation (55) and (56)). However, this time it is slightly different,
because today, besides consumption and labor, she also has to decide over optimal transfers B.
First of all an exogenous gross savings grid, GA¯′ = {A¯′1, . . . , A¯′n}, is spanned, following our
definition of gross savings (46). Net savings are given by A′ = A¯′ − B f , where f is the number
of children within a household. Thereby, we hold gross savings exogenous and solve for the
optimal combination of net savings and transfers. This leads to cash-on-hand tomorrow of
X′ = Rnt+1A
′ + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,q
= Rnt+1(A¯
′ − B f ) + (1 − τss)wt+1, j+1,q,
enabling us to express Eη′ |η
[
V ′t+1,X′ ( j + 1, X
′, q, γ, η′)
]
as a function of B. Transfers will deter-
mine the value function of the child, while net savings will determine today’s optimal choices
via first-order-conditions as described in detail within the solution of periods jr − 1, . . . , ja + j f
in Section B.2. Putting it in words, the following question is posed: “Let’s assume the agent
would invest a sum of A¯′ into her savings and her children, how would her other choices today
have to look like (given what we know about t + 1) for these gross savings to be the optimal
choice?”
The first step is, given an exogenous gross savings level A¯i, to span a corresponding vivos
transfer grid GB(A¯i) = {B1, . . . , Bn}. The lower end is set to B′1 = 0, while the upper end follows
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from the gross savings definition and reads Bn(A¯i) =
A¯i+Ψ(q)A j,t
f , leading to net savings of:
A′ = A¯i − B f |B = Bn =
A¯i + Ψ(q)A j,t
f
A′ = A¯i − (A¯i + Ψ(q)A j,t)
A′ = −Ψ(q)A j,t.
One issue of this method is at the upper end of the gross savings grid GA¯′ = {A¯′1, . . . , A¯′n}.
Usually A¯′n is chosen such that it prevents agents to fall of the grid in period t + 1 (see Section
B.2.1), avoiding the necessity for inaccurate extrapolations and leading to a high density of grid
point in the relevant area of the state space. Setting A¯′ to this value and assuming that high
savings will most likely be accompanied by positive vivos transfers B, the state space of policy
functions cannot be filled that precise anymore in vivos transfer and investment periods.
The other issue arises on the lower end, i.e. A¯′1 = −Ψ(q)A j,t. As just shown, setting Bi(A¯1) =
−Ψ(q)A j,t+Ψ(q)A j,t
f implies zero vivos transfers. But as shown in Section 3.2.1, being borrowing
constraint does not imply zero vivos transfers or human capital investments. Such an example
is shown in Figure 2 (d), where the agent is always borrowing constraint, but does invest in the
human capital of the child. Consequently, this also has an impact on finding the edge at which
the household starts being borrowing constraint, demonstrated in B.2.1.
So a different method would have to be developed to accomplish both (i) make the value
function Eη′ |η
[
V ′t+1,X′ ( j + 1, X
′, q, γ, η′)
]
expressible in terms of B and (ii) detach savings from
vivos transfers. However, besides the issues arising in defining grids and dealing with borrow-
ing constraints, the even bigger problems comes from imbalanced first-order-conditions further
described below.
Thus, apart from these issues, in general for all household types {q, γ, η, h0, h} the following
steps - for each exogenous gross savings grid point in GA¯′ = {A¯′1, . . . , A¯′n} - are executed:85
85How to solve the fixed point problem due to the unknown value function of kids is described in Section B.1.3.
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(i) Given exogenous gross savings A¯′i , span the grid for vivos transfersGB(A¯′i) = {B1, . . . , Bn},
with B1 = 0 and Bn(A¯i) =
A¯i+Ψ(q)A j,t
f .
(ii) Compute parents’ value functions for each vivos transfer in GB and resulting net savings
A′ = A¯′ − B f :
(a) Evaluate Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
V ( ja, X, h0, h,¬n, η)] , Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [V ( ja, X, h0, n, η)]}]
given B forming kid’s assets A = B
Rkt
and thereby defining cash-on-hand X.
(b) Given net savings A′ compute parents choices for consumption and labor by the
endogenous grid method as described in Section B.1.3.
(c) Use results from (a) and (b) to compute the parents’ value function.
(iii) Evaluate at which vivos transfer in GB(A¯′i) the value function is the highest.
(iv) Hand this point and its neighborhood over to Golden Section Search algorithm and let it
perform (a) and (b) until it found optimal B∗, C∗ and `∗.
B.4.2 Solving for Human Capital Investments
The issues coming along with two endogenous state variables are discussed in Ludwig and
Schön (2014) (44). In particular, they show that multidimensional interpolation cannot be sepa-
rated into several one-dimensional interpolations. The reason becomes apparent when we want
to compute V ′X′(X
′, h′) within equation (62). Savings and investments today lead to X˜′ and h˜′
which are not located on the endogenous grids received from solving this period in the previous
step. Therefore, we would have to find points bordering our imaginary V ′X′
(
X˜′, h˜′
)
. In particular,
separating the two-dimensional interpolation required into two one-dimensional interpolations
would imply holding one dimension fixed while interpolating in the other and vice versa, i.e.
fix h′1 close to h˜
′ and jump to the left and to the right of X˜′ such that X′1 < X˜
′ < X′2. But the
problem is that moving around in the cash-on-hand dimension also changes the human capital
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dimension in case both are endogenous, e.g. the counterpart of Vˆ ′X′(X
′
1, h
′
1) cannot be found by
Vˆ ′X′(X
′
1, h
′
2) and h
′
1 < h˜
′ < h′2, as the tuple (X
′
1, h
′
2) - most likely - will not exist on the grids.
Summing up: We cannot hold one dimension constant while walking around in the other.
Ludwig and Schön (2014) (44) provide two possible solutions. One uses Delauny interpola-
tion. The other is a hybrid interpolation method combining the endogenous and the exogenous
grid method. The latter performs accurate and outperforms the Delauny method in terms of
speed. The idea is to use an exogenous grid in the human capital dimension, while maintaining
the endogenous grid method in the cash-on-hand dimension, enabling us to hold human capital
constant, while jumping left and right in terms of the cash-on-hand of interest (X˜′). Equipped
with this strategy, we will solve periods j f + ja − 1, . . . , j f as follows.
First we need to construct an exogenous grid for kids’ acquired human capital and invest-
ments as described in Section B.3.3. However, for the maximal investment the same issue as in
the vivos transfer period arises. The upper bound for investments reads as i¯pk = min{ih¯,
A¯i+Ψ(q)A j,t
f },
where ih¯ is the investment leading to reasonable upper bound h¯ and the latter restriction comes
from the gross savings definition, potentially ruling out optimal decisions. Such an example
can be found in Figure 2 (d), in which a borrowing constraint household invests into the human
capital of the child.
Again, as this is just a part of the problem, we start now describe the actual solution method
in order to get the whole picture. First we span an exogenous savings grid as described in
Section B.2.1 and can start solving for household type q, γ, η, h0, h, A¯′ with the following steps:
(i) Given h and A¯′ we know i¯pk, j and can span an investment grid G
ipk
j = {0, . . . , i¯pk, j}.
(ii) Compute parents’ value function for each combination of net savings (A¯′ = A¯ − ipk ) and
investments:
(a) Compute h′ following (30).
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(b) Solve equations (62) and (63) by constructing Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′ (Z
′)
]
via the separated inter-
polation method in order to arrive at optimal consumption and leisure.
(c) Compute parents’ value function, again interpolating in both dimensions X′ and h′.
(iii) Evaluate under which investment grid point the value function has its highest value.
(iv) Hand this point (and its neighborhood) over to the golden section search algorithm in
order to find optimal investment, consumption and leisure.
Perform these steps for all exogenous gross saving grid points, for all types q, γ, η, h0, h and
for all ages j f + ja − 1, . . . , j f .
The solution for borrowing constraint households in vivos transfer as well as in human
capital investment periods could be handled by operating as described in Section B.5.3 under
the exogenous grid method, but the issue remains to find that borrowing constraint asset level
in the first place.
However, Figures 2 (c) and (d) reveal the even bigger problem of the HybLevEndo method.
They display a situation in which the household is not borrowing constraint, but the results of
the HybLevEndo method are still far off the actual ones. The reason is further explained in
3.2 and boils down to a unbalance in first-order-conditions between savings and investments or
vivos transfers.
B.5 Solving for Consumption and Leisure
The following computations apply for both methods the endogenous and the exogenous grid
method. Key of this task is equations (55)-(56). Per capita consumption as well as time endow-
ment reduced by college effort also have to be taken into account. The utility function is given
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by:
u
(
C
1 + ζ f
, 1 − 1ζ(h ja) − `
)
=
[(
c
1+ζ f
)µ (
1 − 1ζ(h ja) − `
)1−µ]1−σ
1 − σ .
Let’s define 1 − `n = 1 − 1ζ(h ja) − ` in order to shorten notation for now. Derivatives are then
given by:
uC =
[(
c
1 + ζ f
)µ
(1 − `n)1−µ
]−σ
µ
(
c
1 + ζ f
)µ−1 1
1 + ζ f
(1 − `n)1−µ
= µ
(
c
1 + ζ f
)µ−1−σµ
(1 − `n)1−µ−σ+σµ 1
1 + ζ f
(83)
u1−`n =
[(
c
1 + ζ f
)µ
(1 − `n)1−µ
]−σ
(1 − µ)
(
c
1 + ζ f
)µ
(1 − `n)−µ
= (1 − µ)
(
c
1 + ζ f
)µ−σµ
(1 − `n)σµ−µ−σ (84)
Rearranging equations (55)-(56) slightly leads us to:
FOCC :
uC(C, 1 − `n)
1 + τc
= βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
]
+ µA′ (85)
FOC1−`n :
u1−`n(C, 1 − `n)
wnt, j,q
− µ`
wnt, j,q
= βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
]
+ µA′ , (86)
where wnt, j,q differs following (50), depending whether ` implies Yt ≤ Zt or Yt > Zt. The intra-
temporal Euler equation reads as:
u1−`n(C, 1 − `n) − wnt, j,q
uC(C, 1 − `n)
1 + τc
− µ` = 0. (87)
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B.5.1 Interior Solution of Consumption and Leisure
In case the household is not constraint, we start by setting (83) equal to (85) and rearrange:
µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−1−σµ
(1 − `n)1−µ−σ+σµ 1
1 + ζ f
= β(1 + τc)Rnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
]
⇔
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−1−σµ
(1 − `n)(1−µ)(1−σ) = β(1 + τc)Rnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
] 1 + ζ f
µ
⇔ 1 − `n =
β(1 + τc)Rnt+1Eη′ |η [V ′X′] 1 + ζ fµ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)1+σµ−µ 1(1−µ)(1−σ) (88)
Setting (84) equal to (86) and rearranging leads us to:
(1 − µ)
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−σµ
(1 − `n)σµ−µ−σ = βwnt, j,qRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
]
⇔ (1 − `n)σµ−µ−σ = βwnt, j,qRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
] 1
1 − µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)σµ−µ
⇔ 1 − `n =
βwnt, j,qRnt+1Eη′ |η [V ′X′] 11 − µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ(σ−1) 1σµ−µ−σ (89)
Let’s define X = βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
]
in order to shorten notation. Now we can cancel out 1 − `n by
setting (88) equal to (89):
Xwnt, j,q 11 − µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ(σ−1) 1σµ−µ−σ = X(1 + τc)1 + ζ f
µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)1+σµ−µ 1(1−µ)(1−σ)
⇔ Xwnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ(σ−1)
=
X(1 + τc)1 + ζ f
µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)1+σµ−µ
σµ−µ−σ
(1−µ)(1−σ)
⇔ Xwnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ(σ−1)
=
(
X(1 + τc)
1 + ζ f
µ
) σµ−µ−σ
(1−µ)(1−σ) ( C
1 + ζ f
) (1+σµ−µ)(σµ−µ−σ)
(1−µ)(1−σ)
⇔ Xwnt, j,q
1
1 − µ =
(
X(1 + τc)
1 + ζ f
µ
) σµ−µ−σ
(1−µ)(1−σ) ( C
1 + ζ f
) (1+σµ−µ)(σµ−µ−σ)
(1−µ)(1−σ) ( C
1 + ζ f
)− (µ(σ−1)(1−µ)(1−σ))(1−µ)(1−σ)
.
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Now we rearrange the nominator of (1+σµ−µ)(σµ−µ−σ)(1−µ)(1−σ) − µ(σ−1)(1−µ)(1−σ)(1−µ)(1−σ) as follows:
σµ − µ − σ + (σµ)2 − σµ2 − σ2µ − σµ2 + µ2 + σµ − ((µσ − µ)(1 − σ − µ + µσ))
=σµ − µ − σ + (σµ)2 − σµ2 − σ2µ − σµ2 + µ2 + σµ −
(
(σµ − µ − σ2µ + σµ − σµ2 + µ2 + (σµ)2 − σµ2
)
= − σ
Plugging that in and we can further simplify:
Xwnt, j,q
1
1 − µ =
(
X(1 + τc)
1 + ζ f
µ
) σµ−µ−σ
(1−µ)(1−σ) ( C
1 + ζ f
)− σ(1−µ)(1−σ)
⇔
(
C
1 + ζ f
) σ
(1−µ)(1−σ)
=
(
X(1 + τc)
1 + ζ f
µ
) σµ−µ−σ
(1−µ)(1−σ) (
Xwnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
)−1
⇔ C
1 + ζ f
=
(
X(1 + τc)
1 + ζ f
µ
)σµ−µ−σ
σ
(
Xwnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
)− (1−µ)(1−σ)σ
⇔ C
1 + ζ f
= X
(σµ−µ−σ)−(1−µ)(1−σ)
σ
(
(1 + τc)
1 + ζ f
µ
)σµ−µ−σ
σ
(
wnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
)− (1−µ)(1−σ)σ
.
The exponent of X can be reduced to:
σµ − µ − σ − (1 − µ)(1 − σ) = σµ − µ − σ − 1 + σ + µ − σµ = −1,
which finally leads us to:
⇔ C
1 + ζ f
= X−
1
σ
(
(1 + τc)
1 + ζ f
µ
)σµ−µ−σ
σ
(
wnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
)− (1−µ)(1−σ)σ
⇔ C
1 + ζ f
=
(
βRnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
])− 1σ ((1 + τc)1 + ζ f
µ
)σµ−µ−σ
σ
(
wnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
)− (1−µ)(1−σ)σ
⇔ C∗ =
βRnt+1Eη′ |η [V ′X′] ((1 + τc)1 + ζ fµ
)µ+σ(1−µ) (
wnt, j,q
1
1 − µ
)(1−µ)(1−σ)− 1σ (1 + ζ f )
Now we can get optimal leisure by simply plugging in optimal consumption into either
equation (89) or (88).
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B.5.2 Binding Leisure Constraint
In the first asset region we have `∗ = 0. So we plug optimal leisure 1−1ζ(h ja)− `∗ = 1−1ζ(h ja)
into equation (85) using (83) in order to arrive at optimal consumption:
µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−1−σµ
(1 − `n)1−µ−σ+σµ 1
1 + ζ f
= β(1 + τc)Rnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
]
⇔
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−1−σµ
= β(1 + τc)Rnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
] 1 + ζ f
µ
(1 − `n)µ+σ−σµ−1
⇔ C∗ =
(
β(1 + τc)Rnt+1Eη′ |η
[
V ′X′
] 1 + ζ f
µ
(1 − `n)(µ−1)(1−σ)
) 1
µ−1−σµ
(1 + ζ f ). (90)
The same way we operate on the threshold value, in which we know that labor is Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη
following equation (47). Plugging that into equation (90) leads us to consumption.
B.5.3 Binding Borrowing Constraint
In general the endogenous and the exogenous grid method do not differ when agents are borrow-
ing constraint, because it is about the intra-temporal - not the inter-temporal - Euler equation in
these cases. The only difference is how the asset level under which the agent is restricted (Abc)
is determined.
We defined A¯′ = A′ + ipk f + B f as gross savings and as mentioned above, being borrowing con-
straint requires A′ = −A j,t, but it does not necessarily imply ip = 0 or B = 0. An example would
be highly educated parents with high wage income, but low current assets due to tuition fees.
Their gain from investments or vivos transfers can outweigh the marginal gain from savings.
In case the budget constraint is binding (µA′ > 0), we solve for consumption and leisure
B APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3146
combining the intra-temporal Euler equation (87) received from the first-order-conditions, i.e.
u1−`n(C, 1 − `n) − wnt, j,q
uC(C, 1 − `n)
1 + τc
− µ` = 0.
In order to shorten notation we work with 1ζ(h ja) = 1ζ and 1 − `n = 1 − 1ζ − `. Plugging in
marginal products (83) and (84) we can develop the optimal leisure-consumption-ratio in case
the non negativity constraint on labor is not binding (µ` = 0):
(1 − µ)
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−σµ
(1 − `n)σµ−µ−σ = w
n
t, j,q
1 + τc
µ
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−1−σµ
(1 − `n)1−µ−σ+σµ 1
1 + ζ f
(1 − `n)σµ−µ−σ−(1−µ−σ+σµ) = µ
1 − µ
wnt, j,q
1 + τc
(
C
1 + ζ f
)µ−1−σµ−(µ−σµ) 1
1 + ζ f
(1 − `n)−1 = µ
1 − µ ·
wnt, j,q
1 + τc
(
C
1 + ζ f
)−1 1
1 + ζ f
1 − `n
C
=
1 − µ
µ
· 1 + τc
wnt, j,q
= lcr. (91)
In case the household is borrowing constraint, we know that A¯′ = A′+ipk f +B f = −A j,t+ipk f +B f .
All other resources, let’s define them as86
res = X − A¯′ = AbcRnt + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη − A¯′
= AbcRnt + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη − (−A j,t + ipk f + B f )
= AbcRnt + (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη + (A j,t − expk f ),
with costs per kid of expk = ipk + B, are used for expenditures of consumption and leisure. Using
86There is a special case when agents are in college. In that case res has to be built differently, which we describe
in Section B.7.
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(49) and (50) we receive:
A¯′ = X − (1 + τc)C + τ`,tZt − wnt, j,q(1 − `n) − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
1 − `n = res − (1 + τc)C + τ`,tZt − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
wnt, j,q
(92)
C =
res − wnt, j,q(1 − `n) + τ`,tZt − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
1 + τc
. (93)
Now we operate the same way as described above, walking down the asset regions (see Section
B.3.1 for vivos transfer and investment periods and Section B.2 for all other periods), where the
outer steps (i)-(iii) are only relevant for vivos transfer and investment periods:
(i) Given assets Abc we span a grid from expk1 = 0 to exp
k
n =
X+A j,t
f .
87 A corresponding grid
Gres(Abc) = {res0, . . . , resn} directly follows with
res0 = X −
(
−A j,t +
X + A j,t
f
f
)
= 0 and
resn = X − A¯′ = X + A j,t.
Next for all expki (and resulting resi) we perform the following steps:
(a) Assume labor ` = 0, τ`,t = 0 implying wnt, j,q = (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη and consumption
following from (93), i.e. C = res−(1−τss)wt, j,qγη(1−1ξ)1+τc . Next, compute µ` from (87).
Given Abc we can span a grid for resources
i. If µ` > 0 (agent would like to choose ` < 0) so we have `∗ = 0.
ii. Else proceed to next step.
(b) Assume ` ∈
(
0, Ztwt, j,q
]
, τ`,t = 0 implying wnt, j,q = (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη. Plug (93) into (91)
87For numerical reasons we set the upper bound to expkn =
X+A j,t
f − , which leads to (almost) zero consumption
and leisure and can never be optimal due to the Inada Conditions. In addition, the upper bound for investments
might also be defined by ip
h¯′ as described in Section B.3.3, but we abstract from that for a moment.
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in order to compute 1 − `n:
(1 − `n)(1 + τc)
res − (1 − τss) wt, j,qγη(1 − `n) =
1 − µ
µ
· 1 + τc
(1 − τss) wt, j,qγη
res − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − `n)
1 − `n =
µ
1 − µ · (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
res
1 − `n − (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη =
µ
1 − µ · (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
res
1 − `n =
1
1 − µ · (1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
1 − `n = res(1 − µ)
(1 − τss)wt, j,qγη
i. If ` < ¯` then C = 1−`nlcr .
ii. Else proceed to next step.
(c) Assume ` = ¯` = Zt(1−0.5τss)wt, j,qγη implying C =
res−(1−τss)wt, j,qγη(1−1ξ− ¯`)
1+τc
, almost as in the
first step. Next, compute µ` from (87), but now with wnt, j,q =
(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη,
because at this point increasing ` implies becoming a taxpayer.
i. If µ` > 0 the agent would prefer to work less given this wage. But as we ruled
out ` < ¯` in the previous step, we have `∗ = ¯`.
ii. Else proceed to next step
(d) After eliminating all other possibilities, it has to be the interior solution with τ`,t > 0
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and wnt, j,q =
(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)) wt, j,qγη. Plug (93) into (91) to compute 1− `n:
(1 + τc)(1 − `n)
res + τ`,tZt − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸
restax
−wnt, j,q(1 − `n)
=
1 − µ
µ
· 1 + τc
wnt, j,q
restax − wnt, j,q(1 − `n)
1 − `n =
µ
1 − µ · w
n
t, j,q
restax
1 − `n − w
n
t, j,q =
µ
1 − µ · w
n
t, j,q
restax
1 − `n =
1
1 − µ · w
n
t, j,q
1 − `n = res
tax(1 − µ)
wnt, j,q
=
(
res + τ`,tZt − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss)wt, j,qγη(1 − 1ξ)
)
(1 − µ)
wt, j,q
(
1 − τss − τ`,t(1 − 0.5τss))
Get consumption via C = 1−`
n
lcr . The possibility of ` ≥ 1 can be excluded (for
borrowing unconstraint households) via the first Inada Condition for leisure.
(ii) Evaluate at which expki the value function is the highest.
(iii) Hand this point and its neighborhood over to Golden Section Search algorithm and let it
perform steps (a)-(d) in order to find optimal expk∗ and resulting choices C∗ and `∗.
Again, please note that in periods without children being part of the household there is only
one resource level given assets Abc and the outer loop (i)-(iii) becomes superfluous.
B.6 Taste Shocks
At the college decision we have a discrete choice in our model, which leads to kinks in the
value function, causing analytical and thereby computational issues. As done in previous work
by Busch (2019) (15) or Iskhakov et al. (2015) (34), we add iid extreme value taste shocks to
our model, in order to create a continuous and smooth value function.
The taste shocks are assumed to follow a Gumbel distribution with E[] = µ + σγ, where γ
is Euler’s constant and σ denotes the scale parameter. By setting the location parameter to
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µ = −σγ we normalize the first moment to E[] = 0. Given these taste shocks at the college
decision of their children, the corresponding household problem of parents at the transfer period
writes as:
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,l∈[0,1],B≥0
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{
u (C, 1 − l) + βEt [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)]}
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
E
[
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vt ( ja, A, h0, h,¬n, η)] + ] , E [Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [Vt ( ja, A, h0, n, η)] + ]}] .
Concentrating on the part of interest and making it more readable, the altruistic part of the
parents value can be written as:
Valt = ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
max
{
E
[
Eq|h
[
Vt (·,¬n, η)] + ] , E [Eγ|h [Vt (·, n, η)] + ]}]
= ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
E
(
max
{
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vt (·,¬n, η)] + , Eγ|h [Vt (·, n, η)] + })] ,
where we integrated over the taste shocks. Next, we use a derivation of McFadden (1978) (46),
who shows that the integral over the taste shocks can be analytically solved. This enables us to
rewrite Valt as follows:
Valt = ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
E
(
max
{
Eq|h
[
Vt (·,¬n, η)] + , Eγ|h [Vt (·, n, η)] + })]
= ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
σ log
(
exp
[
Eq|h
[
Vt (·,¬n, η)]
σ
]
+ exp
[
Eγ|h
[
Vt (·, n, η)]
σ
]
+
−σγ
σ
+ γ
)]
,
and, by applying the log-sum formula, we finally receive:
Valt = ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
σ
(
Eγ|h
[
Vt (·, n, η)]
σ
+ log
(
1 + exp
[
Eq|h
[
Vt (·,¬n, η)] − Eγ|h [Vt (·, n, η)]
σ
]))]
.
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Thus, by adding taste shocks to our model, the household problem of parents at the transfer
period reads as:
V ( j, A, h0, h, q, γ, η) = max
C,l∈[0,1],B≥0
A′≥−Ψ(q)A j,t
{
u (C, 1 − l) + βEt [V ′ ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)]}
+ ν˜Eη′∈Πn(η)
[
σ
(
Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h
[
Vt (·, n, η)]
σ
+ log
(
1 + exp
[
Eq∈{d,c}|h
[
Vt (·,¬n, η)] − Eγ∈{γl,γh}|h [Vt (·, n, η)]
σ
]))]
.
The corresponding choice probability of not attending college is given by:
P(q = n | ·) = 1
1 + exp
(
Eq∈{d,c}|h[Vt(·,¬n,η)]−Eγ∈{γl ,γh}|h[Vt(·,n,η)]
σ
) .
By the law of large numbers, P(q = n | ·) is also the fraction in the population with characteris-
tics ja, A, h0, h, η that decides not to attend college. An exemplary course of college attendance
probabilities is displayed in Figure 24. The scale parameter σ determines the extent of the
Figure 24: College Attendance Probability
smoothing induced by the taste shocks and we assume it to be σ = 0.27, which we borrow from
Busch (2019) (15).
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B.7 Budget in College
Cash-on-hand in college is given by
X = Rnt A + wt,n j,qη˜(1 − τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)),
which we short for the purpose of illustration to
X = RA + w˜(1 − τss)(1 − Ψξ).
Savings are demoted by
A′ = X − (1 + τc)C − wt,n j,qη˜(1 − τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja) − l) − T (Yt) − Ψ(q)(1 − θt − θpr)κwt,c ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t,
which we boil down to
A′ = X −C − w˜(1 − τss)(1 − ξ − l) − T (Yt) − CollExp ≥ −A j,t
Bringing them together leads us to:
A′ = RA + w˜(1 − τss)(1ξ) −C − w˜(1 − τss)(1 − ξ − l) − T (Yt) − CollExp ≥ −Ψ(q)A j,t
Now let us look at the situation of a borrowing constraint household. Assuming A j,t = 0 and
received vivos of B = 0, we get:
A′ = w˜(1 − τss)(1 − ξ) −C − w˜(1 − τss)(1 − ξ − l) − T (Yt) − CollExp = 0 (94)
The potential issue of setting res the way we usually do is (i) that the household cannot
choose all values in [0, 1 − ξ] and (ii) perhaps she even cannot afford to go to college even for
` = 1 − ξ. This can also be true if we set res ≥ CollExp + .
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The easiest way to illustrate that is to look at a guy who can only afford college in case he
works full time, implying l = 1 − ξ, leisure equals zero and net wage income is given by:
w˜(1 − τss)(1 − ξl) − T (Yt) = CollExp,
which, given (94), also implies C = 0. However, as net wage income increases monotonically in
l, each l < 1−ξ would violate the borrowing constraint. Further, this shows that each household
with ξh > ξl could not afford to go to college in the first place.
Abstracting from our cash-on-hand definition, we have to make sure that the maximum a
household can earn (and borrow) exceeds the costs she has to carry in this situation, for her to
be able not to violate the budget constraint. For the college period that is:
ARnt + wt, j,q(1 − τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) + A j,t ≥ CollExp + T (Yt)
A ≥ CollExp + T (Yt) − wt, j,q(1 − τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) − A j,t
Rnt
. (95)
Usually that is taken care of by wt, j,q(1 − τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) > T (Yt), even in case of A j,t = 0.
However, in case of college and high time deduction ξ(h ja), there might be positive assets neces-
sary for this student to afford college whenever CollExp+T (Yt) > wt, j,q(1−τss)(1−Ψ(q)ξ(h ja))+
A j,t.
Using the endogenous grid method that is not an issue for interior solutions, as the endoge-
nous asset level can simply be checked. The question remains what are the lowest possible
resources we can throw in at the borrowing constraint? Following (95), we can separate two
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cases:
Ares =

0 if wt, j,q(1 − τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) + A j,t > CollExp + T (Yt)
(95) +  otherwise.
(96)
Resources are then given by res = AresRnt + wt, j,q(1 − τss)(1 − Ψ(q)ξ(h ja)) − A¯′.
B.8 Parallelization
The model is completely coded in FORTRAN, due to its computational superiority. In ad-
dition, we parallized the code inside the household problem, using“Open Multi-Processing”
(OpenMP), which is an open source API supporting multi-platform shared memory multipro-
cessing.
Here we will briefly discuss the fundamental challenges that parallelization has brought
and how we have solved them. We were motivated to do so by the exchange with other col-
leagues and scientists, who turned out to be facing similar problems. In the enclosed code
“ToyModel_Parallel” the following approaches and structures are presented. The potential is-
sues such as the sop called “race condition”, wrong placement of private variables as well as a
small speed test can be performed by following the comments inside the code. In solving the
household problem, we have used well known algorithms such as the “Golden Search” method
and the “Brent Algorithm” (zBrent). Both are univariate solvers that find minima and roots of
functions respectively. The following example illustrates a structural problem of parallelization
and combined with the use of these solvers.
Architecture Parallized Threads Time
2.10 GHz, 192GB RAM, 40 Cores (CSC Skylake) no 1 ≈ 2.62sek
2.10 GHz, 192GB RAM, 40 Cores (CSC Skylake) yes 40 ≈ 0.37sek
Table 18: Comparison Computational Time “ToyModel_Parallel”
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Among other things, we have used zBrent to determine roots of the Euler equations. For this
purpose, we have written a function only be dependent on consumption (it is called FEulerOf-
Cons in both the code “ToyModel_Parallel” and in the solution algorithm of this work). How-
ever, different consumption leads to different savings, which in turn changes the next periods’
cash-on-hand and thereby the right hand side of the Euler equation (see, for example, equation
(55)).
This can be solved by the univariate function accessing another grid whenever zBrent calls
it with a different value for consumption. Per se, this would not be an issue, but here the par-
allelization comes into play, through which the counters of the do-loops are private and there-
fore no longer cross-functional accessible. The solution was to use another declaration of the
openMP toolbox: “THREADPRIVATE”. Unlike for purely private variables, under THREAD-
PRIVATE the entire thread (even nested functions) has access to these variables. In addition,
the race condition is due to parallel working threads is still taken care off.
Another important aspect is to pay attention to the trade-off between parallelization on the
one hand and overhead costs on the other hand. For example, it turned out to be an advantage
for us to work with the OMP DO COLLAPSE command. This command collapses any number
of nested do-loops to one large one. But OMP DO COLLAPSE has the disadvantage over the
more popular OMP DO command, that nothing can be written between nested loops, if they
should be to collapsed. This can be an issue, as this is where usually calculations are placed
so that they are as far outside as possible and do not have to be recalculated unnecessarily in
each iteration. In our particular application, however, the low overhead costs of the OMP DO
COLLAPSE construct has emerged as the fastest option - despite this minor blemish. Table
18 shows the time for solving the “ToyModel_Parallel” with and without paralleization. The
former is roughly 7.1 times faster.
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
This chapter provides supplementary material for Section 4.
C.1 Households
Aggregate assets and the capital output ratio KY have to be in line with the interest rate. Gov-
ernment debt over GDP is set to BY = 0.6 exogenously (see 4.8), while
K
Y = 3 (see 4.9) is
the simulated moment that we want to hit using second stage parameter β, which determines
aggregate assets A. And from
A
Y
=
K + B
Y
=
K
Y
+
B
Y
we can extract our target KY =
A
Y − BY = AY −0.6. The interest rate can be developed via r = α YK −δ.
Plugging in α = 13 and δ = 0.07 we get
r =
1
3
· 1
3
− 0.07 ≈ 0.04, (97)
and, given capital taxes of 28.3%, a net interest rate of rn = r(1 − τk) ≈ 0.03. The following
steps are required:
(i) Solve model given guess for β.
(ii) Compute aggregate A ass the sum of all asset holdings in the economy.
(iii) Compute aggregate L following (3) and Lt,q the sum of all hours worked for the respective
qualification type.
(iv) Compute aggregate Y following (4).
(v) Compute KY =
A
Y − 0.6.
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(vi) Adjust β accordingly.
Iterate on (i)-(vi) until ||KY −3|| ≤ . Please note that the capital output ratio and the time discount
factor β need to be adjusted in the solving algorithm, as one period in the model lasts for four
years (see C.9 for details).
C.2 Ability and Education
According to Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) (50) the fraction of non-college agents, Φn, is 0.54,
implying a fraction of college attendance of 46%. Also, they find a dropout rate of 50%.
Therefore, the fraction of dropouts equals the fraction of college graduates and is Φc = Φd =
0.46 · 0.50 = 0.23. We match Φn with the time cost parameter λ in (32), by performing the
following steps:
(i) Solve model given a guess for λ.
(ii) Compute Φn − 0.54.
(iii) Adjust λ accordingly.
Iterate on (i)-(iii) until ||Φn − 0.54|| ≤ . In the same way we use the curvature parameter µc in
the college completion probability (31) to hit the target of a 50% dropout rate:
(i) Solve model given a guess for µc.
(ii) Compute Φd1−Φn 0.5.
(iii) Adjust µc accordingly.
Iterate on (i)-(iii) until || Φd1−Φn − 0.5|| ≤ .
In order to match the ratio of non-tertiary to tertiary government education spending in the
US of E
e
Ec = 2.62, we use the investment level in non-tertiary education i¯
g. In the initial steady
state of our model, total expenditures on tertiary education are given by
Ec =
(
Φ j,c + φΦ j,d
)
κw0,cθ0, (98)
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whereas total expenditures on non-tertiary education are, using our simplifying assumption,
Ee =
ja−1∑
j=0
igj,tΦ j,0 = i¯
g
t
(
ζ
g
e,tΦ j,0 + ζ
g
e,tΦ j,1 + ζ
g
l,tΦ j,2 + ζ
g
l,tΦ j,3
)
= i¯gt Φ j,g
(
2ζge,t + 2(1 − ζge,t)
)
= 2i¯gt Φ j,g, (99)
with Φ j,0 = Φ j,1 = · · · = Φ j,g being the constant mass of all generations (we do not incor-
porate survival risk in the model). Now, given κ, θ0, φ and the endogenously determined ob-
jects Φc,Φd,w0,c,Φ j,0, we can simplify that to
2i¯gt Φ j,g
(Φc + φΦd) κw0,cθ0
= 2.62
⇔ i¯g∗ = 2.62
(
Φ j,c + φΦ j,d
)
κw0,cθ0
2Φ j,g
. (100)
So we search for the investment level i¯g∗ leading to E
e
Ec = 2.62 by performing the following steps:
(i) Solve model given a guess for i¯g.
(ii) Compute i¯g∗ − i¯g following (100).
(iii) Adjust i¯g accordingly.
Iterate on (i)-(iii) until ||i¯g∗ − i¯g|| ≤ .
C.3 Labor Productivity and Wages
Wages are given by wt,q j,qγη. In the benchmark model we assume the average college wage
premium to be 80%, which is in line with U.S. data. By normalizing non-graduate wages to
wt,n = wt,d = 1, the parameter that is left to match this wage premium wˆt,c is the average college
wage wt,c. We define wˆt,c as:
wˆt,c =
wt,c jr−1∑
j= jc
 j,c
∫
γiηiΦc
 j,n
∫
γiηiΦn +  j,d
∫
γiηiΦd
 Φn + ΦdΦc . (101)
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Summing up, the following steps are required:
(i) Solve model given a guess for wt,c.
(ii) Compute wˆt,c − 1.8.
(iii) Adjust wt,c accordingly.
Iterate on (i)-(iii) until ||wˆt,c − 1.8|| ≤ .
C.4 Government and Pension Budget
Given all policy instruments, i.e. college subsidies, early education subsidies and tax deduction,
labor taxes τ` have to clear the government budget in accordance to our assumptions b = t−er−gy =
0.6 and GY = 0.17. In addition, given social payroll taxes τss, the pension budget has to be
cleared by ρss.
Government Budget
The budget constraint of the government is composed of interest payments BtRt, expenditures
Et, tax income Tt and end of period debt Bt+1:
Bt+1 = BtRt + Et − Tt.
The government’s expenditures (Et) consist of exogenous government consumption G and en-
dogenous educational expenditures:
Et = G + edu.exp.
The latter are the sum of college subsidies and early education subsidies:
edu.expt = (Φc + φΦd) κwt,c(θt + θpr) +
3∑
j=0
igj,tΦ j,t. (102)
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The government receives taxes from τc, τ` and τk:
Tt = τcCt +
∑
j
Nt, j
∫
Tt(yt)dΦt, j + τkrtAt. (103)
In the steady state government debt relative to GDP is assumed to be constant at 0.6:
Bt+1 = BtRt + Et − Tt
⇔ Bt+1
Yt+1
Yt+1
Yt
= b(1 + r) + (e − t) |Bt+1
Yt+1
Yt+1
Yt
= b(1 + gy)
⇔ b(r − gy) = t − e
⇔ b = t − e
r − gy = 0.6, (104)
with t−er−gy =
t−e
r as g
y = 0 in our model. Exogenous government consumption relative to GDP
is assumed to be gy = GY = 0.17. In order for (104) to hold, labor taxes τ` have to balance Tt,
edu.expt and Yt such that:
B
Y
r = t − e = Tt − (edu.expt + Gt)
Y
=
Tt − edu.expt
Y
− G
Y
⇔ Tt − edu.expt
Y
=
B
Y
r +
G
Y
⇔ T ∗t =
(B
Y
r +
G
Y
)
Y + edu.expt (105)
Pension System
Pensions of an agent with qualification q and productivity type γ are given by:
pt, j = ρssγwt,q.
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The pension system is financed by a fixed pension contribution rate τss, implying that the pen-
sion market equilibrium condition reads as:
τss
∑
q
wt,qLt,q =
J∑
j= jr
Nt, j
∫
pt, j(γ, q)dΦt, j
= ρss
J∑
j= jr
Nt, j
∫
γwt,qdΦt, j. (106)
Clearing Budgets
Taking care of a the tax progressivity, while clearing both government budget and pension sys-
tem requires and interplay of tax dt, τ` and ρss. They are solved jointly in the following way:
Overall taxes Tt are given by (103) and we define tax level T ∗t =
(
B
Y r +
G
Y
)
Y + edu.expt as
the one satisfying (105). Labor taxes
∑
j Nt, j
∫
Tt(yt)dΦt, j can be defined as τ`Ydt , where Y
d
t is
aggregate income exceeding tax exemption limit dt, implying Ydt =
∑
j Nt, j
∫
Tt(yt)dΦt, j
τ`
. Using that
within (103) and rewriting it leaves us with:
τ∗` =
T ∗t − τcCt − τkrtKt
Ydt
=
(
B
Y r +
G
Y
)
Y + edu.expt − τcCt − τkrtAt∑
j Nt, j
∫
Tt(yt)dΦt, j
. (107)
Further, using (107) and defining the following function enables us to solve for τ∗` via both fix
point and root-finding algorithms:
f1(τ`) = τ∗` − τ` = 0. (108)
Regarding pensions, we solve the model given a guess for ρss and observe both overall
social security contributions τss
∑
q wt,qLt,q and pensions distributed ρss
∑J
j= jr Nt, j
∫
γwt,qdΦt, j.
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We define:
ρ∗ss =
τss
∑
q wt,qLt,q∑J
j= jr Nt, j
∫
γwt,qdΦt, j
and in the spirit of (108):
f2(ρss) = ρ∗ss − ρss = 0. (109)
The tax free amount Z is set by the government and - in steady state - supposed to be in
line with average income following Z = d YtNt . Again, we solve the model under Z, compute
Z∗(Z) = d YtNt and define
f3(z) = Z∗ − Z = 0 (110)
in order to solve for the tax free amount in the steady state. Once we solve f = [ f1, f2, f3] = 0
jointly, governmental and pension budget are cleared and we have found Ψ∗ = [τ∗` , ρ
∗, z∗].
C.5 GE Interpretation of PE Model
While we develop the solution in partial equilibrium, we have an underlying general equilibrium
interpretation. Aggregate labor is given by:
Lt =
(
(Lt,n + Lt,d)ρ + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
=
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
, (111)
Aggregate production is given by a nested CES-Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = F(Kt, Lt) = Kαt (Υ1Lt)
1−α = Kαt
[
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]1−α
. (112)
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We can develop prices from profit maximization:
Πt = Kαt
[
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]1−α
− rK − wt,ndLt,nd − wt,cLt,c + λ (Kt+1 − δKt . . . )
∂Πt
∂K
= αKα−1t
[
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]1−α
− r − δ = 0 (113)
∂Πt
∂Lt,nd
= Kαt (1 − α)Υ1−α1
[(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]−α [(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1−ρ
ρ
]
Lρ−1t,nd − wt,nd = 0 (114)
∂Πt
∂Lt,nd
= Kαt (1 − α)Υ1−α1
[(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]−α [(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1−ρ
ρ
]
Υ2L
ρ−1
t,c − wt,c = 0. (115)
From (113) we get:
r = αKα−1t
[
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]1−α
− δ, (116)
which we can further reduce to:
r = α
 Kt
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ

α−1
− δ
r = αkα−1t − δ ⇔ kt =
(
α
r + δ
) 1
1−α
(117)
with k = K
Υ1L
. Please note, that this could also be rearranged to
r = αKα−1t
[
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]1−α
− δ
r = αK−1t K
α
t
[
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]1−α
− δ
r = α
Yt
Kt
− δ. (118)
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Rearranging (114) leads to:
wt,nd = Kαt (1 − α)Υ1−α1
[(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
]−α [(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1−ρ
ρ
]
Lρ−1t,nd
wt,nd = (1 − α)kαt
[
Υ1
(
Lρt,nd + Υ2L
ρ
t,c
) 1−ρ
ρ
]
Lρ−1t,nd (119)
wt,nd = (1 − α)kαt Υ1
(
Lt
Lt,nd
)1−ρ
(120)
and, accordingly:
wt,c = (1 − α)kαt Υ1Υ2
(
Lt
Lt,c
)1−ρ
, (121)
as well as:
wt,c
wt,nd
= Υ2
(
Lt,nd
Lt,c
)1−ρ
. (122)
C.6 Calibration in Partial Equilibrium
In the partial equilibrium variant of our model, the interest rate is set to r = 0.04. As can be
verified by equation (118) this is consistent with a general equilibrium model with a capital
output ratio of KY = 3, a depreciation rate of capital of δ = 0.07 and a capital elasticity of
production of α = 0.33.
We normalize wt,nd = 1, whereas wt,c is a result from hitting the average college wage pre-
mium. Rewriting (120) using (117) we observe that the normalization of wt,nd = 1 is equivalent
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to a normalization of the technology parameter Υ1:
Υ1 =
wt,nd
(1 − α)k
−α
t
(
Lt,nd
Lt
)1−ρ
=
wt,nd
(1 − α)
((
α
r + δ
)1−α)−α (Lt,nd
Lt
)1−ρ
=
wt,nd
(1 − α)
(r + δ
α
) α
1−α
(
Lt,nd
Lt
)1−ρ
=
1
(1 − α)
(r + δ
α
) α
1−α
(
Lt,nd
Lt
)1−ρ
. (123)
Also, from (122) we see that targeting the college wage premium wt,c/wt,nd = wt,c is equiva-
lent to a normalization of Υ2:
wt,c
wt,nd
= wt,c = Υ2
(
Lt,nd
Lt,c
)1−ρ
(124)
⇔ Υ2 = wt,c
(
Lt,c
Lt,nd
)1−ρ
. (125)
We can use Υ2 to compute Υ1 and finally receive K from (117):
Kt =
(
α
r + δ
) 1
1−α
Υ1Lt, (126)
as well as Yt from (112) and the resulting capital output ratio KtYt .
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C.7 Prices in General Equilibrium and Small Open Economy
In general equilibrium the three factor prices of production - college and non-college wages
as well as the interest rate - have to be in line with the first order conditions of production
(113)-(115). We solve for these prices as follows:
1. Guess prices r˜, w˜nd and w˜c.
2. Solve the household given guessed prices and compute aggregate assets A˜t(r˜, w˜nd, w˜c) as well
as aggregate labor types L˜t,nd(r˜, w˜nd, w˜c) and L˜t,c(r˜, w˜nd, w˜c).
3. Solve the firm’s problem:
(i) Compute aggregate labor from (111):
L˜t(r˜, w˜nd, w˜c) =
(
L˜ρt,nd + Υ2L˜
ρ
t,c
) 1
ρ
,
with production parameters Υ1 and Υ2 from the calibrated benchmark model.
(ii) Compute the implied capital stock via (126):
K˜t(r˜, w˜nd, w˜c) =
(
α
r˜ + δ
) 1
1−α
Υ1L˜t.
(iii) Use K˜t and L˜t to compute Y˜t(K˜t, L˜t) via (112).
(iv) Compute government debt B given government debt to GDP ratio of 0.6, i.e. B˜ = 0.6Y˜t.
(v) Use the marketing clearing condition of the capital market A = K + B to update the
capital stock K = A˜ − B˜.
(vi) Use the updated capital stock K as well as L˜t, L˜t,nd and L˜t,c in order to compute prices
r,wnd and wc via the firm’s first order conditions (116), (120) and (121).
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4. If distances between all guessed and model prices are small enough, i.e.
‖r − r˜‖ ≤ ,
‖wnd − w˜nd‖ ≤ ,
‖wc − w˜c‖ ≤ ,
then STOP.
Else update prices accordingly and start over with STEP 2.
Small Open Economy In a small open economy variant of the model, the procedure is the
same until step (v). Instead, implied of computing the capital stock from marketing clearing,
the implied capital stock from step (ii), K˜t, is used in order to compute prices wnd and wc via the
firm’s first order conditions. An equilibrium in the small open economy is established if both of
the following conditions hold:
‖wnd − w˜nd‖ ≤  and
‖wc − w˜c‖ ≤ .
C.8 Aggregation
The distribution of innate abilities of generation t does only depend on the distribution of innate
abilities within the respective cohort of parents, i.e. generation t − j f . Thus, the invariant
distribution Φ0(h0) can be computed by iterating on Φh,i+1 = Φh,iΠh(h0 | hp0) until Φh,i+1 = Φh,i,
where Πh(h0 | hp0) is the transition matrix of innate abilities following (29). However, we do not
know the households these are born in with respect to other states like assets, acquired human
capital level of the parents etc. Therefore, we neither know the development of abilities during
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childhood, nor the distribution of abilities and other state variables at age ja, the point in time
where a household makes her first economic decision.
But we do know that the distribution at the college decision has a counterpart, which it needs
to be consistent with, i.e. the distribution of this generation’s future children, themselves facing
the college decision, right after receiving vivos transfers from their parents. This sums up our
fixed point problem: we guess a distribution at age ja and iterate until the distribution of their
respective children at the same age (parents’ age j f + ja = jt) is consistent with the guess. We
operate in the following manner:
• Compute the invariant distribution of innate abilities Φ0(h0) by iterating on Φh,i+1 =
Φh,iΠh(h0 | hp0) until Φh,i+1 = Φh,i.
• Ages j0 to ja: Φ( j, A = 0, h0, h).
Children do not possess assets. In order to keep track of their abilities, we would have to
know who their parents are. This gap will be closed from the corresponding distributions
at age j + j f .
Begin fix point problem:
– College decision at age ja: Φ( ja, A = B/Rn, h0, h ja , η).
Given the distribution of innate abilities Φ0(h0), we assume a distribution Φi( ja, A, h0, h ja , η)
of innate abilities, assets, acquired human capital and idiosyncratic shocks. Given (i)
this distribution, (ii) college decision probabilities, (iii) college completion shocks
and (vi) conditional probabilities of productivity shocks, we can compute Φ( ja, A =
B/Rn, h0, h, q∈{c,d}, η) and Φ( ja, A = B/Rn, h0, n, γ∈{γh,γl}, η) respectively.
– College period at age ja:
Moving to the next period is achieved by applying policy functions:
1. College households: look-up A′( j, A, h0, h, q∈{c,d}, η) and compute:
Φ( j, A, h0, h, q∈{c,d}, η)→ Φ′( j + 1, A′, h0, q, γ, η′)88
88Please note that college graduates and dropouts draw γ in period ja + 1.
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2. Non-college households: look-up A′( j, a, h0, n, γ∈{γh,γl}, η) and compute:
Φ( j, A, h0, n, γ∈{γh,γl}, η)→ Φ′( j + 1, A′, h0, n, γ, η′).
– Working without children at ages ja + 1 to j f − 1: Φ( j, A, h0, q, γ, η).
Moving from one period to another is achieved by:
Look-up A′( j, A, h0, q, γ, η)
Compute Φ( j, A, h0, γ, η)→ Φ′( j + 1, A′, h0, q, γ, η′)
– Preparing for parenthood at age j f − 1: States in Φ( j f − 1, A, h0, q, γ, η) become
Φ( j f , A, q, γ, η, hc0, h
c
j), as kids are joining the household.
Map parents’ into the innate ability of the child via Πh(hc0 | h0)
Look-up A′( j, A, h0, q, γ, η)
Compute Φ( j, A, h0, q, γ, η)→ Φ′( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′, hc0, hc) with hc0 = hc.
– Working as parents at ages j f to jt − 1: Φ( j f , A, q, γ, η, hc0, hcj).
In addition to assets, human capital of children changes following the investment
decision:
Look-up ip( j, A, q, γ, η, hc0, h
c
j) in order to compute h
′(h, h0, ip)
Look-up A′( j, A, q, γ, η, hc0, h
c
j)
Update Φ( j, A, γ, η, hc0, h
c)→ Φ′( j′, A′, γ, η, hc0, hc
′
)
– Vivos transfer period at age jt: Φ( jt, A, q, γ, η, hc0, h
c
ja
).
Look-up B( j, A, q, γ, η, hc0, h
c
ja
)
Update Φ( j, A = B/Rn, h0, h ja)
After applying the idiosyncratic shock, we receive Φ( j, A = B/Rn, h0, h ja , η) which
is the object we need to match with the one we assumed at age ja:
* If
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φ( j, A = B/Rn, h0, h ja , η) − Φi( j, A = B/Rn, h0, h ja , η)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ : Stop.
* Else set Φi+1( j, A = B/Rn, h0, h ja , η) = Φ( j, A = B/Rn, h0, h ja , η) and start with
next iteration.
End fix point problem.
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• Working as parents of adults at ages jt + 1 to jr − 1: Φ = ( j, A, q, γ, η).
Look-up A′( j, A, q, γ, η)
Compute Φ = ( j, A, q, γ, η)→ Φ′ = ( j + 1, A′, q, γ, η′)
• Retirement at ages jr to jJ − 1: Φ = ( j, A, q, γ).
Look-up A′( j, A, q, γ)
Compute Φ = ( j, A, q, γ)→ Φ′ = ( j + 1, A′, h0, q, γ).
Lastly, the distribution of kids at ages j0 to ja, Φ( j, A = 0, h0, h), can be extracted from the
distribution of parents at ages j f to jt.
We calibrate the model in order to match targets, which are partly connected to the distri-
butions computed in the aggregation. On the one hand there is targets directly linked to the
distribution, e.g. the fraction of non-college agents and college dropouts. On the other hand
there is targets that are linked indirectly to the outcome of the aggregation, such as the ratio of
non-tertiary to tertiary government education spending E
e
Ec . Therefore, the aggregation is nested
in the outer loop of the calibration.
C.9 Transformation in 4-Year Model
Because in our model one period stands in for four years, we need to adjust some parameters
for the solution algorithm. A summary can be found in 19.
Starting with the household side, β in the model expresses the discount factor for four years
and therefore calculates with βˆ = β4. The value for the interest rate in a 1-period model was
developed in Section C.1. In the 4-period world, capital is a stock and contributes over the
whole period for output Y , which is accumulated over time. Therefore, the capital output ratio
needs to be adjusted to KˆY =
K/Y
4 =
3
4 and the marginal product of capital is transformed to
ˆmpk = α · YˆK = 13 · 43 = 0.44. In the same way as the time discount factor, the adjusted interest
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rate is denoted by rˆ = (1+r)4 = 0.1699, which is also used to compute the matching depreciation
rate, i.e. δˆ = ˆmpk − rˆ = 0.27014.
The capital market is cleared when AY =
K
Y +
B
Y and, given our assumptions
B
Y = 0.6 and
K
Y = 3, this is the case when
A
Y =
K
Y +
B
Y = 3 + 0.6 = 3.6. Transforming this condition the the
4-period model - again distinguishing between accumulated and stock values - the equilibrium
is established when AˆY =
Kˆ
Y +
Bˆ
Y = 0.9.
Parameter Source 1-Period 4-Period
Time Discount Calibration β = 0.96 βˆ = β4 = 0.83
Capital Output Ratio Assumption KY = 3
Kˆ
Y =
K/Y
4 =
3
4
MP Capital mpk = α · YK mpk = 13 · 13 = 0.11 ˆmpk = α · YˆK = 13 · 43 = 0.44
Interest Rate Assumption r = 0.04 rˆ = (1 + r)4 = 0.1699
Depreciation δ = mpk − r δ = 0.07 δˆ = ˆmpk − rˆ = 0.27014
Gov. Debt to GDP Assumption BY = 0.6
Bˆ
Y =
B/Y
4 = 0.15
Capital Market Equilibrium AY =
K
Y +
B
Y = 3.6
Aˆ
Y =
Kˆ
Y +
Bˆ
Y = 0.9
Gov. Cons. / GDP Assumption GY = 0.17
G
Y = 0.17 (unchanged)
Tax Free Amount Z = d¯ YN Z = d¯
Y
N = d¯Y Z = d¯Y (unchanged)
Gov. Budget Equilibrium Tt−edu.exptY =
B
Y r +
G
Y
Tt−edu.expt
Y =
Bˆ
Y rˆ +
G
Y
Table 19: Transformation Production in 4-Period Model
One last parameter that needs to be adjusted is Υ1 = 11−α
(
r+δ
α
) α
1−α ( Lt,nd
Lt
)1−ρ
. It is com-
puted by plugging in the adjusted values for both gross interest and depreciation rate: Υ1 =
1
1−α
(
rˆ+δˆ
α
) α
1−α ( Lt,nd
Lt
)1−ρ
.
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D Appendix to Chapter 5
This chapter provides supplementary material for Section 5. Table 20 provides detailed results
of the partial equilibrium experiment of college subsidies and Table 21 its counterpart for in-
vestments in non-tertiary education. In Section D.1 the computation of the inequality measures
is shown.
D.1 Inequality Measures
To evaluate the results in terms of their distribution, we use two inequality measures. Wage
income is received by agents at ages ja, . . . , jr − 1 and we define Jw = ( jr − 1)− ja + 1 = jr − ja
as the number of working periods. Agents live for J periods and we normalized the mass across
all generations living at a given period to one. Thus, each cohort is of mass 1J and the working
population of mass mw = JwJ . We apply the two measures for:
(i) Wage income
(ii) Capital income
(iii) Overall income (i) + (ii).
Theil Index
Mass population m = 1. Mass working population mw = JwJ . Given mean µ =
1
mw
∫ mw
0
yidΦw, the
Theil Index is given as:
T =
∫ mw
0
yi
µ
ln
(
yi
µ
)
dΦw =
1
µ
∫ mw
0
yi (ln (yi) − ln (µ)) dΦw
=
1
µ
∫ mw
0
yi ln (yi) dΦw − 1
µ
∫ mw
0
yi ln (µ) dΦw =
1
µ
∫ mw
0
yi ln (yi) dΦw − ln (µ)
µ
∫ mw
0
yidΦw
=
1
µ
∫ mw
0
yi ln (yi) dΦw − ln (µ)
µ
mwµ =
1
µ
∫ mw
0
yi ln (yi) dΦw − ln (µ) mw.
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College Subsidy 0.0000 0.388* 0.8750 1.7500 2.6250 3.5000
Social Welfare -0.9345 -0.9499 -0.9076 -0.8437 -0.8536 -0.8859
Labor Tax 0.2245 0.2584 0.2642 0.2966 0.3509 0.4160
Education
Aver. Human Capital 0.3764 0.3899 0.4037 0.4083 0.3997 0.3964
Fraction Non-College 0.8097 0.5591 0.4125 0.2879 0.1152 0.0077
Fraction Graduates 0.1070 0.2205 0.2880 0.3202 0.3361 0.3352
Fraction Dropouts 0.0832 0.2205 0.2995 0.3919 0.5488 0.6571
Dropout Rate 0.4375 0.5000 0.5098 0.5503 0.6202 0.6622
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035 0.0037 0.0035 0.0033
Aggr. Vivos Transfers 0.0042 0.0047 0.0051 0.0048 0.0039 0.0028
Production
Aggr. Labor 0.7731 0.8767 0.9005 0.8807 0.8507 0.8061
Aggr. Output 0.3994 0.4530 0.4653 0.4550 0.4396 0.4165
Av. College Wage Premium 1.8311 1.7974 1.8560 1.8356 1.8441 1.8403
Av-Wage Non-College 1.0334 1.0079 0.9482 0.9320 0.9033 0.9053
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.1423 1.1121 1.1317 1.0980 1.0484 1.0257
Av-Wage Graduates 1.9109 1.8646 1.9032 1.8865 1.8871 1.8851
Income and Wealth
Aver. Assets Non-College 0.3878 0.3740 0.3715 0.3721 0.3649 0.5030
Aver. Assets Dropouts 0.3692 0.3536 0.3794 0.3714 0.3478 0.3430
Aver. Assets Graduates 0.5626 0.5455 0.5912 0.5570 0.5201 0.4973
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Non-College 1.2049 1.1647 1.0973 1.0622 1.0066 0.8949
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Dropouts 1.3402 1.2958 1.3011 1.2346 1.1448 1.0701
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Graduates 2.1417 2.0709 2.0860 2.0181 1.9683 1.8964
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 0.8167 0.7684 0.7165 0.6771 0.6161 0.5263
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 0.9182 0.8628 0.8646 0.7991 0.7086 0.6289
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 1.5894 1.4951 1.5013 1.4158 1.3195 1.2001
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CN 0.9367 0.9061 0.9887 0.9559 0.9618 1.0015
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CD 0.8015 0.7750 0.7850 0.7835 0.8236 0.8263
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN 0.7727 0.7267 0.7847 0.7387 0.7034 0.6739
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CD 0.6712 0.6322 0.6367 0.6167 0.6110 0.5712
Consumption
Aggr. Cons 0.4127 0.4223 0.4403 0.4343 0.4111 0.3793
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3800 0.3574 0.3387 0.3227 0.2939 0.2899
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.4106 0.3860 0.3923 0.3720 0.3356 0.3040
Aver. Cons College 0.6616 0.6230 0.6356 0.6109 0.5746 0.5289
Inequality
Theil Index Consumption 0.1126 0.1188 0.1226 0.1187 0.1169 0.1146
Theil Index Leisure 0.0029 0.0032 0.0033 0.0050 0.0058 0.0071
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.3746 0.3800 0.3881 0.3940 0.3971 0.3953
Theil Index Overall Net Income 0.2765 0.2844 0.2914 0.2961 0.3004 0.2990
Var LN Consumption 0.3145 0.3290 0.3384 0.3328 0.3319 0.3271
Var LN Leisure 0.0113 0.0121 0.0128 0.0182 0.0217 0.0270
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.3498 1.3318 1.3437 1.3557 2.0875 2.1505
Var LN Overall Income 0.8248 0.8327 0.8447 0.8609 1.6055 1.6850
Table 20: Full Results Partial Equilibrium Experiment Subsidies
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. “Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN” is difference
between average net wage income of graduates and non-college households (“CD” college vs. dropouts). Beside
factor prices wq, average wages (“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
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Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0170 0.049* 0.0978 0.1786 0.2594 0.3401
Social Welfare -1.0646 -0.9499 -0.9000 -0.8347 -0.8020 -0.8231
Labor Tax 0.2187 0.2584 0.2815 0.2946 0.3081 0.3390
Education
Aver. Human Capital 0.1701 0.3899 0.5107 0.6720 0.8027 0.8744
Fraction Non-College 0.8122 0.5591 0.3920 0.2328 0.1404 0.0901
Fraction Graduates 0.1112 0.2205 0.3188 0.4494 0.5392 0.5844
Fraction Dropouts 0.0767 0.2205 0.2892 0.3178 0.3204 0.3255
Dropout Rate 0.4081 0.5000 0.4756 0.4142 0.3727 0.3577
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0014 0.0030 0.0019 0.0008 0.0004 0.0001
Aggr. Vivos Transfers 0.0126 0.0047 0.0032 0.0022 0.0010 0.0000
Production
Aggr. Labor 0.7615 0.8767 0.9187 0.9254 0.9052 0.8861
Aggr. Output 0.3935 0.4530 0.4747 0.4781 0.4677 0.4579
Av. College Wage Premium 2.1867 1.7974 1.7399 1.7337 1.7076 1.6699
Av-Wage Non-College 0.8607 1.0079 1.0538 1.0617 1.0888 1.1779
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.1552 1.1121 1.1224 1.1485 1.1648 1.1688
Av-Wage Graduates 1.9376 1.8646 1.8841 1.9276 1.9494 1.9550
Income and Wealth
Aver. Assets Non-College 0.3645 0.3740 0.3804 0.3880 0.3812 0.3577
Aver. Assets Dropouts 0.3757 0.3536 0.3497 0.3573 0.3558 0.3366
Aver. Assets Graduates 0.6173 0.5455 0.5284 0.5257 0.5165 0.4848
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Non-College 1.0169 1.1647 1.2014 1.1995 1.2257 1.3188
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Dropouts 1.3589 1.2958 1.2983 1.3172 1.3289 1.3258
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Graduates 2.1781 2.0709 2.0783 2.1107 2.1241 2.1209
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 0.6757 0.7684 0.7830 0.7748 0.7850 0.8275
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 0.9372 0.8628 0.8501 0.8553 0.8546 0.8313
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 1.6256 1.4951 1.4740 1.4821 1.4753 1.4349
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CN 1.1612 0.9061 0.8769 0.9112 0.8984 0.8021
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CD 0.8192 0.7750 0.7800 0.7935 0.7952 0.7951
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN 0.9500 0.7267 0.6910 0.7074 0.6903 0.6074
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CD 0.6885 0.6322 0.6240 0.6268 0.6207 0.6036
Consumption
Aggr. Cons 0.3738 0.4223 0.4467 0.4822 0.5026 0.4948
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3280 0.3574 0.3623 0.3608 0.3618 0.3680
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.4183 0.3860 0.3792 0.3821 0.3806 0.3655
Aver. Cons College 0.6778 0.6230 0.6118 0.6159 0.6119 0.5864
Inequality
Theil Index Consumption 0.1338 0.1188 0.1137 0.1090 0.1029 0.0977
Theil Index Leisure 0.0044 0.0032 0.0029 0.0027 0.0023 0.0020
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.3992 0.3800 0.3730 0.3671 0.3576 0.3459
Theil Index Overall Net Income 0.3028 0.2844 0.2786 0.2732 0.2653 0.2574
Var LN Consumption 0.3516 0.3290 0.3160 0.3032 0.2850 0.2679
Var LN Leisure 0.0166 0.0121 0.0111 0.0104 0.0093 0.0082
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.2898 1.3318 1.3175 1.3047 1.2761 1.2232
Var LN Overall Income 0.8294 0.8327 0.8201 0.8071 0.7851 0.7575
Table 21: Full Results Partial Equilibrium Experiment Non-Tertiary Investments
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. “Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN” is difference
between average net wage income of graduates and non-college households (“CD” college vs. dropouts). Beside
factor prices wq, average wages (“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
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Variance in Log Earnings
Accordingly, log-mean is µln = 1mw
∫ mw
0
ln (yi) dΦw. In addition, we define
E
(
(ln y)2
)
=
1
mw
∫ mw
0
(ln (yi))2 dΦw.
Using
var(X) = E (X − E (X)) = E
(
X2
)
− E (X)2 ,
we can express the variance of log earnings as:
var(ln y) = E
(
(ln y)2
)
− µ2ln.
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E Appendix to Chapter 6
This chapter provides supplementary material for Section 6. Table 22 shows detailed results
of the small open economy experiment of college subsidies and Table 23 for investments in
non-tertiary education.
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College Subsidy 0.0000 0.388* 0.8750 1.7500 2.6250 3.5000
Social Welfare -1.0732 -0.9509 -0.8930 -0.8371 -0.8384 -0.8479
Labor Tax 0.2523 0.2584 0.2651 0.2970 0.3396 0.3840
Education
Aver. Human Capital 0.4008 0.3899 0.3840 0.3747 0.3729 0.3710
Fraction Non-College 0.7186 0.5591 0.4930 0.3453 0.2003 0.1177
Fraction Graduates 0.1581 0.2205 0.2469 0.2888 0.2988 0.3162
Fraction Dropouts 0.1233 0.2205 0.2601 0.3660 0.5010 0.5661
Dropout Rate 0.4381 0.5000 0.5130 0.5590 0.6264 0.6416
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0038 0.0030 0.0028 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024
Aggr. Vivos Transfers 0.0050 0.0047 0.0047 0.0043 0.0034 0.0028
Production
Aggr. Labor 0.8340 0.8767 0.8834 0.8755 0.8529 0.8298
Aggr. Output 0.4309 0.4530 0.4565 0.4523 0.4407 0.4287
Av. College Wage Premium 2.4850 1.7974 1.6594 1.4606 1.4184 1.3564
Av-Wage Non-College 0.9255 1.0079 1.0178 1.0233 1.0855 1.0175
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.0700 1.1121 1.1662 1.1921 1.1367 1.1637
Av-Wage Graduates 2.3524 1.8646 1.7740 1.6216 1.5916 1.5444
Income and Wealth
Aver. Assets Non-College 0.3459 0.3740 0.3788 0.3768 0.3738 0.3370
Aver. Assets Dropouts 0.3186 0.3536 0.3894 0.3917 0.3665 0.3622
Aver. Assets Graduates 0.6689 0.5455 0.5490 0.4780 0.4549 0.4371
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Non-College 1.5151 1.1647 1.1695 1.1573 1.2050 1.1236
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Dropouts 1.7735 1.2958 1.3335 1.3282 1.2394 1.2341
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Graduates 3.7617 2.0709 1.9527 1.7543 1.6831 1.5890
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 1.0492 0.7684 0.7714 0.7498 0.7605 0.6853
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 1.2397 0.8628 0.8908 0.8715 0.7857 0.7576
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 2.8293 1.4951 1.3935 1.2087 1.1176 1.0122
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CN 2.2466 0.9061 0.7832 0.5970 0.4782 0.4655
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CD 1.9882 0.7750 0.6192 0.4261 0.4437 0.3549
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN 1.7802 0.7267 0.6222 0.4588 0.3571 0.3269
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CD 1.5897 0.6322 0.5028 0.3372 0.3320 0.2547
Consumption
Aggr. Cons 0.4052 0.4223 0.4295 0.4212 0.4031 0.3836
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3316 0.3574 0.3594 0.3490 0.3468 0.3068
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.3682 0.3860 0.4040 0.4007 0.3663 0.3536
Aver. Cons College 0.7688 0.6230 0.5965 0.5335 0.5026 0.4657
Inequality
Theil Index Consumption 0.1478 0.1188 0.1122 0.1024 0.0992 0.0962
Theil Index Leisure 0.0036 0.0032 0.0031 0.0040 0.0047 0.0054
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.4219 0.3800 0.3720 0.3642 0.3633 0.3589
Theil Index Overall Income 0.3233 0.2844 0.2766 0.2695 0.2698 0.2671
Var LN Consumption 0.3762 0.3290 0.3148 0.2931 0.2876 0.2811
Var LN Leisure 0.0135 0.0121 0.0119 0.0150 0.0176 0.0205
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.4009 1.3318 1.3098 1.2757 1.7640 1.7492
Var LN Overall Income 0.8912 0.8327 0.8151 0.7975 1.2712 1.2819
Table 22: Full Results Small Open Economy Experiment Subsidies
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. “Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN” is difference
between average net wage income of graduates and non-college households (“CD” college vs. dropouts). Beside
factor prices wq, average wages (“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
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Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0131 0.049* 0.1051 0.2013 0.2972 0.3914
Social Welfare -1.2314 -0.9499 -0.8923 -0.9050 -0.9797 -1.1379
Labor Tax 0.2333 0.2588 0.2912 0.3541 0.4234 0.5018
Education
Aver. Human Capital 0.1922 0.3899 0.4898 0.6513 0.7946 0.8724
Fraction Non-College 0.7809 0.5591 0.5206 0.5350 0.5589 0.5723
Fraction Graduates 0.1310 0.2205 0.2506 0.2714 0.2793 0.2812
Fraction Dropouts 0.0880 0.2205 0.2288 0.1936 0.1617 0.1466
Dropout Rate 0.4019 0.5000 0.4773 0.4163 0.3667 0.3427
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0024 0.0030 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Aggr. Vivos Transfers 0.0165 0.0047 0.0027 0.0013 0.0005 0.0000
Production
Aggr. Labor 0.7808 0.8767 0.8917 0.8935 0.8866 0.8715
Aggr. Output 0.4034 0.4530 0.4607 0.4617 0.4581 0.4503
Av. College Wage Premium 3.2578 1.7974 1.5094 1.3260 1.2288 1.1860
Av-Wage Non-College 0.7512 1.0079 1.1321 1.2370 1.3072 1.3439
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.0198 1.1121 1.1533 1.1879 1.1997 1.2037
Av-Wage Graduates 2.5359 1.8646 1.7185 1.6229 1.5767 1.5599
Income and Wealth
Aver. Assets Non-College 0.3587 0.3740 0.3852 0.3705 0.3344 0.2795
Aver. Assets Dropouts 0.3245 0.3536 0.3549 0.3307 0.2886 0.2352
Aver. Assets Graduates 0.8300 0.5455 0.4718 0.3925 0.3240 0.2560
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Non-College 0.9015 1.1647 1.2797 1.3666 0.8334 1.4236
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Dropouts 1.2197 1.2958 1.3250 1.3421 0.7939 1.3110
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Graduates 2.8043 2.0709 1.9066 1.7911 0.9921 1.6805
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 0.5761 0.7684 0.8363 0.8556 0.4590 0.7796
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 0.8121 0.8628 0.8665 0.8380 0.4348 0.7200
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 2.1271 1.4951 1.3293 1.1788 0.6003 0.9695
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CN 1.9028 0.9061 0.6269 0.4245 0.1587 0.2569
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CD 1.5846 0.7750 0.5816 0.4490 0.1982 0.3696
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN 1.5510 0.7267 0.4931 0.3232 0.1413 0.1898
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CD 1.3150 0.6322 0.4628 0.3408 0.1655 0.2495
Consumption
Aggr. Cons 0.3675 0.4223 0.4259 0.4043 0.3705 0.3252
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.2875 0.3574 0.3809 0.3783 0.3562 0.3166
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.3625 0.3860 0.3856 0.3645 0.3305 0.2882
Aver. Cons College 0.8474 0.6230 0.5562 0.4839 0.4224 0.3621
Inequality
Theil Index Consumption 0.1868 0.1188 0.1018 0.0895 0.0808 0.0752
Theil Index Leisure 0.0061 0.0032 0.0026 0.0023 0.0021 0.0020
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.4845 0.3800 0.3539 0.3296 0.3088 0.2879
Theil Index Overall Income 0.3787 0.2844 0.2614 0.2425 0.2286 0.2171
Var LN Consumption 0.4371 0.3290 0.2888 0.2551 0.2290 0.2104
Var LN Leisure 0.0222 0.0121 0.0103 0.0093 0.0085 0.0081
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.4130 1.3318 1.2730 1.1877 1.0959 0.9883
Var LN Overall Income 0.9316 0.8327 0.7846 0.7347 0.6900 0.6456
Table 23: Full Results Small Open Economy Experiment Non-Tertiary Investments
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. “Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN” is difference
between average net wage income of graduates and non-college households (“CD” college vs. dropouts). Beside
factor prices wq, average wages (“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
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Government
College Subsidy 0.0000 0.3880 0.8750 1.7500 2.6250 3.5000
Social Welfare -1.0601 -0.9509 -0.8935 -0.8362 -0.8401 -0.8475
Labor Tax 0.2528 0.2584 0.2689 0.2983 0.3396 0.3833
Education
Aver. Human Capital 0.4019 0.3899 0.3849 0.3749 0.3725 0.3708
Fraction Non-College 0.7159 0.5591 0.4933 0.3454 0.2019 0.1180
Fraction Graduates 0.1596 0.2205 0.2469 0.2887 0.2981 0.3160
Fraction Dropouts 0.1246 0.2205 0.2599 0.3659 0.5000 0.5660
Dropout Rate 0.4384 0.5000 0.5128 0.5590 0.6265 0.6417
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0038 0.0030 0.0028 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024
Aggr. Vivo Transfers 0.0049 0.0047 0.0045 0.0042 0.0035 0.0028
Production
Aggr. Capital 0.3284 0.3397 0.3507 0.3431 0.3295 0.3206
Aggr. Labor 0.8354 0.8767 0.8833 0.8755 0.8527 0.8299
Aggr. Output 0.4337 0.4530 0.4601 0.4540 0.4401 0.4284
Av. College Wage Premium 2.4566 1.7974 1.6522 1.4548 1.4162 1.3529
Av-Wage Non-College 0.9348 1.0079 1.0271 1.0290 1.0850 1.0178
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.0798 1.1121 1.1753 1.1977 1.1351 1.1637
Av-Wage Graduates 2.3492 1.8646 1.7814 1.6232 1.5871 1.5403
Gross Interest Rate 0.1657 0.1699 0.1627 0.1666 0.1707 0.1707
Income and Wealth
Aver. Assets Non-College 0.3464 0.3740 0.3755 0.3763 0.3736 0.3374
Aver. Assets Dropouts 0.3188 0.3536 0.3843 0.3899 0.3664 0.3628
Aver. Assets Graduates 0.6620 0.5455 0.5422 0.4753 0.4541 0.4369
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Non-College 1.1033 1.1647 1.1780 1.1624 1.2047 1.1241
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Dropouts 1.2801 1.2958 1.3425 1.3337 1.2379 1.2343
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Graduates 2.5956 2.0709 1.9592 1.7556 1.6788 1.5854
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 0.7196 0.7684 0.7762 0.7532 0.7602 0.6860
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 0.8478 0.8628 0.8954 0.8749 0.7845 0.7581
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 1.9229 1.4951 1.3947 1.2084 1.1143 1.0101
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CN 1.4923 0.9061 0.7811 0.5931 0.4741 0.4612
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CD 1.3155 0.7750 0.6166 0.4218 0.4409 0.3511
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN 1.2034 0.7267 0.6186 0.4552 0.3541 0.3242
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CD 1.0752 0.6322 0.4993 0.3335 0.3298 0.2520
Consumption
Aggr. Cons 0.4072 0.4223 0.4283 0.4210 0.4025 0.3838
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3336 0.3574 0.3589 0.3494 0.3468 0.3073
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.3705 0.3860 0.4029 0.4008 0.3660 0.3542
Aver. Cons College 0.7661 0.6230 0.5935 0.5321 0.5015 0.4653
Inequality
Theil Index Consumption 0.1475 0.1188 0.1136 0.1030 0.0990 0.0958
Theil Index Leisure 0.0036 0.0032 0.0032 0.0040 0.0046 0.0054
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.4198 0.3800 0.3710 0.3636 0.3630 0.3586
Theil Index Overall Income 0.3237 0.2844 0.2797 0.2708 0.2692 0.2664
Var LN Consumption 0.3775 0.3290 0.3195 0.2950 0.2868 0.2801
Var LN Leisure 0.0135 0.0121 0.0121 0.0151 0.0175 0.0205
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.3964 1.3318 1.3048 1.2718 1.7640 1.7484
Var LN Overall Income 0.8977 0.8327 0.8287 0.8032 1.2700 1.2800
Table 24: Full Results General Equilibrium Experiment Subsidies
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. “Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN.” is difference
between average net wage income of graduates and non-college households (“CD” college vs. dropouts). Beside
factor prices wq, average wages (“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
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Government
Ivst. Level Non-Tert. Edu. 0.0134 0.0491 0.1061 0.2068 0.3141 0.4290
Social Welfare -1.0862 -0.9499 -0.9055 -0.9278 -1.0529 -1.3207
Labor Tax 0.2472 0.2588 0.2897 0.3486 0.4228 0.5168
Education
Aver. Human Capital 0.2319 0.3899 0.4871 0.6507 0.7946 0.8724
Fraction Non-College 0.7404 0.5591 0.5239 0.5407 0.5698 0.5876
Fraction Graduates 0.1588 0.2205 0.2487 0.2680 0.2730 0.2730
Fraction Dropouts 0.1008 0.2205 0.2274 0.1913 0.1572 0.1394
Dropout Rate 0.3881 0.5000 0.4777 0.4165 0.3654 0.3380
Aggr. HC Investments 0.0045 0.0030 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Aggr. Vivo Transfers 0.0137 0.0047 0.0027 0.0014 0.0005 0.0000
Production
Aggr. Capital 0.4034 0.3397 0.3338 0.3144 0.2806 0.2352
Aggr. Labor 0.7997 0.8767 0.8904 0.8903 0.8768 0.8473
Aggr. Output 0.4507 0.4530 0.4551 0.4461 0.4253 0.3921
Av. College Wage Premium 2.7615 1.7974 1.5174 1.3332 1.2441 1.2102
Av-Wage Non-College 0.8624 1.0079 1.1146 1.1958 1.2164 1.1953
Av-Wage Dropouts 1.1766 1.1121 1.1360 1.1457 1.1129 1.0707
Av-Wage Graduates 2.4855 1.8646 1.7011 1.5768 1.4855 1.4176
Gross Interest Rate 0.0986 0.1699 0.1797 0.1981 0.2301 0.2801
Income and Wealth
Aggr. Assets Non-College 0.3301 0.2091 0.2021 0.2078 0.2053 0.1894
Aggr. Assets Dropouts 0.0319 0.0780 0.0812 0.0655 0.0478 0.0359
Aggr. Assets Graduates 0.1106 0.1203 0.1180 0.1073 0.0908 0.0720
Aver. Assets Non-College 0.4458 0.3740 0.3858 0.3843 0.3604 0.3223
Aver. Assets Dropouts 0.3170 0.3536 0.3571 0.3425 0.3040 0.2573
Aver. Assets Graduates 0.6960 0.5455 0.4744 0.4002 0.3324 0.2637
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Non-College 0.9818 1.1647 1.2631 1.3251 1.2739 1.2510
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Dropouts 1.3711 1.2958 1.3078 1.2993 1.3066 1.1638
Aver. Grs. Lab-Inc Graduates 2.7332 2.0709 1.8900 1.7465 1.6241 1.5343
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Non-College 0.6430 0.7684 0.8241 0.8289 0.7362 0.6650
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Dropouts 0.9272 0.8628 0.8540 0.8103 0.7679 0.6199
Aver. Net Lab-Inc Graduates 2.0460 1.4951 1.3175 1.1507 0.9963 0.8633
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CN 1.7514 0.9061 0.6269 0.4215 0.3503 0.2833
Diff. Av. Gross Wage Inc. CD 1.3621 0.7750 0.5822 0.4472 0.3176 0.3705
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN 1.4030 0.7267 0.4935 0.3218 0.2601 0.1984
Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CD 1.1188 0.6322 0.4636 0.3404 0.2284 0.2435
Consumption
Aggr. Cons 0.3986 0.4223 0.4235 0.4028 0.3632 0.3104
Aver. Cons Non-College 0.3156 0.3574 0.3786 0.3774 0.3499 0.3037
Aver. Cons Dropouts 0.3920 0.3860 0.3834 0.3628 0.3229 0.2741
Aver. Cons College 0.7894 0.6230 0.5549 0.4826 0.4142 0.3433
Inequality
Theil Index Consumption 0.1824 0.1188 0.0999 0.0828 0.0676 0.0529
Theil Index Leisure 0.0088 0.0032 0.0025 0.0021 0.0019 0.0019
Theil Index Net Wage Income 0.4648 0.3800 0.3543 0.3306 0.3092 0.2863
Theil Index Overall Income 0.3935 0.2844 0.2566 0.2284 0.1995 0.1667
Var LN Consumption 0.4737 0.3290 0.2826 0.2345 0.1889 0.1441
Var LN Leisure 0.0311 0.0121 0.0100 0.0085 0.0076 0.0075
Var LN Net Wage Income 1.4007 1.3318 1.2752 1.1962 1.1018 0.9824
Var LN Overall Income 1.0699 0.8327 0.7647 0.6785 0.5779 0.4618
Table 25: Full Results General Equilibrium Experiment Non-Tertiary Investments
Note: * benchmark model. Bold letters policy with highest welfare. “Diff. Av. Net Wage Inc. CN.” is difference
between average net wage income of graduates and non-college households (“CD” college vs. dropouts). Beside
factor prices wq, average wages (“Av-Wage”) take the productivity types γ of households into account.
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(a) College Enrollment (b) Dropout Rate
(c) College Graduates (d) Labor Taxe Rate
Figure 25: Results Bivariate Experiment (SOE)
Please note that due to convergence issues and time restrictions with respect to high performance computing
resources, for three edge cases displayed in these figures, we had to approximate the results by extrapolation.
However, given these points are not in the neighborhood of the best policy mix, that does not change the results
(for the sake of completeness, these edge cases are: min. investments and min. subsidies, min. investments and
max subsidies, max. investments and max subsidies).
Figure 26: Experiment College Subsidy General Equilibrium (*Benchmark Model)
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